APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Aaron Malone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder. He asserts that the court erred in denying relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and his due process rights were violated by the State’s failing to preserve unedited footage from “The First 48” television show. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Mitchell Garner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and resulting twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a challenge to certain decisions made by the probate court pursuant to a petition to ratify the decisions of the estate’s executor. Although we affirm the probate court’s determination that a $250,000.00 debt once owed to the decedent is now extinguished and also affirm its determination that a certain annuity policy should be transferred to the estate, we reverse the probate court’s determination that insurance policies owned by the decedent at her death should be transferred to her grandchildren. Further, we reverse the trial court’s order to the extent that it directs two other annuity policies to be directed to the decedent’s grandchildren. These other two annuities are also assets of the estate that are subject to distribution in accordance with the decedent’s will.

The petitioner, Orlando Malone, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1999 Bradley County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed suit alleging discriminatory and harassing practices violative of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, holding that the defendants had negated essential elements of the plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow for additional discovery before ruling on the request for summary judgment. The plaintiff also argues that the trial court failed to address all her claims and that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment. Therefore, we affirm.

The defendant, Yelsin A. Cruz, appeals his Maury County Circuit Court jury conviction of rape of a child, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement to the police, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the 27-year sentence is excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the proper ownership of a piece of farm property in which the deed recites ownership as one-half to parents and one-fourth each to their two sons. The trial court eventually ruled that the property in dispute was solely owned by parents based on the complaining son’s nonpayment of taxes and awarded full ownership of the property to the parents under the theories of title by prescription and unjust enrichment. We reverse and remand.

The defendant, Marcus Boales, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 for failure to assert a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mary L. Vaughn, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged her 2014 Hawkins County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of second degree murder and aggravated child abuse, arguing that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were not knowingly or voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Willie Morgan, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to a term of eleven years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in excluding testimony about the victim’s compensation fund. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ronald Turner, appeals his convictions stemming from various drug and firearm offenses. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the criminal gang enhancement of some of his offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121(b) was unconstitutional in light of State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016). Upon review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. However, because Defendant is entitled to retroactive application of the holding in Bonds, we vacate the sentences of the underlying convictions to which the enhancement was applied and remand those convictions for resentencing. Additionally, we conclude that the trial court committed plain error by improperly applying the Drug-Free School Zone Act and remand for resentencing on this basis. We also remand for correction of clerical errors.

The defendant, Charles Macklin, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 for failure to assert a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Moriarco Montrell Lee, and his co-defendant, Dequevion Lamar Lee, were indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted first degree murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a judgment form as to count two reflecting that the Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction was merged with count one.

Paula Dugger (“Employee”), a home health nurse, was injured in a motor vehicle accident while returning to her home from an attempt to travel to a patient’s residence. Home Health Care of Middle Tennessee (“Employer”) denied her claim, contending that the injury did not occur in the course of her employment. Employee sought temporary benefits from the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (“trial court”). The trial court denied her petition, and that denial was affirmed by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. Upon remand to the trial court, Employer filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of compensability. The motion was supported by a set of agreed facts submitted by the parties. The trial court granted Employer’s motion and entered an order dismissing Employee’s claim. Employee appealed directly to the Supreme Court, as permitted by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-225(a)(1) (2014) and 50-6-239(c)(7) (2014). The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse and remand.

