APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Humphre Ford, of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and two counts of simple possession of marijuana. Due to his extensive criminal history, the trial court imposed a within-range consecutive sentence of twelve years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a handgun convictions and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Christopher Clifton, was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Subsequently, Defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault as a Range I standard offender. The State recommended and the trial court imposed a four-year sentence at thirty percent with the ability to apply for probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on his assertion that the plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an extraordinary appeal, filed pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, seeking review of the Trial Court’s ex parte injunction temporarily changing custody of the parties’ six-year-old child (“Child”), born out-of-wedlock, pending the final adjudication of the Petition for Custody and Injunction (“Petition” or “Petition for Custody”) filed by the Petitioner, Randall V. Harness, Jr. (“Father”), in which he seeks to legitimate and obtain custody of Child. We conclude that an extraordinary appeal is warranted, that both the ex parte injunction changing custody and the Trial Court’s subsequent order continuing that injunction should be vacated, and that custody of Child be restored to the Respondent, Tamara Reece Milton (“Mother”), pending further action by the Trial Court.

The defendant, Elton Keith McCommon, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, one count of evading arrest, one count of driving under the influence, and one count of driving with a suspended or revoked license. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, evading arrest, and driving with a suspended or revoked license. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender and imposed an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for reckless endangerment and evading arrest. The defendant also challenges the trial court’s evidentiary ruling regarding items found during a search incident to his arrest. Finally, the defendant disputes his status as a career offender. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner sought post-conviction relief alleging that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness prevented him from seeking a direct appeal.  The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, finding that Petitioner failed to show he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s actions.  We determine that the record does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court.  Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Leroy Langley, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court found that it was without jurisdiction to hear the petition because the Petitioner filed the writ in the incorrect county. Although we hold that the habeas corpus court had jurisdiction, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This appeal involves review of prison disciplinary proceedings. The prisoner pled guilty to the possession of contraband and waived his right to a formal disciplinary hearing. He later attempted to appeal his conviction and have it set aside. The chancery court affirmed the conviction by the prison disciplinary board. We affirm.

After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), acting on behalf of the Tennessee Board of Cosmetology, revoked a cosmetologist’s license based upon evidence that he had assisted in the procurement of reciprocity licenses in exchange for cash.  The ALJ also assessed civil penalties against the cosmetologist in the amount of $20,000.  The cosmetologist filed a request for judicial review, and the chancery court affirmed the decision of the ALJ.  We have concluded that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial and material evidence and that none of the grounds raised by the cosmetologist justify reversal under the deferential standard of review described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h).

The State appeals the trial court’s granting the petitioner, Deangelo Moody, post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder after finding that the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel.  After review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s grant of relief and reinstate the judgment against the petitioner.

The petitioner, Rodney Watkins, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2009 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of 25 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff Laura Lee Demastus brought this action against her former employer, University Health System, Inc., doing business as the University of Tennessee Medical Center (Employer). After Plaintiff had worked roughly three years as a nurse at the UT Medical Center, Employer suspected that she was illegally diverting medications. When Plaintiff’s supervisors confronted her with evidence of several suspicious transactions recorded by the medication monitoring systems, Plaintiff denied doing anything wrong or improper. She, however, could not explain the suspicious transactions. She was terminated shortly thereafter. Plaintiff brought this action under the Tennessee Disabilities Act (TDA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103 et seq. (2016), alleging that she was fired solely because Employer perceived her to have the disability of drug addiction. Employer argued that it did not fire her because she was considered a drug addict, but because it thought she was stealing medications. Following discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment, holding that under the undisputed material facts, Plaintiff could not establish that Employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination. We affirm

