APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This action was instituted as a complaint for a declaratory judgment and for a partition of real estate. The appellant sought a declaratory judgment that she was the owner of an undivided interest in a tract of land located in Sevier County as a tenant in common with the appellee. She further sought to have the court partition the property in question. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court sustained the defendant's motion for summary judgment, denied plaintiff's motion and fond that the appellant held no interest in the property. This appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Ralph Avery Smith, was convicted of the sale of cocaine, a class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues (a) that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, (b) that a prospective juror was improperly removed by the prosecution in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), (c) that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, and (d) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.

The determinative issue on appeal as framed by the appellant is: [Whether] the defendants were deprived of a fair and impartial jury because of Juror Rankin's failure to respond truthfully on voir dire and further, because Juror Rankin and plaintiffs' counsel both failed to reveal a recent attorney/client relationship and an upcoming trial wherein plaintiffs' counsel would be a crucial witness on behalf of Juror Rankin.

In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff, insurance company, sought a declaration that its insured, John H. Rasnic, was not an insured under its policy for the accident occuring between the Rasnic and Davis motor vehicles. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Rasnic had violated the policy provision:

We must be notified promptly of how, when, and where the accident or loss happened. Notice should also include the names and addresses of any injuried persons and of any witness. Allstate would assert that while the accident occurred on December 1, 1993, they did not receive notice until June 24, 1994.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted second-degree murder in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) and §39-12-101(a). Judgment was entered and following a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced to death by electrocution for the first degree murder and to thirty (30) years imprisonment for the attempt to commit second-degree
murder, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review:

The appellant has filed a petition for rehearing stating that this Court’s opinion failed to address the request in her brief that she be awarded attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. After due consideration, the appellant’s request for an award of attorney’s fees occurred on appeal is denied.