APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The parental rights of Cedric G., Sr. (“Father”) were terminated by the Davidson County Juvenile Court (“the trial court”) on November 20, 2023. Father appeals. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights as to Cedric G., Jr. (“the Child”) for abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit, failure to support, and exhibiting a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; persistence of conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the Child. We also affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the Child’s best interests.

The defendant, Jerry Donald Brown, III, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Michael Halliburton (“Halliburton”) filed a lawsuit against his former attorney, Blake Ballin (“Ballin”) and Ballin’s law firm, Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C. (“Ballin Firm”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). Ballin and Ballin Firm filed a motion to dismiss Halliburton’s amended complaint. The Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss, and Halliburton has appealed. Having reviewed the record and briefs in this case, we conclude that Halliburton presents an issue unreviewable by this Court and that Halliburton’s appellate brief, accordingly, does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. We affirm the Trial Court.

In this post-divorce action, the father filed a petition seeking to modify the parties’ agreed permanent parenting plan based on alleged mental and emotional instability of the mother. During trial, the father sought to remove the guardian ad litem for purportedly violating her duties pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40A; however, the trial court denied the father’s motion. The father also sought to introduce statements by the minor children indicating that the mother had told them private information regarding the parties’ divorce. Upon objection by the mother and the guardian ad litem, the trial court determined such statements to be inadmissible hearsay. The trial court ultimately entered an order on August 4, 2023, determining that modification of the parties’ permanent parenting plan was neither necessary nor in the best interest of the parties’ children despite certain changes in the parties’ circumstances. The trial court also denied the father’s motion for a restraining order against the mother, although the court found that the mother’s actions had been inappropriate. The trial court further ordered that each party would pay his or her own attorney’s fees. The father timely appealed. Upon our thorough review, we vacate the trial court’s determination concerning child support and its finding regarding the mother’s gross income. We remand for further hearing as needed and a determination of the mother’s gross income with instructions to the trial court to consider whether gifts or payment of living expenses by her family should have been included. The trial court shall then be required to recalculate child support utilizing the proper gross income amount for the mother. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. We deny the father’s request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

An employer sought to enforce restrictive covenants against a former employee. In response, the former employee filed a counterclaim for retaliatory discharge, and the employer moved to compel arbitration on the counterclaim. The former employee opposed the motion, arguing that the arbitration agreement was either unenforceable or inapplicable. The trial court agreed that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the counterclaim. So it denied the motion to compel. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a premises liability claim brought against a construction company. The plaintiff tripped over a cut signpost while walking along a highway in Blount County, Tennessee. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant construction company caused, created, or had knowledge of the signpost and had a duty to the plaintiff. Following a motion for summary judgment by the construction company, the trial court determined that that construction company was not responsible for the signpost and thus owed the plaintiff no duty of care. The plaintiff appealed to this Court. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The defendant, Norma Jean Hardin, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering that she serve her full sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the revocation and disposition of the
defendant’s probation.

This appeal arises from a civil action that was commenced and voluntarily dismissed without prejudice twice before the plaintiff refiled the same action for a third time. The defendants responded to the third filing by moving to dismiss on the ground that the third action was filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Relying on the authority in Payne v. Matthews, 633 S.W.2d 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), the trial court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. In their brief, the defendants/appellees ask this court to award them their attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this appeal, contending that the appeal is frivolous. Finding that the appeal is devoid of merit and, therefore, frivolous, we remand this matter to the trial court to award the defendants/appellees their reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this frivolous appeal.

The Defendant, Robert Allen Turner, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery and two counts of possession of a firearm with intent to go armed and received an effective twelve-year sentence. The Defendant did not file a direct appeal of his convictions but filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court ultimately determined that the Defendant was entitled to a delayed appeal. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated robbery conviction and that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a Range II, multiple offender for that conviction. Based upon our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court was without jurisdiction to grant a delayed appeal because the post-conviction petition was untimely. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of its claim concerning the Water Quality Control Act (“WQCA”), codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 69-3-101, et seq.1 We now affirm the dismissal due to the applicable statute of limitations.

The parties in the present appeal duel over the question of whether, when appealing the decision of an administrative judge to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas in relation to an alleged violation of the Water Quality Control Act, a party has 15 or 30 days in which to appeal. Jamesway Construction, Inc. asserts that the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) only had 15 days to appeal, and, accordingly, that the administrative judge’s decision became final when TDEC failed to appeal within that period. TDEC insists that it had 30 days to appeal, and, accordingly, that its appeal was timely.

Nearly twenty years ago, Petitioner, Nickolus L. Johnson,1 shot Bristol Police Officer Mark
Vance in the face as Officer Vance entered a home responding to a disturbance call, killing
the officer. State v. Johnson, 401 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2013). A Sullivan County jury
convicted Petitioner of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. Id. After his
conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, id. at 7, Petitioner subsequently
sought post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief after extensive
hearings. Petitioner raises numerous arguments on appeal assailing his conviction and
sentence based primarily on ineffective assistance of counsel as well as several standalone
constitutional claims. After a thorough review of the record, the applicable law, the parties’
briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment in all respects.

Father appeals the trial court’s award of grandparent visitation to the child’s maternal grandmother. Although we affirm the trial court’s determination that an award of grandparent visitation is warranted, we vacate the visitation schedule set by the trial court.