The defendant, Tavis Bowers, was convicted by a Madison County jury of two counts of assault by offensive or provocative touching, a Class B misdemeanor, and one count of resisting arrest, also a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent six-month sentences for the assault convictions, to be served consecutively to a six-month sentence for the resisting arrest conviction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court committed plain error by not instructing the jury on self-defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Khaleefa Lambert (“the Petitioner”) was found guilty of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping by a Montgomery County jury, for which the Petitioner received a sentence of life plus eighteen years.  This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, and our supreme court denied further review.  The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) investigate evidence and case law that would have contradicted the State’s argument of premeditation; (2) discuss jury selection with the Petitioner; and (3) discuss the decision to testify with the Petitioner.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

The defendant, Allan Wayne Bradberry, was convicted of twenty-five counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1005, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-532, one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1003,one count of rape,Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503,and three counts of incest, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court failed to require the State to elect the offenses upon which it sought to convict the defendant.  The defendant also argues the trial court’s imposition of partial consecutive sentencing resulted in an excessive, eighty-four-year sentence.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Willie C. Cole, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, challenging various aspects of trial counsel’s representation as ineffective, among other things.  After appointment of counsel and a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, Henry Thomas Johnson, of premeditated first degree murder and aggravated burglary.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  State v. Henry T. Johnson, No. M2010-02452-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1071809, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 28, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 16, 2012).  The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he contended that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his contention, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective because his trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine multiple witnesses.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In 2014, the Petitioner, Gene E. Nevils a/k/a Gene E. Edwards, pleaded guilty to sale of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine and was sentenced to twelve years of incarceration.  In 2015, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had not entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  The post-conviction court held a hearing on the petition and denied relief.  We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is the third appeal in a post-divorce case. It arises from Husband’s petition to modify the requirement that he pay private school tuition for his children’s elementary and secondary education, and Wife’s petition to calculate Husband’s income tax rate in order to determine the net amount to be paid to Wife out of Husband’s deferred compensation for 2011, 2012, and 2013. Husband contends the trial court erred by holding that his obligation to pay private school tuition was not modifiable because it was a contractual obligation. He also contends the trial court incorrectly calculated the tax rates and erred by refusing to allow him to introduce expert proof of the proper method for this calculation. We have determined the trial court erred in ruling that Husband’s obligation to pay private school tuition for elementary and secondary education was not modifiable. Therefore, we reverse and remand this issue with instructions for the trial court to determine whether a material change of circumstances has been established and, if so, whether to modify Husband’s obligation to pay private elementary and secondary school tuition for the children. With regard to the tax rates for 2011, 2012, and 2013, Husband failed to introduce evidence at the hearing that pertained to the proper method to be used to determine the tax rates. After the court rendered its ruling, Husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.02 motion seeking permission to present expert proof on the tax rate issue in order to alter or amend the ruling. We find no error with the decision to not consider Husband’s belated expert proof or the decision to deny the motion to alter or amend. We also affirm the trial court’s calculation of the tax rates and Wife’s share of Husband’s deferred compensation for the years in question. As for Wife’s challenge to the trial court’s decision to impute income to her for the purpose of calculating child support and refusing to consider work-related care expenses she might incur, we affirm these decisions.

The Petitioner, Kevin Lee Johnson, entered a guilty plea on April 17, 2013, for failure to appear, a Class E felony. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition challenging his conviction for failure to appear and also challenging a 2012 conviction for operating a vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”). The post-conviction court dismissed both claims. On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal of the part of the petition related to the 2012 conviction but reversed and remanded for a hearing on the part of the petition related to the conviction for failure to appear. See Kevin Lee Johnson v. State (Kevin Lee Johnson I), No. M2014-01166-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL 2445817, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2015) no perm. app. filed. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the allegation that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea to the charge of failure to appear, and the post-conviction court denied the petition, finding neither deficiency nor prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves a father’s petition to modify an order granting custody of his minor child to the maternal grandparents. The father alternatively requested an order granting him specific visitation. The juvenile court dismissed the petition on the grandparents’ motion. After our review of the petition, we conclude the juvenile court appropriately dismissed father’s request for a change of custody based solely upon the presumption of superior parental rights. But the court erred in dismissing the father’s request for visitation. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

