Please enter some keywords to search.
| Ames vs. Phillips Builders
01A01-9701-CV-00043
Originating Judge:Barbara N. Haynes |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/19/97 | |
| Bellsouth Telecommunications vs. TN. Regulatory Authority
01A01-9601-BC-00008
|
Court of Appeals | 11/19/97 | ||
| Zanetis vs. McMackin
01A01-9705-CV-00203
Originating Judge:William C. Koch |
Court of Appeals | 11/19/97 | ||
| Alexander Friedmann, v. Charles Bass, et al.
01A01-9707-CH-00331
This appeal involves a prison disciplinary proceeding. After being found guilty of engaging in an unauthorized monetary transaction, the prisoner filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County alleging that the disciplinary proceeding violated his due process rights. The trial court granted the prison officials’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed to make out a due process claim as a matter of law. We affirm the summary judgment in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b).1
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/19/97 | |
| Pratt vs. Smart
03A01-9701-CV-00024
|
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 11/18/97 | |
| 03A01-9704-CH-00133
03A01-9704-CH-00133
|
Greene County | Court of Appeals | 11/18/97 | |
| State vs. David Moss
02C01-9610-CC-00365
|
Lauderdale County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/18/97 | |
| Charles Fossett vs. State of TN
02A01-9703-BC-00061
|
Court of Appeals | 11/18/97 | ||
| Hutton vs. Johnson
01S01-9705-CH-00101
Originating Judge:James L. Weatherford |
Giles County | Supreme Court | 11/17/97 | |
| State vs. Charles A. Pinkham, Jr.
02S01-9611-CR-00096
|
Supreme Court | 11/17/97 | ||
| State vs. Jerry Cooper
01C01-9604-CC-00150
Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee |
Lincoln County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/17/97 | |
| 03S01-9512-CC-00133
03S01-9512-CC-00133
|
Sevier County | Supreme Court | 11/17/97 | |
| State vs. Jerry Cooper
01C01-9604-CC-00150
Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee |
Lincoln County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/17/97 | |
| State vs. Utley
01S01-9604-CR-00120
|
Supreme Court | 11/17/97 | ||
| Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.
M2002-01752-COA-R3-CV
On November 16, 1997, a fire destroyed a Chili's Restaurant ("Chili's") in Nashville, Tennessee. At the time of the fire, the premises were owned and operated by RMR Investments and Gower Center, Ltd. ("RMR/Gower") and leased to Chili's. Under a 20-year lease agreement, Chili's agreed to insure the improvements against loss or damage by fire and other casualties and to insure against property damage and public liability arising out of occurrences on the premises. RMR/Gower was to be named as a loss payee or additional insured under the insurance policies obtained by Chili's. According to the lease, in the event the premises and/or the improvements were destroyed by fire or other casualty, Chili's had the option to terminate the lease, and all insurance proceeds were to be paid to RMR/Gower, except for the portion payable to Chili's for loss of personal property. Pursuant to the lease agreement, Chili's obtained insurance coverage through Lexington Insurance Company ("Lexington"). The certificate of insurance dated December 5, 1997 listed RMR/Gower as certificate holder and named RMR/Gower as additional insured. After the fire, Chili's elected to terminate the lease agreement due to the condition of the premises. Lexington paid the proceeds for the loss of the building to RMR/Gower, less amounts paid to Chili's for loss of personal property. RMR/Gower submitted an additional claim for damages it incurred for the loss of rental income and other charges it would have otherwise collected from Chili's. This claim was denied by Lexington. RMR/Gower then submitted a claim to its insurer Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company ("Charter Oak") for the loss of rental income, which Charter Oak paid. After Lexington refused to reimburse Charter Oak for the amounts it paid RMR/Gower for the loss of rental income, Charter Oak filed suit against Lexington for breach of contract under the theory of third party beneficiary. Parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On June 26, 2002, the trial court granted Lexington's summary judgment motion and denied Charter Oak's motion. Notice of this appeal soon followed. For the reasons set forth below, the order of the trial court is reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Authoring Judge: Judge Don R. Ash
Originating Judge:Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/16/97 | |
| Christopher S. Baker v. Middle Tn. Acoustics, Inc., et al.
01S01-9702-CH-00035
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff/appellant, Christopher Steven Baker, appeals from the trial court's decision holding that he failed to prove that he sustained an injury while working for the defendant/appellee, Middle Tennessee Acoustic, Inc. The outcome of the case hinges primarily on a determination of the plaintiff's credibility. While our review is de novo, it is accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the trial court's findings. Moreover, when the trial court has made a decision that hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, it will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is in the record clear, concrete, and convincing evidence to the contrary. And, too, considerable difference is to be accorded the trial court where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved. Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tenn. 1992), Airline Construction, Inc. v. Barr, 87 S.W.2d 247, 264 (Tenn. App. 199). The record is filled with contradictory and conflicting evidence regarding whether the plaintiff injured himself as he claims. The plaintiff, at trial, testified that he injured himself on Friday, June 2, 1995. Yet he alleges in his complaint that the injury was on June 5, a Monday. Records from Nashville's General Hospital reflect that he once gave June 3 as the date of his injury and later gave June 5 as the date. The plaintiff told Dr. David Gaw it was June 5. Confusion over the exact date of an injury is not unusual and failure for a worker to recall the exact date or recalling an incorrect date is usually immaterial to the outcome of the case. But the plaintiff himself emphasizes the exact date. It is important for him to prove it happened on a Friday. Wallace Harris, owner of the employer corporation, testified that the plaintiff told him he, the plaintiff, hurt himself while moving. This, of course, directly contradicts the plaintiff's testimony. But it also sheds some light on why the June 2 date surfaced at trail. By proving that he hurt himself on a Friday, the plaintiff proves that he did not hurt himself over the weekend when he moved. Ronnie Stroud was working with the plaintiff when the plaintiff says he injured himself. The plaintiff testified he told Stroud he hurt his back and that the two of them finished the work day with Stroud doing the overhead work with the plaintiff handing Stroud the materials. Stroud testified at trial that the plaintiff never complained about being hurt and that he, Stroud, never observed the plaintiff being hurt. The plaintiff had a previous work-related back injury. He denies that it was bothering him before June 2 or June 5, 1995. Yet he was scheduled for a Social Security disability examination with Dr. Gaw before June 2 or June 5. If he had no manifestation of disability - 2 -
Authoring Judge: Robe R T S. Br Andt , Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle, |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 11/14/97 | |
| Holloway vs. Collier, Jr.
01A01-9704-CV-00153
Originating Judge:William B. Cain |
Maury County | Court of Appeals | 11/14/97 | |
| O.W. Winsett v. Paul Orr and Mary Orr
02A01-9605-CH-00100
This case involves the alleged breach of an oral contract for the construction of a home. The trial court granted the builder summary judgment. Because some genuine issues of material fact exist, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Originating Judge:Chancellor Floyd Peete, Jr. |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 11/14/97 | |
| State vs. Robbie James
01C01-9609-CR-00388
|
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/14/97 | |
| American Color vs. Innovo
01A01-9703-CH-00120
Originating Judge:William C. Koch |
Court of Appeals | 11/14/97 | ||
| Thomas v. White
01A01-9610-CH-00479
Originating Judge:Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/14/97 | |
| Harris Hughes Jr. vs. TN Seeds, et al
02A01-9611-CV-00290
Originating Judge:Dick Jerman, Jr. |
Haywood County | Court of Appeals | 11/14/97 | |
| 01C01-9612-CC-00517
01C01-9612-CC-00517
|
Williamson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/14/97 | |
| Kenneth Rudstrom, et al vs. Ronald Terry Construction
02A01-9605-PB-00098
Originating Judge:Leonard D. Pierotti |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 11/14/97 | |
| City of Memphis vs. Civil serv. Comm., et al
02A01-9607-CH-00158
Originating Judge:C. Neal Small |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 11/14/97 |