APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Kelvin Anthony Lee, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, and the Lauderdale County Circuit Court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his sentence of life without parole violates Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Moten v. State, 935 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); and Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(j). Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The mother of a woman whose body was discovered in Center Hill Lake, where she had been camping with several friends, brought this wrongful death action against those friends, alleging that they caused her daughter’s death and conspired to cover it up. One of the defendants asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in her answer to the complaint and in response to discovery requests; in due course, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The mother filed several affidavits and declarations in response, as to which the defendant filed motions in limine and motions to strike in total or in part. The defendant also asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege as to additional statements of disputed facts filed by the mother in response to the summary judgment motion. The trial court granted or denied, in whole or in part, each motion in limine and to strike; held that the mother was not entitled to an adverse inference as to the defendant’s invocation of the privilege in response to discovery and mother’s statement of disputed facts in opposition to the summary judgment motion; and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Mother appeals. Upon a thorough review of the record, we reverse the grant of summary judgment, vacate the rulings on the motions in limine that are at issue in this appeal, vacate the holdings relative to defendant’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

In this breach of contract action, the trial court entered a judgment against the individual defendant for the plaintiff’s damages and attorney’s fees. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, asserting that he could not be held personally liable for damages because the work he had performed for the plaintiff was conducted through his business, which was a limited liability company. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, determining that there were no facts presented at trial to support the defendant’s contention that he was operating his business as a limited liability company. The defendant timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

I concur in the reversal of the grant of summary judgment. But, because the basis of the reversal is Hannah Nicole Palmer’s failure to “satisfy her initial burden to produce evidence showing there was not a genuine issue of fact for trial,” I conclude it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the rulings on the motions in limine. I would vacate those rulings without further comment as, in my view, they were premised on the mistaken assumption that Ms. Palmer had shifted the burden to Sherry Smith.

In this capital case, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Henry Lee Jones, of alternative counts of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of Clarence James and alternative counts of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of Lillian James. The jury sentenced the Defendant to death on all four counts. As for the two counts related to Mr. James, the jury found the evidence sufficient to support six aggravating circumstances. As for the two counts related to Mrs. James, the jury found the evidence sufficient to support five aggravating circumstances. The trial court merged each of the felony murder convictions into the corresponding premeditated murder convictions and imposed two sentences of death. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. On automatic review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 39-13-206(a)(1), we now address the following issues: (1) Whether the Defendant was unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the former testimony of Tevarus Young; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the appointment of a mitigation expert. We also conduct our mandatory review of the Defendant’s death sentences. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and death sentences. As to the remaining issues raised by the Defendant, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions and attach as an appendix to this opinion the relevant portions of that court’s decision.

This appeal arises from a dispute between a residential homeowner association and the owners of a lot in the subdivision. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the association upon the determination that the subject property was encumbered by the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (“CCRs”), due in part to the fact that the CCRs were expressly referenced and incorporated into the Special Warranty Deed conveyed to the homeowners. The court also granted summary judgment upon the finding it was undisputed that the challenged improvements made to the property by the homeowners, the parking of commercial vehicles on the street in front of the house, and operating a business out of the home were in violation of the CCRs. Following a hearing on damages and injunctive relief, the trial court issued an injunction ordering the homeowners to remove the unauthorized improvements, stop parking commercial vehicles on the street in front of the home, and cease conducting their business out of the home, and awarded unpaid assessments and attorney’s fees to the association. On appeal, the homeowners argue that their lot is not encumbered by the restrictive covenants, the association did not have standing or authority to enforce the restrictions, and the homeowners did not violate the restrictions. Additionally, the homeowners take issue with the court’s failure to apply the doctrine of laches, its decision to summarily dismiss their slander of title claim against the homeowner association, and the award of attorney’s fees. We have determined there is a genuine dispute of fact concerning whether the homeowners were conducting their business out of the home in violation of the CCRs which precludes summary judgment; therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on that claim. We affirm the trial court’s rulings in all other respects.

The benefit board of a metropolitan government denied injured-on-duty benefits to a police officer with post-traumatic stress disorder. On a petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court upheld the benefit board’s decision. Finding material evidence to support the action of the benefit board, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support and to visit. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We reverse the trial court on its finding that the mother abandoned the child by failing to visit. We affirm the trial court on all other rulings.

In this workers’ compensation case, Christopher Batey (“Employee”) filed a Petition for Benefit Determination after he sustained a back injury while working for Deliver This, Inc. (“Employer”). The trial court determined that Employee was entitled to 275 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(a)(2). On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the trial court erred in “defining an employee’s burden of proof under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(a)(2) and in defining the phrase ‘employee’s pre-injury occupation’ as used in subsection 242(a)(2)(B)” but concluding that the errors were harmless under the circumstances presented. Batey v. Deliver This, Inc., No. 2016-05-0666, 2018 WL 805490, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 6, 2018). Employer and its insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, have appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, section 2, this Court directed that the appeal not be referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and adopt its opinion in its entirety as set forth in the attached Appendix.

The Petitioner, Jimmy Heard, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contesting his transfer from Tennessee to Kentucky for trial. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court was without jurisdiction to order his transfer because he was not served with an arrest warrant. On appeal, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition.

