APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Cocke County grand jury indicted the petitioner on four counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. On November 28, 1994, the petitioner pled guilty to all six counts. Following a sentencing hearing, he received twelve years on each aggravated robbery and six years on each aggravated assault. The trial court then ran some of the sentences consecutively resulting in an effective sentence of thirty years as a Range I, standard offender. On direct appeal this Court modified the sentence to twenty-four years. State v. Gregory Scott Caudill, No. 03C01-9510-CC-00338, 1997 WL 7009 at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, January 9, 1997). The petitioner's application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court was denied. Thereafter, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging errors made with regard to his plea. Counsel was appointed to assist him; an amended petition was filed; and the trial court conducted a hearing thereon. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. Through this appeal the petitioner avers that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking his plea. More particularly, he alleges that the trial court did not advise him of the mandatory minimum and maximum penalties that he could potentially receive. After reviewing the record, we find that the petitioner's specific claim lacks merit. However, through its brief the State observes that constitutionally mandated advice concerning the petitioner's confrontation rights was not provided by the trial court in its colloquy at the time of the petitioner's plea. Therefore, the State requests that this Court remand the case for a hearing to determine if this omission was harmless. We agree and remand the matter for this purpose.

The Petitioner pled guilty to first degree felony murder and to forgery, receiving concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of parole and one year's incarceration, respectively. The Petitioner subsequently petitioned the trial court for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals this decision. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered his pleas of guilty, causing him to enter his pleas involuntarily and unknowingly. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Petitioner's representation was not deficient and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a jury trial, Defendant, Wheatley Jamar Graham, III, was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon in commission of a felony. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-four (24) years incarceration as a Range I offender for two counts of attempted first degree murder, 4.5 years incarceration for three counts of aggravated assault and 1.9 years for possession of a weapon in the commission of a felony. The trial court ordered all sentences to be served concurrently, but merged two counts of aggravated assault with the two counts of attempted first degree murder. In this appeal as of right Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to convict Defendant of attempted first degree murder in counts 3 and 4 of the indictment; (2) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce evidence that Defendant refused to permit law enforcement officers to obtain a "hand swab" from him; and (3) whether the trial court erred in not dismissing Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault in counts 7 and 8 instead of merging these convictions with counts 3 and 4, attempted first degree murder, as being in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. We conclude that the evidence in this record supports Defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling Defendant's refusal for hand swabs was admissible and the trial court's merging of the two counts of aggravated assault with the attempted first degree murder conviction was not double jeopardy. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ralph Phillips, appeals as of right from the sentence imposed by the trial court, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his request for community corrections. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant First Capital Home Improvements appeals the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees Sara J. Malone and Jerry H. Malone in this breach of contract action. We affirm.

I concur in the conclusion that paragraph 17 of the lease was not triggered by the sale from the lessors to MDHA. I am also of the opinion that the critical sentence beginning with “All damages awarded for such taking . . .” refers to a partial taking, because the damages are described later in the sentence as “compensation for diminution in value to the leasehold or to the fee of the property herein leased.” A taking of the whole would not diminish the value of the leasehold or the fee; it would extinguish the leasehold and the fee and replace them with a monetary award.

This is a post-divorce custody proceeding. Jean Kelly Fisher Wallace (“mother”) was
granted a divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby County from Richard Edward Wallace
(“father”) in May, 1992. Mother was awarded custody of the parties’ minor child, Caroline. In
April, 1995, father filed a petition to change legal custody from mother to father. Following a
bench trial, the court denied the relief sought by father and permitted custody to remain with
mother. The court delayed its decision for six months, principally to allow mother the
opportunity to make changes in two aspects of her life: (1) the neighborhood in which she and
the minor child had been living for slightly over a year and (2) her ongoing association and
relationship with her boyfriend. The trial court felt both aspects were detrimental to the welfare
of the parties’ child.

Plaintiff, Sheila Faye Hagen McCall Barnett (Wife), and defendant, Ronald Edward Barnett, Sr. (Husband), were divorced by decree entered January 9, 1997. Husband appeals and presents issues concerning property division, alimony, and attorney’s fees.

The Defendant, Damien Marcess Jackson, was indicted for first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. A jury convicted the Defendant of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. He was subsequently sentenced as a Range I offender to twenty-five years for the murder and twelve years for each of the attempted murders, all to run consecutively. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress; the trial court's refusal to order the State to disclose the identity of a confidential informant; the sufficiency of the evidence; and the length and manner of service of his sentences. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Brian Bottoms, Sr., and Amy Bottoms have appealed from the judgment of the Juvenile
Court, terminating their parental rights in respect to Brian Scott Bottoms, aged 7, Israel Vaughn
Bottoms, aged 5, and Elijah Keane Bottoms, aged 2, and placing them in the legal guardianship
of AGAPE with the right to place them for adoption.

The petitioner, Anthony P. Jones, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and received consecutive sentences of ten years for each count for a total effective sentence of thirty years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing. The post-conviction court denied his petition. Consequently, the petitioner presents the following issue for our review: whether the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The captioned executors filed this suit to recover damages for the wrongful death of 88
year old Leslie H. Little, deceased, who lost his life in a motor vehicle collision at the
intersection of North Main Street and Colloredo Boulevard in Shelbyville, Bedford County,
Tennessee. Movement of traffic through the intersection was controlled by the multicolored
lights of an ordinary traffic control signal.
Several

This appeal involves the forfeiture under the Tennessee Drug Control Act of $4,710.75 in cash, twenty-two pistols, rifles and shotguns, a video camera, silver bars, and assorted gold and silver coins during a search of a residence in Waynesboro. The Commissioner of Safety ordered the currency and personal property forfeited despite the family’s contention that an initial search of their home and property without a warrant was illegal. The family filed a petition for judicial review in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The trial court found the personal property was lawfully seized after the officers obtained a search warrant and affirmed the forfeiture order. The family perfected this appeal. We have determined that there is substantial and material evidence to support the commissioner’s decision.

We concur with the results of the presiding judge’s opinion because we believe that the holding of Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.2d 777 (1956) controls the outcome of this case. The Harpeth Valley Utility District has been operating since 1959 under the aegis of the Utilities Law of 1937 [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-82-101, -804 (1992 & Supp. 1997)] providing water and sewerage disposal services to areas of Davidson, Williamson, and Cheatham Counties. As such, it is a governmental entity. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-82-301(a)(1) (Supp. 1997); First
Suburban Util. Dist. v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 128, 132-34, 146 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1941). Unless specifically provided otherwise, a city’s zoning power does not extend to state government instrumentalities located within its borders. See Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. at 583-84, 292 S.W.2d at 780-81.

The Defendant, Kathleen Malley, entered a guilty plea to theft of over $60,000, a Class B felony, in exchange for an agreed sentence of eight years incarceration. Following a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service of that sentence, the Defendant was ordered to serve six months in jail followed by twelve years of probation. She was also ordered to pay $100,000 in restitution. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant her full probation. We find no error. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Douglas C. Carr, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of driving while an habitual motor vehicle offender. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner was sentenced as a standard Range I offender to eighteen months incarceration in the Shelby County Correction Center with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the appellant alternative sentencing, and, on appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals, via certified question of law, the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine seized as a result of a warrantless search of the defendant's pockets. Because the officer made a lawful full custodial arrest of the defendant and searched the defendant incident to this lawful full custodial arrest, we affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.