APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner was originally convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and sentenced to thirty-seven years as a Range II offender. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged his indictment was void. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the testamentary intent of an 89-year-old widow who died leaving a sizeable estate. After one of the decedent's grandsons, acting as her executor, submitted for probate a February 1991 will and a June 1995 codicil, the decedent's surviving daughter filed a will contest proceeding in the Chancery Court for Sumner County, alleging that the will had been procured by the executor's undue influence and that the distribution of the estate should be governed by a 1989 holographic instrument. Following a bench trial, the trial court upheld the validity of the 1991 will and the 1995 codicil. On this appeal, the decedent's daughter asserts that the trial court erred by determining that the 1991 will and the 1995 codicil expressed the decedent's testamentary wishes rather than the 1989 document. We have determined that the evidence supports the trial court's conclusions and, therefore, affirm the judgment.

The Defendant, Winslow B. Roberts, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated robbery. The Defendant was sentenced to twenty years on each count of especially aggravated kidnapping, with the terms to be served concurrently, and ten years on each count of aggravated robbery, with the terms to be served concurrently. The trial court ordered that the Defendant's sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping be served consecutively to his sentences for aggravated robbery, for an effective sentence of thirty years. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict him of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, a manufacturers' representative, filed this action for a declaratory judgment that it is not indebted to the defendant for commissions on sales of tee shirts manufactured by Tee Jays Manufacturing Company and sold to Planet Hollywood, in light of the fact that the defendant's sole participation was to arrange a meeting between buyer and seller. The Chancellor found the plaintiff was liable for the commission under a contract theory. We affirm.

Defendant was indicted by a Shelby County grand jury on the charge of rape of a child. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to sexual battery and received a two-year sentence. The issue of how his sentence should be served was submitted to the trial court. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that it is necessary to remand for a new sentencing hearing since the trial court relied upon the defendant's failure to make a public confession at a church in determining the sentence.

The SREE General Partnership was formed for the purpose of owning and managing motel property in Nashville, Tennessee. During the ownership period, the property deteriorated. The partners sued a co-partner for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that his negligent management of the property was what caused the deterioration and resulting economic loss. The trial court ruled for the defendant. We affirm.

The defendant, Charles Roy Cole, was charged with aggravated assault and rape of a child. He was acquitted on the first charge and convicted on the second. The trial court imposed a sentence of 20 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding admissions against interest. The judgment is affirmed.

In this dispute over a landscaping contract, the Circuit Court of Maury County held that the contractor breached the agreement. The defendant contends that the court rewrote the agreement. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to several offenses in 1992, receiving an agreed effective sentence of twenty-four years. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied after a hearing. The Defendant filed a second post-conviction petition which the trial court summarily dismissed. The Defendant now appeals; we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jacob Lee Davis, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, reckless endangerment, and carrying a weapon on school property. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and one year each for the reckless endangerment and carrying a weapon on school property convictions. The trial court ordered that the latter sentences be served concurrent to the sentence for life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain each of the convictions and argues that the trial court erred in failing to strike six potential jurors for cause. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the two sentences for which he was incarcerated were being served concurrently and that both had expired, resulting in his being held illegally by the Tennessee Department of Correction for the second sentence. However, the Court of Appeals, presented previously with this same issue by the petitioner, determined that the sentences were to be served consecutively. Thus, the second sentence has not expired. We reverse the order of the post-conviction court that the two sentences were served concurrently and that the second sentence has expired. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.

Defendant, charged with possession with intent to sell and/or deliver a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, filed a motion to suppress over 300 grams of cocaine, paraphernalia, and U.S. currency discovered during a search of his vehicle. The trial court, Dickson County, granted Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search impermissibly exceeded the scope of Defendant's consent. The State appealed. After a review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property valued over sixty-thousand dollars, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to the minimum eight-year sentence, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony. The Defendant was sentenced as an especially mitigated offender to two years and seven months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted in the Cumberland County Criminal Court of aggravated sexual battery of a seven-year-old boy. Following the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed an appeal as of right to this court, raising three issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated sexual battery; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial, based upon newly discovered evidence; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted for driving under the influence (DUI), driving while his alcohol concentration was .10% or more (DUI per se), and DUI, second offense. After a jury trial on DUI and DUI per se, the jury acquitted the defendant of DUI and was unable to reach a verdict on DUI per se. A second trial was held, and the jury convicted the defendant of DUI per se. The trial judge then found this conviction to be a second offense. In this appeal, the defendant alleges (1) the defendant's retrial for DUI per se violated the principles of double jeopardy; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted the results of the breath test and related evidence; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of the arresting officer concerning his encounters with other motorists charged with DUI; (4) the trial court improperly considered a prior conviction for enhancement of the defendant's sentence; and (5) the trial judge erroneously failed to recuse himself. Upon review of the record, we reduce the defendant's conviction to DUI, first offense, remand for resentencing, and affirm the trial court in all other respects.

The defendant appeals from the revocation of his probation, contesting the trial court's jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Murray E. Body ("Plaintiff") filed this personal injury suit against the owner of a jet ski, Jim Lamarr ("Defendant"). Plaintiff sustained physical injuries while pulling ski ropes into his boat when Defendant's jet ski ran over Plaintiff's ski ropes. Plaintiff had a boating policy ("Policy") with Continental Insurance Company ("Continental") which had uninsured boater limits of $100,000. Defendant had a liability policy with limits of $50,000. Plaintiff contends that his damages exceed Defendant's limits and that his Policy should be interpreted to provide coverage for accidents involving underinsured boaters. Continental filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Policy's language clearly and unambiguously does not provide coverage for underinsured boaters. The Trial Court treated Continental's motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the motion. Plaintiff was granted an interlocutory appeal. We affirm.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a superseding indictment issued after the statute of limitations has elapsed must allege that the prosecution was timely commenced within the statutory period. After the trial court refused to dismiss the indictment, the defendants were tried and convicted of theft of property over $10,000. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the superseding indictment, which was issued after the statute of limitations had elapsed, did not have to allege facts showing that the prosecution was timely commenced with a prior presentment.