On August 26, 2016, the Defendant, Heather Montgomery, was convicted of two counts of sale of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park and two counts of delivery of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park. Counts 2 and 4 were merged into Counts 1 and 3, and the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective 8-year term, to be served at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion is neither excluding the testimony of a confidential informant or granting a continuance and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions. After thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

This is a health care liability action in which the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based upon the plaintiff’s failure to file a certificate of good faith with the complaint. The plaintiff then filed the required certificate. The defendants responded with motions for summary judgment with attached affidavits, attesting that a certificate of good faith was not attached to the original complaint. The plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion and filed an order of voluntary dismissal. The defendants appeal, claiming that Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure1 prohibits the taking a voluntary nonsuit when a summary judgment motion is pending. We affirm.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the Mother appeals the trial court’s rulings on several motions; finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment in all respects, except the award of child support, which is not final and is subject to further review by the trial court.

Claimants to cash seized by the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office moved to dismiss the related administrative forfeiture proceeding. They also requested an award of attorney’s fees. An administrative law judge granted the motion to dismiss but did not address the request for attorney’s fees. Claimants later filed a separate motion for attorney’s fees, which the ALJ denied. Claimants then filed a petition for judicial review. Claimants filed their petition within sixty days of the denial of the motion for attorney’s fees but over sixty days from the day the order granting the motion to dismiss became final. The chancery court reversed, awarding claimants part of the attorney’s fees requested. Because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition, we vacate the decision of the chancery court.

A bank extended a line of credit to a husband and wife in 2007 and obtained as security a parcel of undeveloped property. The bank foreclosed on the property in 2009 upon the couple’s default on the loan and filed suit in 2010 to collect a deficiency judgment. The trial court’s award of a deficiency judgment was reversed on appeal. The husband and wife then filed a complaint against the bank in 2014, based on the same line of credit agreement, claiming the bank had engaged in fraud and breach of contract. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the 2014 complaint, and the couple appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment, finding (1) the couple waived their breach of contract claim by failing to assert it as a compulsory counterclaim in the 2010 litigation and (2) the couple’s fraud claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

This appeal concerns the unauthorized practice of law. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Jonathon Trotter (“Trotter”) alleging that he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Trotter had advertised on Facebook and Craigslist that, for a fee, he would prepare various legal documents for customers. Trotter, however, was not an attorney. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, which Trotter failed to reply to in a manner compliant with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court granted the State’s motion with respect to liability. The Trial Court later assessed damages against Trotter. Trotter appeals, arguing material facts are disputed such that his case should survive summary judgment and proceed to trial. We find and hold that the State made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, and that Trotter failed to show that there is a genuine disputed issue of material fact. We affirm.

An inmate housed in a private prison filed a complaint naming several defendants including the Tennessee Department of Correction, the owner of the prison, and the owner’s employees. The complaint alleged several causes of action, including various violations of his constitutional rights, defamation, and breach of contract. All defendants filed motions to dismiss averring that the inmate failed to state any claims for which relief could be granted, and that the inmate failed to comply with the procedural requirements applicable to inmates bringing civil claims in forma pauperis. We affirm as modified.  

Defendant, Thomas Clinton Wood, was indicted by the Putnam County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to three years in confinement as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, and that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action involves the petitioner’s termination of employment as a firefighter for the City of Cleveland. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari and sought partial summary judgment, alleging, inter alia, that the termination procedure was unlawful. The trial court agreed and granted partial summary judgment. The case proceeded to a hearing on damages, after which, the court found that the petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence in securing employment. The petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend. The court then altered its original order and held that material evidence existed in the record to support the termination decision, reversing the order for partial summary judgment and dismissing the action. The petitioner appeals. We reverse.

The unsuccessful bidder for certain municipal construction projects filed this action against the municipality, alleging, inter alia, that the municipality had violated its own competitive bidding ordinances and engaged in unlawful restraint of trade. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality with regard to all claims except the bidder’s claim for damages for violation of the municipal ordinances and common law restraint of trade. In this interlocutory appeal, we have been asked to determine whether a cause of action exists against a governmental entity for common law restraint of trade and whether a bidder has a private right of action for damages against the municipality for alleged violations of municipal bidding ordinances. We determine that the municipality maintains sovereign immunity concerning any purported claim of common law restraint of trade. We further determine that because a petition for writ of certiorari would be the sole method of review of the City’s contract award, unsuccessful bidders are not authorized to bring a private cause of action for monetary damages for an alleged violation of the municipality’s competitive bidding ordinances. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the municipality’s motion for summary judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the municipality.

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The administrator of an estate appeals the trial court’s grant of a claim against the estate for the payment of funeral expenses. We affirm.

This is a parental termination case. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate mother and father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by conduct exhibiting wanton disregard and persistence of conditions. The trial court further found that termination was in the best interests of the child. On appeal, however, the Department of Children’s Services did not defend the trial court’s ruling as to the ground of abandonment. Although we accordingly reverse as to that ground, we affirm as to the ground of persistence of conditions and with respect to the trial court’s determination that the termination of mother’s and father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

Defendant, Torvarius E. Mason, was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court found that the proof supported three grounds for termination as to both parents: substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2), persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3), and failure to manifest an ability to parent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). The court further found that the termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the proof supported the substantial noncompliance ground as to Mother, reverse its finding that the proof supported the substantial noncompliance ground as to Father, vacate the other grounds for termination against both Mother and Father based upon insufficient findings by the trial court, affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our direction in this Opinion.

After entering an order granting Mother sole residential custody and providing Father restricted parenting time, the trial court awarded Mother discretionary costs in the amount of $45,238.85. Father appeals the trial court’s award of discretionary costs. Because Father failed to prove that the trial court abused its discretion, we affirm the award of discretionary costs.