APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Byron Hartshaw, of two counts of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to serve an effective term of fifteen years. After that, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to prepare a defense, failed to clarify a pretrial ruling, and failed to object during cross-examination, opening statements, and closing arguments. He also argued that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies was sufficient to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Colby Mason Kilburn, was convicted in the Lawrence County Circuit Court of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove premeditation and intent.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Brian C. Lautenschlager, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (“the Petition”), seeking relief based on a “newly discovered” affidavit that was signed in 2007 and “sent” to him in 2023. The coram nobis court found that the Petition was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations and that Petitioner failed to establish that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and summarily dismissed the Petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety based on failure to serve the named defendants. Although we affirm the dismissal of the named defendants for insufficiency of service of process and expiration of the statute of limitations, we vacate the dismissal of the plaintiff’s attempt to hold the uninsured motorist carrier liable under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206.

Petitioner, Derek Cunningham, Jr., claims that the trial court erred by summarily denying his pro se Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and his pro se Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, both for failing to state a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Andre JuJuan Lee Green, --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2022-00899-SC-R11-CD, 2024 WL 3942511 (Tenn. 2024). See State v. Torrian Seantel Bishop, No. W2023-00713-CCA-R3- CD, 2024 WL 1564346, (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2024) (Bishop I), case remanded (Tenn. Aug. 27, 2024). This court concluded in the previous appeal that the certified question was dispositive of the case and that the officers had probable cause to search the Defendant’s car because an officer smelled the odor of marijuana. Upon further review, we conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case because our supreme court in Andre JuJuan Lee Green made clear that a trial court must apply a totality of the circumstances analysis when determining whether an officer has probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a car. --- S.W.3d ---, 2024 WL 3942511, at *6. Upon consideration of the certified question and our supreme court’s holding in Andre JuJuan Lee Green, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the certified question presented. The appeal is dismissed.

This appeal concerns a motion to set aside a default judgment. Roland Brown (“Plaintiff”) sued HDR Logistics, LLC (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he sustained injuries from an incident in which Defendant’s employee backed his tractor-trailer into Plaintiff’s parked tractor-trailer. Plaintiff served a copy of the complaint and summons on Lisa Blackwell (“Blackwell”), Defendant’s designated agent in Tennessee for service of process. Defendant failed to respond, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendant later filed a motion to set aside. Defendant submitted the affidavits of two individuals who said that the company did not receive notice of the lawsuit. Notably, the record contains no affidavit from Blackwell explaining what happened. The Trial Court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals, arguing that its failure to respond was due to excusable neglect in that it lacked actual notice of the lawsuit even though its agent was served, and that the Trial Court failed to conduct a writ of inquiry on unliquidated damages as required. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment. We hold further that Defendant failed to meet its burden showing the Trial Court did not conduct an appropriate evidentiary hearing on unliquidated damages. We affirm.

Jonathan Douglas (“Mr. Douglas”) filed a Complaint to Enforce Deed Restrictions seeking to enjoin Five Star Properties, Inc. (“Five Star”) from building a CrossMod home in a subdivision in which the parties each own property. Mr. Douglas argued that the CrossMod is a “mobile home” and is thus prohibited by the parties’ respective deeds. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Douglas. Five Star appeals that judgment. We conclude that the CrossMod home at issue is not a “mobile home,” reverse the judgment of the trial court, and vacate the injunction entered by the trial court.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Andre Davis, Jr., for one count each of harassment and aggravated stalking. A jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective two-year sentence. Defendant appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff Terry Case did not make his mortgage payments for several years. The real property which secured his loan was subsequently sold at a foreclosure sale following the postponement of a prior sale date. Mr. Case brought a claim for “wrongful foreclosure,” among others, alleging Defendants Wilmington Trust, N.A. and Wilson & Associates, PLLC violated the notice requirements in the applicable deed of trust by failing to provide him with written notice of the postponement. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants, and Mr. Case solely appealed the dismissal of his claim for “wrongful foreclosure.” The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Defendants failed to satisfy their notice obligations under the deed of trust and that summary judgment on the claim for “wrongful foreclosure” was therefore inappropriate. Defendant Wilmington Trust applied for permission to appeal to this Court, and we granted review to determine (1) whether Tennessee recognizes a common law cause of action for “wrongful foreclosure,” and (2) whether the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Deed of Trust requires written notice of postponement in addition to oral announcement pursuant to section 35-5-101(f) of the Tennessee Code. We further instructed the parties to address whether Mr. Case satisfied the requirements for constitutional standing. We hold that Mr. Case has constitutional standing to bring his claim. However, we also hold that there is no common law cause of action for “wrongful foreclosure” in Tennessee. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

I concur in the majority’s well-written opinion. I write separately only to clarify a point that is important but tangential to the Court’s resolution of the issues presented. It relates to the majority’s discussion of the Open Courts provision in our Constitution, Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17.

