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| Joseph Spottswood Crowell vs. Mayme Modena Roberson
E1999-00348-COA-R3-CV
The appellee has filed a petition for rehearing pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39. In the first ground of his petition, he asserts that we made a mistake in computing the "[a]djustment re: North Carolina property" reflected on page 8 of our opinion. The appellee is in error in this assertion. We purposely utilized an adjusting figure of $141,915 rather than $140,447.50 -- the latter figure being fifty percent of the value of the marital property share of the North Carolina property. The larger figure was a "plug" figure used to achieve equality in the overall division of the parties' marital property. Since it will be necessary to transfer funds to consummate this division, we deemed it equitable in this case to equally divide the parties' marital estate. The trial court found that equality was equitable and the evidence does not preponderate against this finding.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Frank V. Williams, III |
Roane County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/00 | |
| Borders vs. Crow
M1999-00985-COA-R3-CV
This is a suit by employee for compensation allegedly due after discharge under oral contract of employment. Upon finding that the discharge was for cause, the jury nevertheless returned a verdict for the employee for post-discharge compensation. On the employer's appeal, we vacate that part of the judgment awarding post-discharge compensation.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/00 | |
| In the Matter of the Estate of S.W. Brindley
M1999-02224-COA-R3-CV
This is a will contest between two siblings. After the onset of the parties' father's final illness, during which his competence was questioned and eventually a conservator appointed, the father executed a codicil to his will that materially altered the distribution of his estate in favor of his son, the appellant herein. The testator's daughter challenged the validity of the codicil in the underlying action. After the jury found that the codicil was not the testator's "own free act," but was instead the result of undue influence on the son's part, the codicil was declared a nullity. We affirm the jury's verdict.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Originating Judge:Stella L. Hargrove |
Giles County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/00 | |
| Douglas Kirkham, Jr. vs. State
M2004-02635-CCA-R3-HC
The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. Specifically, he alleges fatal deficiencies in the indictment; an involuntary, unintelligent, and unknowing guilty plea; an illegal and void sentence; and ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner has not presented any claims that justify habeas corpus relief. Therefore, we affirm the summary dismissal of the habeas corpus petition.
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Originating Judge:Jane W. Wheatcraft |
Sumner County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/13/00 | |
| State vs. Richard Korsakov
E1999-01530-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant, Richard Korsakov, appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, third offense. He contends that (1) the breath test results were inadmissible because the officer administering the test failed to observe him for twenty minutes; (2) the photocopies of certification and maintenance records were inadmissible for lack of compliance with the rules of evidence; (3) he should have been allowed to cross-examine the officer on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test for the purpose of impeachment; (4) a sealed, miniature bottle of cognac was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible; (5) the trial court improperly commented upon the evidence by instructing the jury to disregard the address on an exhibit's tag; and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial prejudiced him. Because we hold that the results of the breath test are inadmissible, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Originating Judge:Douglas A. Meyer |
Hamilton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/13/00 | |
| Hobbs vs. Hobbs
M1999-00715-COA-R3-CV
Two years after a divorce, and eight months after the divorce decree was affirmed on appeal, the former husband filed a pro se motion asking the trial court to review new evidence and to find that he had been defrauded and denied his constitutional rights in the divorce proceeding. The trial court treated the pleading as a motion under Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., and held that the motion was (1) untimely and (2) not supported by the proof submitted by the movant. We affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Originating Judge:Thomas W. Graham |
Sequatchie County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/00 | |
| State, ex rel Boren vs. Town of Orlinda
M1999-02240-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from property owners' quo warranto challenge to an ordinance annexing their property. Property owners allege that the annexation was not reasonably necessary for their health, safety, and welfare and for the annexing municipality. Prior to trial, the trial court denied Defendant's motion in limine which sought to exclude testimony of the property owners, a comparison of the services offered by the annexing municipality and a neighboring municipality interested in annexing the disputed area, evidence regarding the public hearing on annexation, and evidence of the annexing municipality's other annexations. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs, finding the annexation was not reasonable, and the trial court entered judgment thereon. Defendant appeals.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:James E. Walton |
Robertson County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/00 | |
| State vs. Michael S. Reid
M1999-00305-CCA-R3-CD
The Williamson County grand jury indicted the appellant, Michael S. Reid, with one (1) count of driving under the influence, third offense, one (1) count of driving on a revoked license and one (1) count of criminal impersonation. The appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license and criminal impersonation and, after a jury trial, was found guilty of driving under the influence, third offense. The trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent terms of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days, suspended after service of 180 days, for driving under the influence, third offense and six (6) months, suspended after service of ten (10) days, for driving on a revoked license. In addition, the appellant received a consecutive sentence of six (6) months, suspended after service of five (5) days, for criminal impersonation. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in (1) admitting hearsay evidence over his objection by allowing a Williamson County Sheriff's Deputy to testify as to the contents of a dispatch he received prior to stopping the appellant; and (2) allowing the state to introduce evidence concerning a prior stop of the appellant for which he was not charged. We hold that the officer's testimony concerning the dispatch was nonhearsay and relevant and, as a result, properly admissible. Additionally, we conclude that the appellant has waived the issue regarding the prior stop as a result of his failure to object to this evidence at trial and his failure to include this issue in the motion for new trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Originating Judge:Timothy L. Easter |
Williamson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/12/00 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Joseph S. Burris, Jr.