This is an action for defamation and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“the TCPA”). The plaintiffs operated a teledentistry platform dedicated to providing remote treatment for mild-to-moderate malocclusion of the teeth. The defendants published an online article and broadcast an “investigative report” that alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiffs’ customers were experiencing “painful problems” such as nerve damage, joint damage, and loss of teeth. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued these and other statements—as well as the implications derived from those statements—injured the plaintiffs’ reputation and disparaged the plaintiffs’ products, services, and business. The trial court dismissed the action under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“the TPPA”), holding that the TCPA did not apply and that the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case for their defamation claims. This appeal followed. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs and disregarding all countervailing evidence, we have determined that the plaintiffs presented prima facie evidence of falsity to support some of their claims but failed to produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Defendants ask for an award of their appellate attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-107, which requires an award of costs and fees “[i]f the court dismisses a legal action pursuant to a petition filed under [the TPPA].” Because we have affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims under the TPPA, Defendants are entitled to an award to be determined by the trial court on remand.

Defendant, Lacorious Tyquez Fuller, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court conviction for conspiracy to deliver more than 150 grams of heroin, for which he received a sentence of 17 years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s admission of a video recording of a controlled purchase between Defendant and two confidential informants. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jimmy Smith, Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Taeshaun K. Patterson, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, a Class A felony, facilitation of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class D felony, facilitation to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and robbery in concert with two or more persons, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-11-403 (2018) (facilitation), 39-12-103 (2018) (criminal conspiracy), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-13- 401 (2018) (robbery), 39-12-302 (2018) (sentencing classification for acting in concert). The Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court should have held a sentencing hearing for the first degree murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, in light of State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), we remand for the entry of an amended first degree felony murder judgment form to reflect in the special conditions section that the Defendant is entitled to an individualized parole hearing after serving between twenty-five and thirty-six years of his life sentence.

Plaintiff insurance company is the insurance carrier for an insurance agency that was sued for negligence in five Tennessee lawsuits. After the underlying lawsuits were settled, the plaintiff, in its own name and on behalf of its insured, sued the law firm that represented the insured in the lawsuits. The plaintiff asserted a direct legal malpractice claim, a legal malpractice claim as subrogee of the insured, and a negligent misrepresentation claim. The trial court dismissed all claims. In particular, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not maintain a direct legal malpractice claim against the law firm due to the lack of attorney-client relationship and that the assignment of legal malpractice claims is prohibited in Tennessee. In the alternative, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not establish the damages element of its legal malpractice claims. The trial court further ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish a misrepresentation of existing or past fact. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s direct legal malpractice action. As to the remainder of the trial court’s rulings, however, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Radames Antonio Rivera, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to strike two jurors who had prior connections with the parties and by failing to effectively cross-examine a principal State witness. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

This appeal concerns whether witness testimony in the course of a parole hearing is absolutely privileged. Fred Auston Wortman, III (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner, filed a defamation lawsuit against Eric Shirkey (“Defendant”), a detective who testified at Plaintiff’s parole hearing, in the Circuit Court for Morgan County (“the Trial Court”).1 Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s statements about him at the parole hearing, such as calling Plaintiff a “narcissist,” damaged his reputation. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. The Trial Court concluded that Defendant’s statements were absolutely privileged. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that his parole hearing was administrative rather than judicial in nature, so Defendant’s statements were not protected by absolute privilege. We hold that the parole board, in considering whether to grant Plaintiff parole, was exercising a judicial function such that absolute privilege extended to testimony at the parole hearing. We hold further that Defendant’s statements were relevant and pertinent to the issues involved. Therefore, Defendant’s statements at Plaintiff’s parole hearing were absolutely privileged. We affirm.

The Defendant, John Michael Storey, pled guilty as a Range III, persistent offender to reckless homicide and the sale and delivery of fentanyl. As part of the plea, the parties agreed to have the trial court decide the length of the sentences and the manner of their service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted an alternative sentence or, alternatively, should have modified his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 to provide for probation or split confinement. Upon our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely as to the trial court’s original sentencing decision, and we dismiss that part of the appeal. We respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

The Plaintiff was injured as a result of stepping into a hole in the grass on the Defendant’s property and brought a premises liability action. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendant, finding that the Plaintiff’s responses to the Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts established that the Defendant had no actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. On appeal, the Plaintiff asserts there is evidence from which notice could be inferred. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment. The judgment is affirmed.

At issue in this appeal is the petitioner’s attempt to recover for breach of contract of a marital dissolution agreement entered into between his parents prior to their divorce. Although the parents’ agreement had called for the petitioner’s father to create an irrevocable life insurance trust for the petitioner’s benefit, the trial court concluded that there was not an enforceable obligation regarding that subject matter and entered summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

The Petitioner, James Lee McClain, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for aggravated assault and witness coercion. The Petitioner argues he received the ineffective assistance of both pretrial and appellate counsel. Specifically, he contends both attorneys who represented him during the pretrial stage were ineffective by failing to discuss discovery materials and case strategy with him, failing to adequately prepare for trial, and failing to file “critical” motions, resulting in the Petitioner’s having to represent himself at trial. Additionally, he argues appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to include sufficiency of the evidence and severance issues in his direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a dispute between a partnership and its limited partners concerning the payment of attorney’s fees under the parties’ limited liability agreement. The trial court held that the attorney’s fees were payable from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership’s property, and the limited partners appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.