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| In matter of Hannah Parlow
W2000-01462-COA-R3-CV
After paternity was established and Mother was granted custody of minor daughter, Father filed petition to change custody on the ground of material change of circumstances consisting of Mother's remarriage to an allegedly violent man, and Mother's intention to move with the child out of the state. The juvenile referee denied the petition and, upon a de novo trial before a special juvenile judge of the juvenile court, Father's petition was denied. Father has appealed. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:George E. Blancett |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 06/14/01 | |
| Travis Watt v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., et al.
W2000-00104-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Joe C. Morris |
Madison County | Supreme Court | 06/14/01 | |
| Travis Watt v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., et al.
W2000-00104-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Joe C. Morris |
Madison County | Supreme Court | 06/14/01 | |
| Gary L. Holt, Sr. v. Ozburn-Hessey Moving Company and American Alternative Insurance Corporation
M1999-02563-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appellant appeals from the amount of the award of permanent partial disability benefits. After a complete review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the award made by the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. ' 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed LEE RUSSELL, SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, J. and JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR.J., joined Jeffrey P. Boyd, Jackson Tennessee, for the appellant, Ozburn-Hessey Moving Company James R. Tomkins, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Gary L. Holt, Sr. MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal by Defendant Ozburn-Hessey Moving Company (hereinafter referred to as "Ozburn-Hessey" or "the company") from an award of benefits made in favor of Gary L. Holt 1 ("Claimant") on a claim filed pursuant to the Tennessee Workers Compensation Act. The trial court held that the Claimant was an employee of Ozburn-Hessey and awarded the Claimant a forty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of an injury to the back which allegedly occurred on July 23, 1998. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in her holding that the Claimant was an employee of Ozburn-Hessey and not a mere independent contractor. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial judge's finding that the Claimant was an employee.
Authoring Judge: Lee Russell, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/14/01 | |
| State vs. Miles Mateyko
M1998-00275-SC-R11-CD
The defendant was charged and convicted of child abuse through neglect in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-401(a). The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the State did not establish that the defendant's children suffered any actual, deleterious effect or harm from the neglect. However, the intermediate court found that the defendant was guilty of attempted child abuse through neglect, and it remanded the case for resentencing. The State requested permission to appeal to this Court, and we hold that section 39-15-401(a) does require proof of an actual, deleterious effect or harm to the child's health and welfare and that the mere risk of harm is insufficient to support a conviction. We also hold that in those cases in which no such actual, deleterious effect or harm is shown, a defendant may be convicted of attempted child abuse through neglect under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-12-101, provided that the State is successful in making the required showing. Because the record in this case contains conflicting evidence as to the required intent necessary for the attempted crime, we remand this case to the Lincoln County Circuit Court for a new trial on the lesser-included offense of attempted child abuse through neglect. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee |
Lincoln County | Supreme Court | 06/14/01 | |
| Cora Cantrell, et al vs. Knox County Bd of Ed. et al
E1999-01557-SC-R11-CV
The issue in this appeal is whether non-certified, non-tenured teacher aides have under state law a reasonable expectation of continued employment beyond the term of their written contracts such that they are entitled to back pay and benefits beyond the expiration of their contract period. We conclude that teacher aides do not have a reasonable expectation of continued employment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Harold Wimberly |
Knox County | Supreme Court | 06/14/01 | |
| Robert Richardson vs. Deborah Richardson
W2000-02374-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:Robert A. Lanier |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 06/14/01 | |
| Eddie Limbaugh, Executor vs. Coffee Med. Center
M1999-01181-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:John W. Rollins |
Coffee County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| Charmaine West, et al vs. Media General Convergence, Inc., et al
M2001-00141-SC-R23-CQ
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court accepted certification of the following question from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee:
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
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Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | ||
| Estate of Julie Amos, et al. v. Vanderbilt University, et al.
M1999-00998-SC-R11-CV
We granted appeal in this case to determine whether the special proof requirements of Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996), extend to all negligence claims in which damages for emotional distress are sought as an item of compensatory damages. We hold that the special proof requirements of Camper apply only to "stand-alone" claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress. We further hold that Vanderbilt University Medical Center owed a duty to warn Julie Amos of her potential exposure to HIV so that she might take appropriate measures to protect third parties. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment in this case.