01C01-9907-CC-00247
Originating Judge:J. Steve Daniel |
Rutherford County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/12/00 | |
| Hudgens vs. Rogers
M2000-00239-COA-R3-CV
The mother of four minor children appealed the trial court's decision to change custody from Mother to Father based on a material change in circumstances. Prior to the entry of that order, it had been determined that an agreement, originally announced to the court which awarded custody of the children to Mother, had been set aside due to the court's finding that there had been no meeting of the minds of the parties as several critical issues had been left unresolved. We have determined that the court was correct in that decision. Therefore, the standard which the trial court should have applied was one of comparative fitness and best interest of the children rather than a material change of circumstances. This matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Originating Judge:Arthur E. Mcclellan |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 07/12/00 | |
| Talmage Crump vs. Kimberly Bell
W1999-00673-COA-R3-CV
This is a personal injury case. Plaintiff filed a complaint and issued summons, which was returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued an alias summons which was also returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued pluries summons more than one year after the return of the alias summons. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to comply Rule 3, Tenn.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff asserts that defendant is equitably estopped from relying upon Tenn.R.Civ.P. 3, because of action of defendant's liability insurance carrier leading him to believe that the defense would not be raised upon which he relied to his detriment. The trial court found no estoppel, and plaintiff has appealed.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:George H. Brown |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/12/00 | |
| Planters Gin Company v. Federal Compress &Amp; Warehouse
W1999-02460-COA-R3-CV-
Originating Judge:Kay S. Robilio |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 07/12/00 | |
| State vs. Ronald Wayne Ashby
M1999-01247-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant appeals his aggravated burglary conviction. He asserts that insufficient evidence supported the jury verdict, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of another crime, and that his sentence is excessive. We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the verdict and that the "other crime" evidence was properly admitted. We affirm the sentence.
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Originating Judge:William Charles Lee |
Lincoln County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/12/00 | |
| Johnna Hayes vs. Jeff Hayes
W1999-00445-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Johnna Lea Hayes (Beuerlein) and Defendant Jeff C. Hayes regarding the amount of Mr. Hayes' child support obligation and the enforcement of a promissory note executed by Ms. Beuerlein in conjunction with the parties' divorce. The trial court found (1) that Mr. Hayes has an annual income of $64,139.00, (2) that Mr. Hayes' child support obligation is $1,221.00 per month but that this amount should be reduced to $621.00 per month until Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is satisfied, (3) that Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage is equal to $14,940.00, (4) that Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is equal to $39,569.85, (5) that, subtracting Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage from Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note, the net amount that Ms. Beuerlein owes to Mr. Hayes is $24,665.85 plus ten percent (10%) interest, and (6) that each party shall pay his or her own attorney's fees. For the reasons set forth below, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Originating Judge:George R. Ellis |
Haywood County | Court of Appeals | 07/12/00 | |
| State vs. Joyce Newman
M1999-00161-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant pled guilty in Sequatchie County to two counts of selling a Schedule II substance and was sentenced to confinement for four years and six months. After serving six months, she was placed in community corrections. Subsequently, an affidavit was filed by her probation officer, alleging that she had violated her Community Services Behavioral Contract in several ways, including "breaking house arrest." Following a hearing, the trial court agreed that the defendant had violated the house arrest provision of the contract and ordered that she serve the remainder of her sentence with the Department of Correction. The defendant timely appealed, alleging that the trial court improperly considered certain evidence and that, if she was reconfined, she should have served her sentence at the local jail, rather than with the Department of Correction. Based upon our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for a new revocation hearing.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Thomas W. Graham |
Sequatchie County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/12/00 | |
| Eddie Brannon v. Pen Gulf, Inc.
