APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Chester County jury convicted the Defendant, Todd Allen Robbins, of theft of a vehicle, among other offenses. On appeal, the Defendant and the State agree that the proof did not establish the vehicle’s value at the time it was stolen. We agree and modify the Defendant’s conviction to a Class A misdemeanor offense. We respectfully remand the case for entry of a modified judgment of conviction reflecting the modified offense class and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days.

This case involves a petition for judicial review filed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503, et seq., after the petitioner requested audio recordings of a third-party’s post-conviction hearings from a court reporter.  The circuit court dismissed the petition.  The petitioner appeals.  For the following reasons, the appeal is hereby dismissed.

The State of Tennessee, on behalf of Mother, sought child support for a minor child. The trial court, finding that there was no reliable evidence of Father’s income, imputed the statutory median gross income. Father appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in setting child support above his stated income and in finding that the evidence of his income was unreliable. Father also asserts that the court’s oral finding that he was willfully underemployed was procedurally deficient. We conclude that the trial court erred in imputing the statutory amount, vacate the award of child support, and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110. The defendantpetitioner asserted that this action was filed by the plaintiffs in response to his “exercise of the right of free speech,” which the TPPA defines as “communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” Specifically, the defendant-petitioner asserted that he was exercising his right of free speech regarding a matter of public concern when he made public the plaintiffs’ failure to disclose their involvement in prior franchise litigation and regulatory actions as required by franchising laws. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the TPPA did not apply because the claims did not involve issues or matters of public concern and free speech as referenced in the TPPA. This appeal followed. We respectfully disagree with this finding. We conclude that the defendant-petitioner presented prima facie evidence that the plaintiffs commenced this action in response to the defendantpetitioner’s exercise of free speech on a matter of public concern related to goods, products, or services in the marketplace. Specifically, the defendant-petitioner’s public dissemination of information via a website alleging that the plaintiffs were continuing to market franchises while withholding material information required to be disclosed by the Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rule. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 436. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Nearly 29 years ago, Anthony E. Perry, Defendant, kidnapped and killed Dorothy Webber. Defendant now appeals from the dismissal of his motion to correct a clerical error under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. In the motion, Defendant argued that he was entitled to release eligibility after serving 25 years in incarceration on a life sentence for first degree murder, that his sentence was illegal because there was no notation in the special conditions box on the judgment form to inform the Department of Correction to calculate his release date under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(i), and that his release eligibility calculation violated the ex post facto clauses of the Tennessee and United States constitutions. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the motion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tyrone E. Murphy, Petitioner, appeals from the Hamilton County Circuit Court’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree premeditated
murder and tampering with evidence. Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court
erred in denying relief based upon his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Jaylon Lebron Hill, appeals his Hamilton County Criminal Court convictions
for second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, reckless endangerment, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received
an effective sentence of 23 years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s instructions to the jury. Finding
no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In the second appeal in this case, Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in her child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a petition to terminate parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that one ground for termination existed as to the father based on a prior adjudication of severe child abuse and that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand.

This appeal, arising from a land dispute, concerns the trial court’s dismissal of several
claims against multiple parties pursuant to motions to dismiss filed under Rule 12.02(6) of
the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the terms of an “Agreed Final Order”
reflected that the Appellants waived their right to appeal any issue regarding two of the
parties in this case, the same order also signaled that nothing prevented the Appellants from
appealing matters involving two other individual parties. Through the present appeal, the
Appellants challenge the dismissal of their claims against these other individual parties.
Although we largely affirm the trial court’s dismissal order, we reverse in part.
Specifically, we hold that, on account of certain allegations that were pled pertaining to the
cutting of trees on the Appellants’ property, the wholesale dismissal of one of the individual
parties was improper.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s orders denying the petitioner’s two pro se motions to recuse the trial court judge in the underlying restoration of citizenship action. The petitioner based his first motion to recuse in the instant case entirely upon actions and rulings made by the trial court judge in a previous civil case. He based his second motion to recuse on the same actions and rulings plus two additional orders, one entered by the trial court judge while the petitioner’s appeal of the first recusal denial was pending. Discerning no reversible error in the trial court judge’s denial of the motions to recuse, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jay William Edwards, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated kidnapping, assault, and interfering with an emergency call, for which he received an effective sentence of ten years’ confinement. On appeal, he argues: (1) trial counsels were ineffective in failing to object to (a) a constructive amendment to the indictment and (b) an incomplete White instruction; 1 and 2) he was deprived of his right to testify at trial.2 After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to two of her minor children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the children. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on all grounds. We also conclude that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests and affirm the trial court’s ultimate ruling.