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr. |
Davidson County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| Eddie Limbaugh, Executor vs. Coffee Med. Center
M1999-01181-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:John W. Rollins |
Coffee County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| City of Chattanooga v. Kevin Davis
E2000-00664-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:Douglas A. Meyer |
Hamilton County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| Did Not Meet The Criteria For Acceptance of Scientific Testimony In Mcdaniel v. Csx Transportation
M2000-00185-WC-R3-CV
The plaintiff, Mary E. Miller, appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Tennessee for the 16th Judicial District at Murfreesboro, where the trial court found: (1) that Ms. Miller sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment and awarded twenty percent (2%) permanent vocational or industrial disability to the right lower extremity; (2) that the testimony of Ms. Miller's expert witness on reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) and fibromyalgia did not meet the criteria for acceptance of scientific testimony in McDaniel v. CSX Transportation Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn.1997), and therefore excluded his testimony; (3) that her condition of fibromyalgia and resulting psychiatric condition were not work-related and as such were not compensable; (4) that Ms. Miller was entitled to permanent medical care and treatment only for the injury to her right leg arising out of this work-related accident but not for fibromyalgia or any other conditions. Ms. Miller also raises some other procedural and evidentiary issues that will be addressed herein. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:Don Ash, Chancellor |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/13/01 | |
| Arthur Ray White v. Maytag Cleveland Cooking
E2000-01451-WC-R3-CV
The Second Injury Fund has appealed an award of total disability where the employer was ordered to pay 2 percent of the award and the Second Injury Fund was to pay the remaining 8 percent. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor |
White County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/13/01 | |
| Nancy Byrd v. Freshi Air Systems, Inc. (Formerly
E2000-00481-WC-R3-CV
The trial court found the plaintiff sustained a permanent psychological or mental impairment as a result of a confrontation between her and a supervisor of the defendant. The trial judge found the plaintiff sustained a fifty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the confrontation. The defendant says the evidence preponderates against the finding. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:O. Duane Sloan, Circuit Judge |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/13/01 | |
| Annette L. Hanna, et al. v. Federated Insurance Company
M2000-01967-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff's husband was killed in the course and scope of his employment and ordered the amount to which his dependants were entitled should be paid in a lump sum. The court further ordered the money to be paid into the court and that the Clerk and Master invest the funds and pay the interest earned thereon to the widow for the benefit fo the deceased's minor children. The defendant says the death benefits cannot be paid in a lump sum and further says, even if lump sum payments is permissible, the plaintiff has failed to show she can manage the money. Further, the defendant says the trial court erroneously failed to commute the award to its present value. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J. and JOSEPH C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., joined. D. Brett Burrow and Delicia R. Bryant, Nashville, Tennessee, attorneys for the appellant, Federated Insurance Company. Mark A. Rassas and Julia P. North, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Annette L. Hanna, widow of the decedent, Darren D. Hanna, and as Guardian for the minor children, Brett Hanna and Marian Hanna, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Darren D. Hanna. OPINION On September 2, 1999, Darren H. Hanna died as a result of a vehicle accident. There was no dispute that the accident occurred within the scope and course of the decedent's occupation with the defendant. Mr. Hanna was survived by his widow, Annette L. Hanna, who was born November 25, 1972, and two minor children, Marian Ruth Hanna, born September 17, 1994, and Brett Darren Hanna, born March 3, 1997. On November 5, 1999, the widow filed this case against the defendant. On June 15, 2, the widow was appointed guardian of the estate of the two minor children to receive any workers' compensation benefits, and also in that order the Clerk of the Chancery Court was authorized to receive the proceeds of any compensation benefits, invest them and pay the interest to Annette K, Hanna for the care and maintenance of the two minor children. On June 27, 2, the widow filed a sworn statement renouncing any benefits from the proceeds of any workers' compensation award conditional on the money being paid into the court and invested and distributed as subsequently ordered by the trial court. On June 3, 2, the trial judge ordered the defendant to pay a lump sum of $174,416. into the court less any credits for sums previously paid, and that the Clerk and Master have control of the funds for the purpose of investment and for payments of the interest earned thereon to the widow for the benefit of the minor children. Discussion Did the trial court have authority to order a lump sum payment_yes. In Jones v. General Accident Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1993), the court held "(i)n any event, we hold today that death benefits awarded under Tennessee Code Annotated. _ 5-6-21 can be commuted to a lump sum." In Clayton v. Cookeville Energy Inc., 824 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1992), the court approved a lump sum settlement to the widow, and in Ponder v. Manchester Housing Authority, 87 S.W.2d 282 (Tenn. 1994) the court approved a lump sum payment to the widow and an arrangement for the minor children's share to be paid to the clerk, invested and the interest therefrom paid to the children. The arrangement in this case is similar to the arrangement in Ponder except in this case the widow will not receive a share of the proceeds.1 Perhaps a more substantial argument is made by the defendant on the premise that the evidence does not support a lump sum award because the widow has demonstrated an inability to wisely manage a lump sum award. 1 The defendant's argument that the widow might remarry is not important because the defendant would still be liable for two-thirds of the benefit because of the two remaining children. -2-