03S01-9906-CH-00053
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Travelers Insurance Company (hereafter "Travelers") appeals the granting of summary judgment dismissing Reliance Insurance Company (hereafter "Reliance") as a party defendant before trial. Travelers asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the last injurious exposure rule did not create an issue of whether Reliance, as a subsequent workers' compensation insurance carrier for Pen Gulf, Inc., may be liable for Eddie Brannon's injury. An appeal from a summary judgment in a workers' compensation case is not governed by the de novo standard of review provided by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3), but by Rule 56, T.R.C.P. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tenn. 1991). No presumption of correctness attaches to decisions granting summary judgment because they involve only questions of law and the reviewing court must determine whether the requirements of Rule 56 have been met. Gonzales v. Alman Const. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Tenn. 1993). Summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56.3, T.R.C.P. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 28, 21 (Tenn. 1993). "It is almost never an option in workers' compensation cases. In a summary judgment hearing, even where the parties have no right to a jury trial, the trial judge is not at liberty to weigh the evidence." Hilliard v. Tennessee State Home Health Services, Inc., 95 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tenn. 1997). Eddie Brannon filed this action on March 23, 1998 to recover workers' compensation benefits for "bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome which was caused by the 2
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Howell N. Peoples
Originating Judge:Hon. Jerri Bryant |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/12/00 | |
| State vs. Seria D. Ward
M1998-00128-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant was convicted in Davidson County of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to confinement for seventeen years. He appealed the conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense, that his videotaped confession should have been excluded, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Thomas H. Shriver |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/12/00 | |
| State vs. Reginald Merriweather
W1999-02050-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant appeals his jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and especially aggravated robbery. He raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant's request for a mistrial based on a juror's response during voir dire; (2) whether the trial court erred in directing a witness to answer questions on cross-examination; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to certain lesser-included offenses. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Authoring Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
Originating Judge:John Franklin Murchison |
Madison County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/00 | |
| State vs. Michael Christopher Adams and Jerry Holt
E1999-00446-CCA-R3-CD
The defendants, Michael Christopher Adams and Jerry Holt, Jr., appeal their convictions by a Sullivan County jury. Adams was convicted of second degree murder and four counts of aggravated assault. He received a total sentence of forty-nine years. Holt was convicted of four counts of aggravated assault and received a total sentence of twenty years. Both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing. Adams also challenges the trial court's application of enhancement factors and failure to apply mitigating factors. We hold that the evidence is sufficient, but we hold that the trial court erred in sentencing. Adams's sentence is modified to reflect a total sentence of forty years, and Holt's sentence is modified to reflect a total sentence of twelve years.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Originating Judge:Richard R. Vance |
Sullivan County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/00 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Daronopolis R. Sweatt
M1999-2522-CCA-R3-CD
Originating Judge:John H. Gasaway, III |
Montgomery County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/00 | |
| State vs. Freddie Norment
W1999-01928-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for wounding a jail cell mate with a homemade knife. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: whether the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence; whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to examine a potential witness outside the jury's presence; and whether the trial court erred in failing to issue curative jury instructions after the allegedly improper testimony of a prosecution witness. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Jon Kerry Blackwood |
Fayette County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/00 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Shunna Demetria Hilliard
W1999-00483-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
Originating Judge:Julian P. Guinn |
Henry County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/00 | |
| State vs. Deshawn McClenton
W1999-00879-CCA-R3-CD
The Defendant, DeShawn McClenton, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offenses of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to thirty years imprisonment for the aggravated robbery conviction and to sixty years imprisonment for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence regarding his identity as the perpetrator was insufficient to support the convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in ruling that his prior aggravated robbery conviction and his three prior attempted second degree murder convictions were admissible to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify, and (3) that the movement and confinement of the victim were essentially incidental to the accomplishment of the aggravated robbery and were therefore insufficient to support a separate conviction for kidnapping. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Originating Judge:Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/00 | |
