APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 2009, the Petitioner, Robert Kizer, pleaded guilty to sale of cocaine and was sentenced to twelve years of incarceration, with all but ninety days to be served on Community Corrections.  In 2010, a Community Corrections violation warrant was issued, prompting the Petitioner to file a motion for post-conviction relief alleging that his sentence was incorrect and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  In 2012, a second violation warrant was issued, and, in 2013, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s Community Corrections sentence and dismissed his post-conviction petition.  Later in 2013, the Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief.  The post-conviction court held a hearing in 2015 following which it denied the petition.  On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea hearing because his attorney lacked “legal authority” to represent him and because his attorney had a conflict of interest.  After review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

We granted the State’s appeal primarily to determine whether the intermediate appellate court erred in finding the search warrant affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause, and in doing so, to revisit the continuing vitality of State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989). In Jacumin, this Court refused to follow Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant, and instead embraced, as a matter of Tennessee constitutional law, another test derived from two earlier United States Supreme Court decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). For the reasons explained herein, we overrule Jacumin and adopt the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant under article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Applying this standard, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision holding the search warrant invalid. We also reverse the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to possess over 300 pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver and conspiracy to commit money laundering and reinstate the trial court’s judgment approving the jury’s verdict. Finally, we affirm, on separate grounds, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision upholding the trial court’s judgment ordering forfeiture of the $1,098,050 cash seized when the search warrant was executed.

Helkie Nathan Carter (“the Defendant”) was indicted for the following counts: (1) driving under the influence (“DUI”)—third offense; (2) driving with a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of .08 or more (“DUI per se”)—third offense; (3) violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender statute; and (4) driving on a revoked license.  The Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a mandatory blood draw was granted by the trial court.  The State sought and was granted permission to appeal, arguing that the Defendant gave both actual and implied consent to the blood draw and that, if the good-faith exception is adopted in Tennessee, it should apply to this case.  Upon review, we concluded that the Defendant’s actual consent was not freely and voluntarily given; that Tennessee’s implied consent law did not, by itself, operate as an exception to the warrant requirement; and that the Tennessee Supreme Court had yet to recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and it was not the role of this court to do so.  State v. Helkie Nathan Carter, No. M2015-00280-CCA-R9-CD, 2016 WL 3044216, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 20, 2016).  Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court’s granting of the Defendant’s motion to suppress.  Id.  On March 8, 2017, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s recent opinion in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016).  Upon reconsideration in light of Reynolds, we conclude that the good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applies in this case and that suppression of evidence derived from the testing of the Defendant’s blood was not required.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court suppressing the results of the warrantless blood draw is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

At issue in this appeal is the liability of a general contractor and two flooring subcontractors for damages sustained by the plaintiffs when a fire destroyed their partially completed house. The plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of the general contractor and the subcontractors caused the fire and that the general contractor had breached the construction contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the general contractor, holding that the plaintiffs could not rely on res ipsa loquitur to establish an inference of negligence; granted summary judgment to the subcontractors based on the plaintiffs’ failure to prove that any negligence of the subcontractors caused the fire; and granted summary judgment to the general contractor based on evidence that the plaintiffs were the first party to materially breach the construction contract. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed summary judgment to the general contractor based on the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur; and reversed summary judgment to the subcontractors on the negligence claim and to the general contractor on the breach of contract claim, finding genuine issues of disputed material fact. We hold that the plaintiffs cannot rely on res ipsa loquitur because they did not produce sufficient evidence that the general contractor was in exclusive control of the specific cause or all reasonably probable causes of the fire. We further hold that the plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that any negligence of the subcontractors was the cause in fact of the fire. For these reasons, the general contractor and flooring subcontractors are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims based on negligence and breach of contract. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 

The Defendant-Appellant, George P. Watkins, III, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell (Count 1), one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver (Count 2), one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 3), and two counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 4 and 5). See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), -425, -1324(a). The trial court, after merging Count 2 with Count 1 and Count 5 with Count 4, sentenced Watkins to two years at thirty percent for the possession of marijuana with intent to sell conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, and three years at one hundred percent for the firearm conviction. The court then ordered the sentences for the marijuana and drug paraphernalia convictions served concurrently and ordered the sentence for the firearm conviction served consecutively to the other sentences in accordance with Code section 39-17-1324(e), for an effective sentence of five years. On appeal, Watkins argues that (1) the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the mental states of “knowingly” and “recklessly” for the offenses of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his firearm convictions. Because the erroneous jury instruction for the firearm offenses constitutes plain error, we reverse and vacate the judgments in Counts 4 and 5 and remand the case for a new trial on these counts. We also remand the case for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 1 and 2.

I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court committed plain error by including “that the defendant acted either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” in its jury instruction for possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony (hereinafter “the possession offense”). After a review of the entire record and applicable law, I do not agree that “a clear and unequivocal rule of law [was] breached” or that “consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice.” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint as untimely, in part, due to its determination that the general savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105, did not apply. We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the State, seeking full funding for English language learner teachers and translators in accord with the ratios found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-3-307(a)(7). The trial court denied the writ of mandamus. We affirm.

