APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, George P. Watkins, III, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell (Count 1), one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver (Count 2), one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 3), and two counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 4 and 5). See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), -425, -1324(a). The trial court, after merging Count 2 with Count 1 and Count 5 with Count 4, sentenced Watkins to two years at thirty percent for the possession of marijuana with intent to sell conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, and three years at one hundred percent for the firearm conviction. The court then ordered the sentences for the marijuana and drug paraphernalia convictions served concurrently and ordered the sentence for the firearm conviction served consecutively to the other sentences in accordance with Code section 39-17-1324(e), for an effective sentence of five years. On appeal, Watkins argues that (1) the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the mental states of “knowingly” and “recklessly” for the offenses of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his firearm convictions. Because the erroneous jury instruction for the firearm offenses constitutes plain error, we reverse and vacate the judgments in Counts 4 and 5 and remand the case for a new trial on these counts. We also remand the case for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 1 and 2.

I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court committed plain error by including “that the defendant acted either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” in its jury instruction for possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony (hereinafter “the possession offense”). After a review of the entire record and applicable law, I do not agree that “a clear and unequivocal rule of law [was] breached” or that “consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice.” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Petitioner, L.B. Rittenberry, Jr., was convicted of second degree murder despite his claim of self-defense.  He appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by finding that he was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate the victim’s prior history of violence.  We affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

In 2009, the Petitioner, Robert Kizer, pleaded guilty to sale of cocaine and was sentenced to twelve years of incarceration, with all but ninety days to be served on Community Corrections.  In 2010, a Community Corrections violation warrant was issued, prompting the Petitioner to file a motion for post-conviction relief alleging that his sentence was incorrect and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  In 2012, a second violation warrant was issued, and, in 2013, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s Community Corrections sentence and dismissed his post-conviction petition.  Later in 2013, the Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief.  The post-conviction court held a hearing in 2015 following which it denied the petition.  On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea hearing because his attorney lacked “legal authority” to represent him and because his attorney had a conflict of interest.  After review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

We granted the State’s appeal primarily to determine whether the intermediate appellate court erred in finding the search warrant affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause, and in doing so, to revisit the continuing vitality of State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989). In Jacumin, this Court refused to follow Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant, and instead embraced, as a matter of Tennessee constitutional law, another test derived from two earlier United States Supreme Court decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). For the reasons explained herein, we overrule Jacumin and adopt the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant under article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Applying this standard, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision holding the search warrant invalid. We also reverse the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to possess over 300 pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver and conspiracy to commit money laundering and reinstate the trial court’s judgment approving the jury’s verdict. Finally, we affirm, on separate grounds, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision upholding the trial court’s judgment ordering forfeiture of the $1,098,050 cash seized when the search warrant was executed.

Helkie Nathan Carter (“the Defendant”) was indicted for the following counts: (1) driving under the influence (“DUI”)—third offense; (2) driving with a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of .08 or more (“DUI per se”)—third offense; (3) violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender statute; and (4) driving on a revoked license.  The Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a mandatory blood draw was granted by the trial court.  The State sought and was granted permission to appeal, arguing that the Defendant gave both actual and implied consent to the blood draw and that, if the good-faith exception is adopted in Tennessee, it should apply to this case.  Upon review, we concluded that the Defendant’s actual consent was not freely and voluntarily given; that Tennessee’s implied consent law did not, by itself, operate as an exception to the warrant requirement; and that the Tennessee Supreme Court had yet to recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and it was not the role of this court to do so.  State v. Helkie Nathan Carter, No. M2015-00280-CCA-R9-CD, 2016 WL 3044216, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 20, 2016).  Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court’s granting of the Defendant’s motion to suppress.  Id.  On March 8, 2017, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s recent opinion in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016).  Upon reconsideration in light of Reynolds, we conclude that the good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applies in this case and that suppression of evidence derived from the testing of the Defendant’s blood was not required.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court suppressing the results of the warrantless blood draw is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the State, seeking full funding for English language learner teachers and translators in accord with the ratios found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-3-307(a)(7). The trial court denied the writ of mandamus. We affirm.

The petitioner, Marcus L. Branner, appeals the summary dismissal of his 2013 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2001 convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint as untimely, in part, due to its determination that the general savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105, did not apply. We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

A prison inmate appeals the trial court’s decision to appoint a limited conservator for healthcare decisions over the inmate and give the conservator the authority to consent to the forcible treatment on behalf of the inmate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case primarily concerns the interpretation of a legal separation agreement that was approved by the trial court as part of a decree of legal separation. After the husband failed to pay child and spousal support, the wife filed a petition for contempt and modification. The husband responded by, among other things, requesting a divorce. The trial court granted the parties a divorce, reformed the provisions of the legal separation agreement, awarded a judgment for child and spousal support arrearages, and held the husband in criminal contempt. On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the legal separation agreement; in awarding the wife a judgment for child and spousal support arrearages; in granting his request for a divorce; and in holding him in criminal contempt. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Charles E. Wagner, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2011 convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, aggravated assault, assault, aggravated criminal trespass, and false imprisonment and his effective nineteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves a military service member’s claim against the Tennessee National Guard pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., and Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-208. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Harold Bernard Schaffer, appeals from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the postconviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal turns on whether the State of Tennessee waived sovereign immunity with regard to a past event. Because in this instance I conclude that it did not, I respectfully dissent.