Petitioner, Kenneth Barnett, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for six counts of aggravated
burglary, six counts of theft, and two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a
convicted felon. Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief
based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel failed to (1) investigate or seek testing of Petitioner’s blood, urine, and cigarettes;
(2) file a motion to suppress Petitioner’s confession; and (3) adequately cross-examine law
enforcement witnesses regarding the credibility of the confession and chain of custody
issues with a gun magazine. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment
of the post-conviction court.

Ordinarily, a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim must prove that the defendant made a false statement and did so negligently. If the plaintiff is a public figure, however, he must prove that the statement was made with actual malice. This is a steep hill to climb, so determining whether the plaintiff is a public figure is a crucial inquiry in any defamation case. This case is no exception. The plaintiff here, Bill Charles, assisted with the development of the Durham Farms community in Hendersonville, Tennessee, and is president of its homeowners’ association. Charles brought defamation and false light claims against Donna McQueen, a Durham Farms resident who posted a Google review that was critical of him. McQueen sought dismissal of Charles’s claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, arguing that Charles could not establish a prima facie case for his claims because he could not prove actual malice. The trial court agreed with McQueen and dismissed the claims. The Court of Appeals reversed in part. It agreed with McQueen that Charles had to prove actual malice to prevail on his false light claim and had failed to do so. But it held that Charles is not a public figure and therefore need not prove actual malice for his defamation claim. We disagree with the Court of Appeals on that score. We hold that Charles is a limited-purpose public figure given the voluntary and prominent role he played in a controversy concerning changes to the Durham Farms development plan. We further hold that Charles failed to establish a prima facie case of actual malice. Finally, we reject Charles’s argument that McQueen waived her request for appellate attorney’s fees by failing to list it as an issue in her Court of Appeals brief. We reverse the Court of Appeals in part and affirm in part, and we remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Dan E. Durell, filed a “Motion for Correction of Sentencing Documents” (“the
Motion”), claiming that the judgments in Case Nos. 29089 and 29090 did not conform to
the trial court’s pronounced sentence, and as a result, his sentences were illegal. The trial
court treated the Motion as a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee
Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The court determined that the Motion failed to raise a
colorable claim and summarily dismissed the Motion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Bobby Gene Carney, appeals the trial court’s partial revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to complete inpatient drug treatment based on a single instance of what were only technical violations. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this legal-malpractice case, the trial court granted Appellees’/Attorneys’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Appellant/Client appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This is an appeal of a divorce case. Although we affirm in part and reverse in part, we also vacate several aspects of the trial court’s judgment for the reasons stated herein and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

A plaintiff sued a grocery store for premises liability, and the case was tried by a jury in June of 2023. The jury
found the defendant store liable but awarded the plaintiff no damages. The plaintiff then appealed to this Court.
However, because the plaintiff has failed to substantially comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure
regarding briefing, any issues purportedly raised by the plaintiff are waived, and the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Jeffrey L. Brousseau, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for
possession with the intent to deliver or sell one-half gram or more of methamphetamine;
possession with the intent to deliver or sell marijuana; theft of property valued at $1,000
or less; driving while in possession of five grams of methamphetamine; and driving on a
suspended license. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the Defendant received an
effective ten-year sentence, and the trial court was to determine the manner of service. The
trial court subsequently denied the Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing, a
decision the Defendant now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

Defendant, Joey Godwin, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, challenging his two convictions for the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and resulting 60-year sentence. The trial court summarily denied the motion. Defendant appeals. Because Defendant failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The Defendant, Scott Allen Briggs, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of rape of a child, a Class
A felony, for which he is serving a thirty-five-year sentence as a Range II offender. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2018)
(subsequently amended) (rape of a child, Range II or higher sentencing requirement). On appeal, the Defendant
contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss due to the State’s failure to preserve
evidence, (2) the court erred by instructing the jury on flight, (3) the court abused its discretion in three of its
evidentiary rulings, and (4) the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following the Decedent’s death, no original will could be found. One of his daughters filed a petition to administer a copy of a lost will, which the trial court granted. We reverse, concluding the evidence does not overcome the strong presumption in favor of revocation of the lost will.

The Defendant, Gary Lynn Hart, was convicted in the Chester County Circuit Court of two counts of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony, a Class B felony; one count of theft of property valued more than one thousand dollars, a Class E felony; and one count of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of thirty-one years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.