The petitioner, Marcus L. Branner, appeals the summary dismissal of his 2013 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2001 convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendants, Janet Michelle Stanfield, Tony Alan Winsett, and Justin Bradley Stanfield, were indicted by the Obion County Grand Jury for various drug and firearm offenses following a warrantless search of their house. The Defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence seized, and the trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The State appeals, asserting that the warrantless search was valid and the evidence was admissible. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In connection with a conservatorship proceeding brought by appellant, the trial court found, inter alia, that Appellant lacked standing to challenge the transfer of his mother’s home to his brother, the appellee. Appellant appealed. Because Appellant failed to properly raise the issue of his standing and failed to submit a proper request for attorney’s fees in the proceedings below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The plaintiff in this case, Benjamin Buffington (“Mr. Buffington”), is a former member of Legacy & Exit Planning, LLC (“Legacy”). Mr. Buffington sued the Appellants on the basis that they had not made certain required contractual payments incident to his departure from Legacy. In response, the Appellants asserted various counterclaims predicated upon Mr. Buffington’s acquisition of a company that had been a former client of a company affiliated with Legacy. The trial court dismissed the Appellants’ counterclaims upon Mr. Buffington’s motion for partial summary judgment, and following a trial, it held that the Appellants were jointly and severally liable for the outstanding payments owed to Mr. Buffington. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In this domestic relations action, the parties divorced following a twenty-six-year marriage. The trial court valued the parties’ marital assets, including the husband’s medical practice, and fashioned an equal distribution. In addition, the court awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $5,000 per month as well as alimony in solido in the amount of $4,500 per month for ten years. The court further ordered the husband to maintain his $1,000,000 life insurance policy in effect to secure the wife’s spousal support awards. The husband has appealed. We modify the trial court’s judgment to provide for a lien on a portion of the husband’s assets sufficient to secure his alimony in solido obligation in the amount of $540,000, and accordingly reduce his court-ordered obligation with regard to maintenance of a life insurance policy in the amount of $1,000,000 to the amount of $500,000. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. We deny the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

The defendant, Nicole Irizzary, pled nolo contendere to voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of second degree murder (Count 1), possession of a Schedule II Drug (Count 2), and child abuse and neglect as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse (Count 3).  The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent, four-year sentences for Counts 1 and 2, to run consecutively to a four-year sentence for Count 3.  The trial court denied the defendant’s request for alternative sentencing and ordered the effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for alternative sentencing and committed plain error by improperly relying on the defendant’s silence at the sentencing hearing.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A prison inmate appeals the trial court’s decision to appoint a limited conservator for healthcare decisions over the inmate and give the conservator the authority to consent to the forcible treatment on behalf of the inmate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case primarily concerns the interpretation of a legal separation agreement that was approved by the trial court as part of a decree of legal separation. After the husband failed to pay child and spousal support, the wife filed a petition for contempt and modification. The husband responded by, among other things, requesting a divorce. The trial court granted the parties a divorce, reformed the provisions of the legal separation agreement, awarded a judgment for child and spousal support arrearages, and held the husband in criminal contempt. On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the legal separation agreement; in awarding the wife a judgment for child and spousal support arrearages; in granting his request for a divorce; and in holding him in criminal contempt. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Charles E. Wagner, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2011 convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, aggravated assault, assault, aggravated criminal trespass, and false imprisonment and his effective nineteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves a military service member’s claim against the Tennessee National Guard pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., and Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-208. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Harold Bernard Schaffer, appeals from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the postconviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal turns on whether the State of Tennessee waived sovereign immunity with regard to a past event. Because in this instance I conclude that it did not, I respectfully dissent.

This is a post-divorce matter in which Ms. Parsons filed a petition for civil and criminal contempt against her former husband, Mr. Parsons. Ms. Parsons argues that Mr. Parsons unilaterally modified the terms of their divorce by failing to compensate her for what she alleges to be a vested interest in his federal retirement benefits. At the conclusion of Ms. Parsons’ direct examination, Mr. Parsons moved for dismissal on the ground that Ms. Parsons did not elect whether she was seeking civil or criminal contempt at the outset of the proceedings. The trial court dismissed Ms. Parsons’ petition for contempt, finding that she did not prove contempt by clear and convincing evidence. Because the trial court used the wrong legal standard and did not allow Ms. Parsons to complete her proof, we vacate and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his suit for lack of prosecution, asserting that the trial court failed to rule on several dispositive motions. Upon a review of the record, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand the case for a hearing on the pending motions.

The Defendant, Jamie Paul Click, was convicted of one count each of selling heroin within a drug-free school zone, delivering heroin within a drug-free school zone, and casually exchanging marijuana; and two counts each of delivering heroin and selling heroin. The trial court merged the three delivery convictions with the corresponding sale convictions and imposed an effective sentence of eighty years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises challenges to the following: (1) the trial court’s refusal to sever the offenses, contending that each drug deal should have been tried separately because his conduct was not part of a common scheme or plan and, additionally, that evidence of the drug-free school zone deal was prejudicial to the other counts; (2) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence supporting his various convictions for sale and delivery of heroin, arguing that all of the transactions were merely casual exchanges and that there was inadequate proof that the one transaction occurred within a drug-free school zone; and (3) various aspects of the trial court’s sentencing decision, including the Defendant’s range classification, the length of his sentences, the imposition of consecutive sentences, and the subsequent denial of his motion to reduce his total effective sentence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Paul William Purvis, entered a best interest guilty plea to theft of property valued over $10,000, a Class C felony. The guilty plea was entered several years after the State had filed a notice that it intended to seek enhanced punishment. The State's notice listed twelve prior convictions and stated that it would seek to sentence the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. The parties did not negotiate a sentence as part of the plea agreement but left determination of the sentence up to the court. At the sentencing hearing, the State sought to have the Defendant sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years' imprisonment as a Range III, persistent offender, and the Defendant appeals, asserting that he is entitled to be sentenced as a Range II offender due to the State's inadequate notice. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the State's notice was ambiguous. However, because the Defendant has not shown that he investigated the ambiguity and has not shown prejudice from the ambiguous notice, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Van Trent, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury of five counts of facilitation of dogfighting. The Appellant received concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, sixty days of which was to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, the trial court's instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses over the Appellant's objection, the denial of the Appellant's right to counsel, the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the causation of scarring to the dogs, the introduction of the Appellant's appearance bond as rebuttal proof, and the trial court's denial of full probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.