The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, wherein he challenged his conviction for aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-502; -14-103; -14-403. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call potential defense witnesses during trial and failing to adequately investigate the Petitioner’s mental health history. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After groping his twenty-five-year-old neighbor's crotch, eighty-two-year-old Walter Townsend, the Defendant, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court placed the Defendant on judicial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313, and deferred prosecution for a period of eighteen months of supervised probation. Significantly, the trial court did not require the Defendant to register as a sexual offender under the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004 (the “Act”), pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-39-201 to -218. In this State appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering the Defendant to register as a sexual offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The Petitioner, Casey J. Lawson, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000.  He timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief; following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel’s advice to plead guilty was deficient and because trial counsel failed to argue several pending motions before the Petitioner pled guilty.  He also argues that his pleas were unknowing and involuntary because the State coerced him into pleading guilty by moving to revoke his bail and because trial counsel moved to withdraw from the representation.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post-divorce case involving wife’s claims against husband for a portion of his military retirement benefits and husband’s claims against wife for retroactive child support. Wife initiated this action against husband claiming that, pursuant to the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, she was entitled to a percentage of the retirement benefits that husband was receiving from the military, as well as a judgment for a portion of the benefits that had already been paid to husband. Husband then filed a counter-petition against wife requesting that the court enter a judgment against her for back child support. The trial court held that the parties’ martial dissolution agreement did in fact entitle wife to a percentage of husband’s military retirement benefits going forward but that she failed to present the proof required for an award of the benefits husband received prior to trial. The trial court further found that wife owed husband child support and calculated the amount of child support wife owed by using the Child Support Guidelines that were in effect at the time wife’s child support obligation was incurred rather than those in effect at the time of trial. Wife appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the calculation of wife’s child support obligation and remand with instructions to re-calculate child support using the Child Support Guidelines in effect at the time of trial. We modify the order of the trial court to correct the percentage of the retirement benefits to which wife is entitled. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed. We decline husband’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.     

Freddy Mora (“Plaintiff”), pro se, appeals the February 4, 2016 judgment of the Chancery Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) in this suit alleging violations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-101, et seq., the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Plaintiff’s brief on appeal severely fails to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27. We, therefore, find that Plaintiff has waived his issues on appeal. David Vincent and Teresa Vincent (“Defendants”) raise an issue regarding the Trial Court’s award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees. We find and hold that while the award of attorney’s fees was proper, there is nothing in the record before us on appeal showing any evidence which the Trial Court could have relied upon in determining the amount of attorney’s fees. Nor is there anything in the record showing that the Trial Court considered the factors contained in Rule 8, RPC 1.5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court or the applicable case law in determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees. Given all this, we vacate the amount awarded in attorney’s fees and remand this case to the Trial Court for further proceedings to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to Plaintiff.

On August 2, 2012, an employee sustained a compensable injury when a co-worker ran over the back of his left foot with a forklift. The employee received temporary disability benefits and medical benefits from his employer. The employee’s treating physician assigned a 20% permanent anatomical impairment to his left leg as a result of the injury. The employer sought a second opinion, and after performing a medical records review, the employer’s physician opined that employee had sustained only 5% permanent impairment to his left leg due to the injury. Based on this second opinion, the employer requested an evaluation through the medical impairment registry (“MIR”) program. After examining the employee and reviewing his medical records, the MIR physician also opined that the employee had sustained 5% permanent impairment to his left leg. However, the trial court found the employee had rebutted by clear and convincing evidence the presumption of correctness statutorily attached to the MIR physician’s rating, applied a multiplier of four, and awarded the employee 80% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the left leg. The employer has appealed, contending the trial court erred in finding that the employee had rebutted the MIR physician’s impairment rating by clear and convincing evidence and in applying a multiplier of four. The employee, in contrast, contends that the trial court erred in considering the MIR physician’s opinion at all. This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse and modify the trial court’s judgment and remand to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this decision.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, (2) Mother’s mental incompetence prevented her from properly caring for the Child, and (3) the conditions which precipitated removal of the Child from Mother’s custody still persisted. The trial court then found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Dennis M. Dykes, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  After a review, we determine Petitioner waived his issues by failing to present them on direct appeal.  As a result, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Marilyn Miller Tansil (“Employee”) obtained temporary total disability benefits after injuring herself while mopping. Atkinson Enterprises, Inc. (“Employer”) acknowledged a compensable injury, but claimed Employee was not entitled to temporary benefits because she worked for her own company while unable to work for Employer. The trial court found Employee performed only token tasks at her company during her injury period, which did not constitute “work,” and thus, denied Employer’s requested credit against the permanent partial disability award. On appeal, Employer challenges the award of temporary total disability benefits as well as the multiplier used. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.