APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Michael John Stitts, was convicted by a Madison County jury of attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and he received an effective sentence of sixty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment to reflect the proper offense date; (4) he is entitled to reversal based on juror bias; (5) the trial court erred in placing the Defendant in restraints immediately before the jury verdict was read, and (6) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range III offender and in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect the proper sentencing range for the attempted first degree murder conviction.

The Defendant, William Lewis Reynolds, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he challenged his guilty-pled conviction for the sale of cocaine and resulting sentence of twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender, at 60%. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand the judgment to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the convicted offense of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because we find no evidence of any bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs accepted an offer of judgment from the defendant company, which included payment of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in an amount to be determined by the trial court. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to the plaintiffs in the amount of $56,423.24, expressly determining such amount to be reasonable. The defendant company has appealed. Inasmuch as the trial court failed to consider the factors listed in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 (“RPC 1.5”) when making its determination regarding a reasonable award of attorney’s fees, we vacate the trial court’s fee award and remand this matter for further proceedings concerning this issue. We accordingly decline to award fees to the plaintiffs on appeal.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey Scott, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his conviction for second degree murder and resulting twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner maintains that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Miguel Saenz, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis seeking relief from his previously entered guilty plea. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, and upon application of the ruling of our Supreme Court in Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016), we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals from the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court after the trial court, sua sponte, ordered Mother to undergo a mental examination pursuant to Rule 35.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court’s actions in this case do not create the appearance of bias, we affirm. 

The Defendant, James Larry Williams, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), reserving a certified question of law challenging whether there existed sufficient probable cause that a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-123(1) had occurred or reasonable suspicion based upon the totality of the circumstances to justify a traffic stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this parental termination case, maternal Grandparents sought termination of both Mother’s and Father’s rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support and (2) abandonment by willful failure to visit.  The trial court found no grounds for termination as to Mother and only one ground—failure to support—as to Father. The trial court however found that it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate Father’s rights.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. 

This action involves a claim for compensatory damages for personal injury caused by a police dog. The defendant sought summary judgment, arguing that the victim, an officer acting in the course and scope of his employment, was a participant in the act or conduct that prompted the need for the dog’s services, thereby removing liability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413(b)(1). The court agreed and granted summary judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Kedrick Carwell, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Within the context of his post-conviction claims, the petitioner attempts to challenge the jury instructions recited at trial, claiming the instructions led to a nonunanimous verdict. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition and conclude the petitioner has waived any challenge to the jury instructions or verdict.

After the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals granted a special exception permit for a nearby property, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Davidson County Circuit Court. The trial court ultimately concluded that the permit was properly issued. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rickey Williams, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his “Ex Parte Injunction and/or Show Cause Order.” On appeal, the petitioner contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion “because his conviction is voidable.” The State contends the petitioner’s appeal is not properly before this Court and, despite the lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of his claim. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the right of redemption after a tax sale. After the tax sale occurred, the original property owners purportedly conveyed their right of redemption to a third party through a contract of sale and quitclaim deed. The third party filed a motion to redeem the property. The trial court denied the motion to redeem, concluding that the third party did not meet the relevant statutory definition of a person entitled to redeem the property. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.

In 2003, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Claude Francis Garrett, of first degree felony murder. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Claude Francis Garrett, No. M2004-02089-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 3262933, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 1, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 1, 2006). This court denied the Petitioner’s subsequent petition for post-conviction relief, Claude F. Garrett v. State, No. M2011-00333-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 3834898, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 5, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2013), following which he filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis that is the subject of this appeal. The trial court issued an order summarily dismissing the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Marquez Williams, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal arises from an inmate filing a common law writ of certiorari challenging the actions of a prison grievance committee. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; specifically, that decisions of a prison grievance board are not reviewable under a common law writ of certiorari. The trial court dismissed the petition. Inmate appeals. We affirm.

As part of a divorce proceeding, the trial court ordered a father to pay child support. Within two months thereafter, the father lost his job as a finance manager for an automotive dealership. The father filed a motion to modify his child support obligation and took a job in another field, making significantly less money. The father claimed that a more lucrative job was not available to him because he only had a high school education. And he did not wish to pursue another job as an automotive dealership finance manager due to the long hours, pressure, and deleterious effect of the job on his health. The mother opposed the motion to modify, claiming that the father was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court agreed. On appeal, the father challenges only the court’s determination that he was voluntarily underemployed. After a review of the record, we affirm. 

The Appellant, Andre Anthony, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce action, the mother argues that, in making the father the primary residential parent, the trial court did not give adequate weight to the father’s relocation with the children against her wishes at the time of the parties’ separation. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving a two-year-old child, Kyle F. (“the Child”). In January 2016, the Sullivan County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child’s mother, Debra F. (“Mother”), on September 19, 2016.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that DCS had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child through conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child prior to her incarceration. Determining that no statutory ground existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights, the trial court declined to address the best interest of the Child. The guardian ad litem timely filed a notice of appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm

The defendant, Deandrey Peterson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possessing a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Because the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the defendant had committed crimes other than those for which he was on trial and because the error cannot be classified as harmless, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he requested DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-303. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis because the evidence was already tested. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

A Carter County Criminal Court Jury found the Appellant, Robert Landon Webster, guilty of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, one of which was within a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his right to confrontation was violated because the State failed to call a confidential informant as a witness at trial and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Presson, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an “economic motive” defense and failing to call witnesses at trial to support that defense; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a severance for charges that involved two separate victims; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge certain jurors during voir dire; (4) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing “to call” the Petitioner as a witness at trial; (5) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s references to the term “pedophile” and to pornography during its closing argument; (6) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request such instructions; (7) that trial counsel “was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court require the State to make an election of offenses” and “by failing to object to the trial court judge’s election of offenses”; and (8) that post-conviction relief is warranted due to cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.