Defendant, Alexis Faxon, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of reckless driving and
speeding which resulted in a fatal two-car accident. The trial court sentenced Defendant
to consecutive sentences of thirty days’ incarceration for speeding and six months
suspended to probation for reckless driving. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence
is insufficient to support her conviction for reckless driving, that the trial court erred by
denying a mistrial based on alleged discovery violations, and that the trial court erred by
admitting photographs and victim impact statements at the sentencing hearing and by
ordering thirty days’ incarceration. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the
parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a declaratory judgment action concerning the enforceability of covenants not to compete in the medical field. The trial court held the covenants unenforceable as applied to the plaintiff clinicians who provide anesthesia services at local hospitals in Tennessee. We affirm.

Defendant, Jerrell Anderson, appeals his Shelby County convictions for four counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying two motions for mistrial and in admitting redacted recordings of jail phone calls into evidence instead of admitting the calls in their entirety. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Russell Lynn Onks, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of four counts of violation of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004. After a hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of two years, suspended to probation after service of ninety days of incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he established a primary residence, secondary residence, or a physical presence within Sullivan County to support counts one and two. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Allen Hessmer, appeals the Wilson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to correct illegal sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An LLC owned seven properties. The members of the LLC were a mother, father and daughter. Mother held the majority voting share. As manager of the LLC, Mother transferred most of its assets to another LLC, whose members were her daughter and son-in-law, without the knowledge of Father. Mother died and her estate sought to recover the assets for the original LLC. The trial court found that Daughter had a conflict of interest and that Mother/Decedent also had a conflict of interest. The trial court also found that the transactions violated Tennessee statutes and the “entire fairness test” of Rock Ivy Holding, LLC v. RC Properties, LLC, 464 S.W.3d 623 (Tenn. 2014). The trial court declared the transactions void. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his personal injury action based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the expiration of the statute of limitations. Because the action was barred by the statute of limitations, we affirm.

The Defendant, Christopher Paul Drake, pled guilty to the offenses of attempted aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and placed the Defendant on probation after service of six months in custody. Thereafter, the Defendant was alleged to have committed a “zero tolerance” violation of his probation by being discharged from an outpatient sex offender treatment program. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentences in full. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the sentences into execution. He also asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the treatment provider’s Notice of Termination despite the provider’s absence from the hearing. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jordan Ballard, was convicted by a Lake County Circuit Court jury of
aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; rape, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class
C felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-304 (2018)
(aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-503 (2019) (subsequently amended) (rape); 39-13-102
(Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); 39-13-101 (Supp. 2020)
(subsequently amended) (assault). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of ten
years for aggravated kidnapping, ten years for rape, four years for aggravated assault, and
eleven months, twenty-nine days for assault, for an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal,
the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated
kidnapping conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A decedent’s former employee filed a petition to dissent from the decedent’s last will and
testament and sought a declaration that she is the decedent’s widow. Following a trial, the
court dismissed the petition on the basis that the evidence rebutted the presumption of a
valid marriage between the decedent and the former employee. We affirm.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the division of marital property, and an award of alimony entered as part of a final decree of divorce.  For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s judgment with respect to both subjects and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

Defendants, Jeffrey August Tate and Steven Ogle, were indicted in separate cases for multiple counts of theft of property and home construction fraud involving separate victims. Before trial, both Defendants filed motions to dismiss the home construction fraud counts in their respective indictments, alleging that a portion of the home construction fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154(b)(1), was unconstitutionally vague on its face, and Defendant Tate also argued that the statute was vague as applied to him. Following a joint hearing on both Defendants’ motions, the trial court concluded that the home construction fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The State appealed both Defendants’ cases pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), and this court consolidated the appeals. We conclude that the State does not have an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c) because the record does not reflect that the substantive effect of the trial court’s order resulted in the dismissal of the indictments. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals.

Paul L. Foutner, Defendant, was indicted for first degree murder, three counts of attempted
first degree murder, reckless endangerment, two counts of employing a firearm in the
commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm for
his role in a shooting in Knoxville. The trial court dismissed the reckless endangerment
charge before trial, and a jury convicted Defendant of second degree murder, attempted
second degree murder, two counts of reckless endangerment, employing a firearm in the
commission of a dangerous felony, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous
felony with a prior violent felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant received
an effective sentence of 54 years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his convictions for second degree murder and attempted second degree
murder. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.