| State vs. Manolito Jemison
M1999-00752-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter on one count of first degree premeditated murder and the lesser offense of reckless homicide on one count of felony murder. The counts were merged into one conviction for voluntary manslaughter, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously applied one enhancement factor and failed to apply two mitigating factors. Based upon our review, we agree that an enhancement factor was improperly applied. However, since two other enhancement factors were properly applied, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Steve R. Dozier |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/11/00 | |
| Glenda Faye Tolliver v. National Health Care
E1999-01017-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for a hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff sustained an accidental injury during her employment with the defendant and that the trial court awarded the plaintiff a twelve and one-half (12-_) percent vocational disability. After a complete review of the record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed. LAFFERTY, SR. J., in which BARKER, J., and PEOPLES, SP. J., joined. Robert W. Knolton, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the appellant, National Health Care Corporation. William A. Hotz, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Glenda Faye Tolliver. MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, age 4, is a licensed practical nurse and a certified nursing assistant instructor. On March 6, 1996, the plaintiff was assisting Tracey Bunch, a nursing assistant trainee, in transferring a patient from a bed to a wheelchair in the defendant's health care center. The plaintiff testified that she felt pain in the right side of her neck, down her shoulders and at the base of her skull. The pain was in the cervical area and the right arm. The pain increased and the following day the plaintiff informed her supervisor. She was referred to Dr. Watson and then to Dr. Uzzle. The plaintiff testified that she had two past injuries, (1) in 199, she sustained a cervical strain while working. Her MRI was negative and she returned to work; (2) in 1993, she fell at the Cracker Barrel injuring her elbow, "it stoved up her neck" and she also injured her left knee. She returned to work. After treatment for her injury of March 6, 1996, the plaintiff returned to work on light duty. The plaintiff requested that her return be limited to an instructor, but she was made a supervisor on the three to eleven shift. On the same day that the plaintiff returned to work, she was fired. At the time of trial, the plaintiff was working two jobs, one as an LPN at the UT hospital and as a supervisor for Helen Ross McNabb, a rehabilitation center. The plaintiff testified that she has problems doing her work, such as giving EKG's, lifting woman's breast, and any computer work, since she must keep her head down. The plaintiff cannot work the floor, lift patients and deliver meal trays. By deposition, Tracey Michelle Bunch testified that on March 6, 1996, she was working as a nursing assistant trainee, working on her certified nursing assistant certification, when the plaintiff assisted her in moving an elderly patient in and out of bed. The plaintiff did not complain of any injury, but the following day the plaintiff was not available as the instructor. The following Monday, Ms. Bunch saw the plaintiff at work answering calls at the nurse's station. The plaintiff had to make a full body turn instead of just a simple head turn. Keri Trammell, Director of the National Health Center, testified that she hired the plaintiff as an instructor for the certified nursing assistant program and as an LPN supervisor. She stated that she was familiar with the report of March 6, 1996, and that the plaintiff was referred to see Dr. Uzzle. The plaintiff was allowed to continue to work but on light duty. About May 1, 1996, Dr. Uzzle removed these restrictions. On May 29, 1996, Ms. Trammell called the plaintiff into her office and advised the plaintiff, based upon the medical reports, that she would be returned to a supervisor's position. The plaintiff refused to accept the supervisor's position, stating that she could only work as an instructor. MEDICAL EVIDENCE By deposition, Dr. Maren L. Watson, a family practitioner, testified that he saw the plaintiff on March 11, 1996, with a complaint of neck pains as well as headaches. The plaintiff advised Dr. Watson that she was lifting a patient at the National Health Center and that evening the pain got worse. In his examination, Dr. Watson found that the plaintiff's vital signs were normal, she was in no distress and cooperative with the exam. As to the musculoskeletal exam, Dr. Watson palpated the plaintiff's neck, upper back and shoulders and found generalized mild tenderness. Although Dr. Watson found no muscle spasms, he did note that the plaintiff's right shoulder was resting one inch lower than her left shoulder. Dr. Watson opined that the plaintiff certainly sustained a cervical muscle strain due to lifting a patient and this caused some pain in her neck that had radiated to her shoulders and middle back, which warranted a few days off from work. Dr. Watson testified that the plaintiff was unhappy with his recommended course of treatment and he did not see her again. Dr. Watson could not give an opinion as to any assessment for physical impairment for the plaintiff. -2-
Authoring Judge: Lafferty, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:Daryl R. Fansler, Chancellor |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/11/00 |