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:James E. Walton, Judge |
Robertson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/13/01 | |
| State vs. Michael D. Simmons
M1999-00099-SC-R11-CD
Appellant, Michael Dewayne Simmons, pled guilty to felony theft of property and aggravated robbery but reserved for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i) the following certified question of law: whether the defendant was denied his federal and state constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Simmons had not been deprived of his speedy trial right. We granted Simmons' application for permission to appeal to determine whether a speedy trial violation occurred in this case where the only prejudice allegedly resulting from the delay is the defendant's lost possibility of concurrent sentencing with a sentence imposed for a prior unrelated offense. Because the delay of twenty-three months was not egregious, the reason for the delay was negligence or administrative oversight, and the only prejudice alleged is the lost possibility of serving a concurrent sentence, we conclude that the defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Seth W. Norman |
Davidson County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| Johnie N. Gibson vs. Douglas Trant, et al
M1999-00390-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Wheeler A. Rosenbalm |
Knox County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| Johnie N. Gibson vs. Douglas Trant, et al
M1999-00390-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Wheeler A. Rosenbalm |
Knox County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| Shawn Tolliver v. State of Tennessee
W2000-00834-CCA-R3-CD
The petitioner appeals his denial of post-conviction relief and asserts that the post-conviction court incorrectly found that he received effective assistance of counsel and, thus, knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Originating Judge:Judge Chris B. Craft |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/12/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Earl Jefferson
W2000-00608-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the admission of three alleged hearsay statements and the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/12/01 | |
| George Robert Rector v. Bridgestone (U.S.A.), Inc.
M1999-02284-WC-R3-CV
The defendant, Bridgestone, appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Rutherford County where the trial court awarded Mr. Rector a 5% vocational disability for a psychological injury incurred as a result of his employment and found Bridgestone responsible for the cost of future psychiatric treatment as well as the cost of psychiatric treatment previously provided by Dr. Ravi Singh. For the reasons stated in this opinion We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: James Weatherford, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:Robert E. Corlew III, Chancellor |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/11/01 | |
| Harold Liford v. Afg Industries, Inc.,
E2000-01474-WC-R3-CV
The employer and insurance company have appealed from an award of permanent total disability insisting the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding the employee's leg condition was causally related to his work injury. The employee contends the award of disability should have been determined to be of a permanent partial nature so that he would qualify for benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-242. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Ben K. Wexler, Circuit Judge |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/11/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Sharon Leming
M1999-01424-CCA-R3-CD
This is Defendant, Sharon Leming's, second appeal as of right to this Court. See State v. Leming, 3 S.W.3d 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). In both Defendant's first and second trial, a Humphreys County jury convicted her of premeditated first degree murder. After the Defendant's initial appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial due to the erroneous admission of testimony regarding statements made by the victim as to his fear of the Defendant. Following a second trial, the Defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this second appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review:1) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Defendant was mentally competent to stand trial; 2) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant of first degree murder; 3) whether the trial court erroneously admitted statements by the Defendant that she would kill her husband before she would allow him to leave her; 4) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony that the Defendant had stated that she needed a gun to protect herself from friends of the deceased; and 5) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's request for a mistrial, when the trial court declined to instruct the jury that a sentence of life with the possibility of parole would require that the Defendant serve a minimum of fifty-one years. Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Originating Judge:Judge Robert E. Burch |
Humphreys County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/11/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel T. Williams
M1999-00790-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder and the possession of a weapon by a convicted felon for shooting a man to death in an automobile shop. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder. Specifically, the defendant contends that the State failed to offer sufficient proof of the victim's cause of death. In support of his claim, he argues that the autopsy report, which states the cause of death as multiple gunshot wounds, was improperly admitted into evidence, that the medical examiner never directly testified that the victim died of gunshot wounds, and that no other evidence was presented to prove cause of death. After a thorough review, we conclude that the defendant waived any objection to the admission of the autopsy report by his failure to object at trial, and further, that sufficient evidence, other than the autopsy report, was presented to show that the victim died as the result of gunshot wounds. Consequently, the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Judge Seth W. Norman |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/11/01 |