This case involves alleged trespass via placement of a dock over lakefront real property that is beneath the lake’s fluctuating water line several months of the year. Prior to congressional approval of construction for Douglas Dam in 1942, the property at issue was part of a 488-acre farm owned by the plaintiff’s mother. In 1942, the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) acquired a flowage easement with the right to flood up to contour line 1007 adjacent to what is now Douglas Lake. TVA subsequently paid $35,628.50 to the plaintiff’s mother to condemn the respective easement rights. In 1944, a third party purchased approximately 245 acres above contour line 1002, creating a subdivision in the 1950s with tracts of land adjacent to the lake. In 2006, the plaintiff learned that she had inherited from her mother title to real property below contour line 1002, located between “lakefront” tracts of land and the lake itself. Upon receipt of a November 2006 letter sent by the plaintiff’s counsel to affected landowners, notifying them of the plaintiff’s claim to the land upon or above which their docks were located, many of the landowners purportedly purchased title to the affected land from the plaintiff. However, the defendant landowner did not respond to the letter. On October 3, 2012, the plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that the defendant was trespassing by virtue of a dock placed on property to which the plaintiff held title. The defendant had placed her dock immediately following the purchase of her tract in November 1992. The trial court subsequently consolidated this action with two similar lawsuits filed by the plaintiff against other landowners. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint against this defendant upon finding that the defendant had established adverse possession of the property on which the defendant’s dock sits when water levels are down and that the defendant’s possession was continuous even when the dock was floating. The plaintiff timely appealed. Although we determine that the trial court erred in concluding that the defendant had established adverse possession for the twenty-year period required by common law, we further determine this error to be harmless because the defendant successfully established the seven-year period required for the statutory affirmative defense provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-2-103. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, DeMarkus Montreal Taylor, appeals as of right from his conviction of first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate aggravated child abuse, two counts aggravated child abuse, and one count of filing a false report.  SeeTenn. Code Ann.  §§ 39-13-202(a)(2); -15-402; -16-502.  On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, arguing that the evidence presented to the jury was predominately circumstantial and that there was no direct proof that the Defendant committed the offenses for which he was charged; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted autopsy photographs of the victim, specifically photographs of the victim’s brain and eyes; (3) that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion for a new trial after counsel for the co-defendant attempted to introduce testimony regarding the Defendant’s prior drug sales; and (4) that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s autopsy report, which contained un-redacted information regarding prior physical abuse.  Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for first degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and false reporting.

Judicial review of a decision of the Tennessee Board of Appeals upholding the termination of a trooper with the Tennessee Highway Patrol for his conduct during a traffic pursuit. The trial court upheld the trooper’s termination. On appeal, the trooper asserts that the administrative judge who heard the case erred in disregarding expert testimony and, as a consequence, the Board’s decision is unsupported by substantial and material evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Decedent had a life insurance policy in which she named her husband and sister as beneficiaries. Upon her death, Decedent’s husband filed suit to recover the proceeds Decedent left to her sister and place them in trust for the benefit of Decedent’s son, who was a minor at the time. The trial court concluded the son was entitled to the proceeds based on the theory of promissory estoppel. The sister appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. An insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the insurance company, and Decedent was entitled to designate whoever she desired as a beneficiary of her policy. Evidence of Decedent’s intent with respect to the proceeds does not deprive the named beneficiary of her right to the funds.

Three corporations approached a lender seeking to refinance an existing loan secured by a deed of trust on certain commercial properties. The parties entered an agreement specifying that the lender’s security interest would be a “first lien deed of trust” and requiring the borrowers to pay a nonrefundable “commitment fee.” The borrowers executed the agreement and paid the commitment fee, but the loan did not close due to the discovery of a prior lien on one of the properties. The borrowers filed suit against the lender for damages arising out of the lender’s refusal to lend or to refund the commitment fee. The trial court granted the lender’s motion for summary judgment but denied the lender’s request for attorneys’ fees. Discerning no error, we affirm.