The Defendants, Janet Michelle Stanfield, Tony Alan Winsett, and Justin Bradley Stanfield, were indicted by the Obion County Grand Jury for various drug and firearm offenses following a warrantless search of their house. The Defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence seized, and the trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The State appeals, asserting that the warrantless search was valid and the evidence was admissible. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In connection with a conservatorship proceeding brought by appellant, the trial court found, inter alia, that Appellant lacked standing to challenge the transfer of his mother’s home to his brother, the appellee. Appellant appealed. Because Appellant failed to properly raise the issue of his standing and failed to submit a proper request for attorney’s fees in the proceedings below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The plaintiff in this case, Benjamin Buffington (“Mr. Buffington”), is a former member of Legacy & Exit Planning, LLC (“Legacy”). Mr. Buffington sued the Appellants on the basis that they had not made certain required contractual payments incident to his departure from Legacy. In response, the Appellants asserted various counterclaims predicated upon Mr. Buffington’s acquisition of a company that had been a former client of a company affiliated with Legacy. The trial court dismissed the Appellants’ counterclaims upon Mr. Buffington’s motion for partial summary judgment, and following a trial, it held that the Appellants were jointly and severally liable for the outstanding payments owed to Mr. Buffington. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In this domestic relations action, the parties divorced following a twenty-six-year marriage. The trial court valued the parties’ marital assets, including the husband’s medical practice, and fashioned an equal distribution. In addition, the court awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $5,000 per month as well as alimony in solido in the amount of $4,500 per month for ten years. The court further ordered the husband to maintain his $1,000,000 life insurance policy in effect to secure the wife’s spousal support awards. The husband has appealed. We modify the trial court’s judgment to provide for a lien on a portion of the husband’s assets sufficient to secure his alimony in solido obligation in the amount of $540,000, and accordingly reduce his court-ordered obligation with regard to maintenance of a life insurance policy in the amount of $1,000,000 to the amount of $500,000. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. We deny the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

The defendant, Nicole Irizzary, pled nolo contendere to voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of second degree murder (Count 1), possession of a Schedule II Drug (Count 2), and child abuse and neglect as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse (Count 3).  The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent, four-year sentences for Counts 1 and 2, to run consecutively to a four-year sentence for Count 3.  The trial court denied the defendant’s request for alternative sentencing and ordered the effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for alternative sentencing and committed plain error by improperly relying on the defendant’s silence at the sentencing hearing.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Julian Agnew (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years and six months in the Department of Correction with release eligibility after service of eighty-five percent of the sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments and that the evidence at trial was insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the record and case law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Roosevelt Pitts III was convicted of robbery, three counts of reckless endangerment, leaving the scene of an accident, and vandalism.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective eighteen years in prison.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the State discriminated against prospective jurors by excusing them for race-based reasons and that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.  The State contends that the Defendant has waived these issues by providing this court with an insufficient record.  Because the record provided for review is insufficient to allow us to consider the issues raised, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a health care liability action wherein a trial by jury resulted in judgment for the defendants. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions in limine, which restricted plaintiffs’ ability to adequately cross-examine defendants’ expert witnesses regarding the “best possible care”; (2) the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions in limine, which restricted plaintiffs’ ability to present evidence relating to medical expenses; (3) the trial court failed to give a curative instruction after defendants’ opening statement; and (4) the weight of the evidence was against the jury verdict. The trial court denied the post-trial motion and affirmed the jury verdict as the thirteenth juror. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights and to adopt filed by the child’s grandparents. The trial court found that no ground for termination was proven by clear and convincing evidence and therefore denied the petition. The grandparents appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.      

Plaintiff was a partner of a physician practice and a limited partner in a real estate investment limited partnership. Continuing employment with the physician practice was a condition of remaining a limited partner. Following the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with the physician group, Plaintiff, the physician group, and the limited partnership entered into a Separation Agreement. The limited partnership agreed not to redeem Plaintiff’s interest in the limited partnership if he did not expand his practice outside Giles and Hickman Counties. Plaintiff began practicing outside these counties, and the limited partnership redeemed Plaintiff’s interest. Plaintiff objected and filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief. The trial court granted the limited partnership’s motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.