APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an action to enforce a 2020 arbitration award (the “Award”), which was confirmed by the Chancery Court for Davidson County in 2021. The subject of the arbitration was Chevy Chase ASC, LLC (“CCASC”), a two-member Tennessee limited liability company, which was formed and operated by Chevy Chase G.I. Investors, L.C. (“Plaintiff”), and AmSurg Holdings, Inc. (“Defendant”). The Award stated, in pertinent part, that the voluntary dissolution of Plaintiff would “trigger the mandatory dissolution” of CCASC. Following Plaintiff’s voluntary dissolution, however, Defendant refused to dissolve or wind up the affairs of CCASC. Defendant contended that it had the statutory right under the “dissolution avoidance” provision of Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-245-101(b) to continue operating CCASC as a single-member limited liability company. Relying on the Award and the 2021 court order confirming the Award, Plaintiff commenced this action to compel Defendant to dissolve CCASC and wind up its business affairs. Finding the Award to be unambiguous, the Chancellor ordered “the immediate liquidation and dissolution of CCASC.” This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.  

The Defendant, Esau Caleb Kelly, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, attempted
second-degree murder, employment of a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony,
and reckless endangerment by discharge of a firearm into an occupied habitation, for which
he received an effective sentence of 24 years. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether
the trial court erred in affirming the jury verdict for the attempted second-degree murder
conviction and reckless endangerment by discharge of a firearm into an occupied habitation
conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ronnie Lee Clayborn, appeals from the Fentress County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child and incest. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief on his claim that he was denied a fair and impartial jury. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A mother appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights to three minor children. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this action, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims based on res judicata and failure to prosecute. The plaintiffs have appealed in companion appeals. 1 Upon review, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims and remand for further proceedings. We deny the plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

The trial court denied Appellant’s seventh and eighth motions to recuse. Appellant filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Jay Junior Heifner, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of the three-year term of probation imposed for his 2021 guilty-pleaded conviction of theft, arguing that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke his probation because the violation warrant was void and that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. We conclude that because the affidavit in support of the violation warrant failed to comply with the statutory and rule-based requirements, the affidavit was void, the violation warrant was void, and the ensuing revocation proceeding was void. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court to determine whether, in the absence of a validly issued probation violation warrant, Defendant’s term of probation has expired.

In this termination of parental rights case, the trial court denied Appellant’s multiple motions to recuse.  Appellant filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Christophe Swearengen, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, one count of theft of property over $10,000, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced Defendant to five years’ probation. After a revocation hearing, the trial court fully revoked Defendant’s probation for violating the conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation because his violation constituted his first technical violation. The State agrees. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial, reinstate Defendant’s probationary sentence, and remand the case for the trial court to determine the appropriate consequence of Defendant’s violation.

The Petitioner, Brian Armstrong, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to maintain communication and for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the execution of an illegal search warrant. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, Keith Hopkins, was convicted of one count of aggravated assault, one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and one count of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective four years’ probation with the condition that if his probation was revoked, he could not later petition to have the remainder of his sentence suspended. The trial court later revoked Defendant’s probation but nevertheless reprobated Defendant. After a subsequent revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation based on the original probation order, reasoning that Defendant was on probation when “he never should have been.” Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate Defendant’s probation, and remand the case for the trial court to determine the appropriate consequence of Defendant’s violations.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is the second appeal in this healthcare liability matter. The plaintiff first appealed from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant physician. This court reversed that judgment in 2020. Upon remand, a trial before a jury resulted in a defense verdict. The plaintiff again appeals. We affirm.

In this action, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims based on res judicata and failure to prosecute. The plaintiffs have appealed in companion appeals. 1 Upon our review, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims and remand for further proceedings. We deny the plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution case at the summary judgment stage on the basis that she had failed to establish an element of the cause of action. Like the trial court, we conclude that the plaintiff failed to show that the nolle prosequi resolution of the underlying criminal matter constituted a favorable termination. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Defendant, Gerald Tyshawn Henry, was convicted by a Knox County jury of second
degree murder and various other gun-related crimes, for which he received an effective
sentence of fifty years in confinement. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our
review is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction of second
degree murder. Upon our review, we affirm.

The petitioner, Brandon Holliday, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Charles Wilson, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of one count of second-degree murder and one count of facilitation of attempted simple robbery for which he received a sentence of twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Quadarius Devonta Bufford, appeals from the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, and his request for funds for a medical expert. He also seeks relief due to the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s multiple deficiencies of performance. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Clifford Lamar Clark, III, appeals from the Henderson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the plea agreement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

More than thirty days after denying a motion to compel arbitration, the trial court granted an application for permission to appeal the denial under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Because an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, we conclude the appeal was untimely.

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Carlos Monalito Clark, a career offender, was indicted for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and vandalism under $1000, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated burglary and received a Range III sentence of ten years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The vandalism charge was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant argues he is entitled to de novo review or a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to consider three statutory sentencing factors, failed to consider the purposes and principles of the sentencing act, and failed to consider his request for community corrections. Upon review, we affirm.

This cause came before the court upon the application of the Defendant, pro se, seeking an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. More specifically, the Defendant seeks review of the trial court’s October 30, 2025, order directing her to undergo a mental health evaluation to determine her competency to stand trial and her mental state at the time of the charged offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7- 301(a). The Defendant also requests a stay of mental health evaluation proceedings.