APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was indicted on twelve counts of aggravated rape and six counts of statutory rape. He pled guilty to four counts of statutory rape, a Class E felony, with an agreed sentence of two years on each count, to be suspended upon service of thirty days. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, which ruling the defendant now appeals. The defendant also appeals the court's denial of his application for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of introduction of drugs into a penal institution. Her plea agreement required her to serve two concurrent six-year sentences for the offenses, but left the manner of service to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals this decision, arguing that the trial court erred by not ordering an alternative sentence. Because we conclude that the record in this case supports the denial of alternative sentencing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his premeditated first degree murder conviction for which he received a life sentence, arguing: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to convict him of first degree murder; (2) he should have been granted a mistrial due to the prosecutor's improper statements during closing arguments; and (3) he was entitled to a special jury instruction regarding diminished capacity. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Rickie Boyd, was convicted by a Shelby County, Tennessee jury of the offense of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 18 years incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal he maintains the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury with respect to the lesser included offense of theft of property. We conclude that is was error to fail to instruct the jury with respect to theft of property. However, we also conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Charles Goode was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape, and was sentenced to twenty-five (25) years in the Department of Correction. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the actions of the judge in sentencing him to serve the maximum sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he had effective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Plaintiff filed a retaliatory discharge action based on dismissal from employment for filing a worker's compensation claim. The Trial Judge held the record established the dismissal was not retaliatory. We affirm.

The defendant appeals his conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, but under $10,000. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a showup identification of him at the crime scene. He further contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth Chambly, appeals his convictions for three charges of aggravated sexual battery for which he received an effective sentence of ten years without parole. He raises various issues on appeal. We reverse the convictions and remand the case for a new trial because of the failure of the state to elect offenses and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the need for offense unanimity in the verdict. We also conclude that the trial court imposed an improper sentence of ten years for one of the convictions.

After pleading guilty to felony theft of identity, a Class D felony, and to violating her probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve one year confinement and one year probation with rehabilitation as a result of violating her probation. In addition, the trial court ordered her to serve an additional three years of probation for the felony theft of identity conviction, to run consecutive to the sentence resulting from the probation violation. The defendant appeals and asserts that the trial court erred in sentencing her on the probation violation, erred in sentencing her to three years of probation for the felony theft of identity, and erred in ordering the two sentences to be served consecutively. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Grundy County jury convicted the defendant, James Larry Cox, for the attempted second degree murder of Jimmy Sweeton. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to ten (10) years of incarceration. On appeal, the defendant questions whether he was denied a fair trial due to the trial court's exclusion of evidence relating to the victim's reputation for violence, and whether he was improperly denied the right to question the victim about a prior conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Richard L. Thompson, was accused by the Wilson County grand jury of incest of his stepdaughter, in three counts, all occurring between May and August 1999. On January 13, 2000, defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of incest for a sentence of six (6) years in the Department of Correction. As part of the plea agreement, defendant requested a sentencing hearing for the trial court to consider an alternative sentence and probation. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied defendant's request for an alternative sentence and probation and confined Defendant in the Department of Correction for six (6) years. On direct appeal, defendant raises five (5) issues: (1) Whether the trial court improperly considered a 1989 Pennsylvania conviction for an undetermined offense in finding defendant was not an appropriate candidate for full probation or split confinement; (2) Whether the trial court erred by finding certain statutory enhancement factors applicable to the determination of how the sentence should be served, where length of sentence was determined in the guilty plea; (3) Whether the trial court erred in finding that the sentence of confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense; (4) Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider whether measures less restrictive than confinement had been applied to this offender; and (5) Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider defendant's special needs into consideration as a factor that made alternative sentencing (community corrections) particularly appropriate in this case. Upon a review of the record, legal arguments, the briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we find no error. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Freddy Allen Perry, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to four counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced as a standard Range I offender to a total effective sentence of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of full probation and judicial diversion. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to state on the record its reasons for denying full probation and judicial diversion; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal. After review, we hold that appellate counsel's decision on direct appeal not to raise potentially improper closing arguments at trial by the prosecutor was neither deficient performance nor prejudicial to the petitioner. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petitioner's petition.

We granted review in this cause to determine whether the trial court erred in finding Timothy L. Crabtree permanently and totally disabled as a result of mental and physical injuries sustained while working for Cutler-Hammer. Crabtree injured his back while working on a production line; then, during treatment for the back injury, he developed severe depression. The trial court found that Crabtree was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combined effect of his mental and physical injuries. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel rejected this finding, concluding instead that Crabtree's mental disorder was not compensable because it was not connected to his back injury, which was compensable. On review, we conclude that Crabtree's mental disorder resulted from his physical injury. We hold, therefore, that Crabtree's mental disorder is compensable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Barry Marable, appeals from his convictions for aggravated burglary, felony reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest, and misdemeanor theft, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgments of conviction except for the one for the evading arrest. We modify that conviction from a Class D felony to a Class E felony and remand the case for sentencing.

The appellant, Steven Lee Whitehead, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of three counts of rape. Pursuant to the appellant's convictions, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding at the appellant's trial evidence of other sexual behavior by the victim; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of prior false testimony by the victim; (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to either exclude DNA evidence or, in the alternative, grant the appellant a continuance of the trial date; (4) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence concerning the appellant's character; (5) whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the appellant's convictions of rape; and (6) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of each count of rape. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court due to the court's failure to instruct the jury on sexual battery, and we remand these cases for a new trial.

The petitioner, Lawrence A. Strickland, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, which challenged his 1997 guilty-plea-based, Roane County conviction of aggravated sexual battery. Based upon our de novo review of matters of law, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the conviction court was void, although we reject the petitioner’s claim that the indictment is invalid. We reverse the judgment of the lower court and grant habeas corpus relief in the form of declaring the petitioner’s Roane County sentence void.  Because the conviction rests upon a guilty plea that, in turn, was premised upon the agreed sentence being valid, we vacate the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The conviction court shall afford the petitioner the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(4).

A Dickson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for rape, and the defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of sexual battery. The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was subsequently withdrawn. Almost two months later, the defendant filed a pro se motion alleging his motion for new trial was unilaterally and improperly withdrawn by counsel. Eventually, the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion for new trial since the defendant's original motion had been withdrawn, and no timely motion was pending. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court's jury charge authorized the jury to convict based on lack of consent, when "force or coercion" was alleged in the indictment. We conclude the motion for new trial was not properly before the trial court, thereby waiving this issue. Nevertheless, we have examined the issue for plain error and conclude defendant's allegation of error is totally without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner was originally convicted by a Lincoln County jury of criminal responsibility for first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The petitioner's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief.