APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Wendy Stevens, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to one count of forgery involving a value of more than $500 but less than $1,000, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value of more than $500 but less than $1,000, both Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eighteen months incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each offense, but immediately suspended the sentence in favor of supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant complains that the trial court erred by failing to grant her judicial diversion. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

These two cases, consolidated for consideration, present two issues of enormous significance. First, we must decide whether a non-profit corporation that provides privatized services to a governmental entity is subject to the public access requirements of the Tennessee Public Records Act. The second issue concerns the authority of the state, acting through the Comptroller of the Treasury, to require said corporation to submit to a state audit. In Memphis Publishing Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., Memphis Publishing Company and others seek access to records belonging to Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., a non-profit corporation which contracted with the Tennessee Department of Human Services to help administer a state-subsidized day care program. In seeking access to the records, the plaintiffs rely on both the Tennessee Public Records Act and provisions in the contracts between the corporation and the state. In Morgan v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., the Comptroller of the Treasury, John Morgan, seeks to require the same corporation to submit to a state audit. As authority for the audit, Morgan relies upon the contracts at issue in Memphis Publishing Co. and upon 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts. 960 (now codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-4-116 (Supp. 2001)), which authorizes the Comptroller to audit the records of entities which derive fifty percent or more of their gross revenue from state or local government. The trial -2- courts in the two cases found that Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. was not a governmental agency, but that all records in its possession were state property pursuant to the contracts between it and the state. Additionally, the trial court in Morgan found that an audit was authorized by 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts 960. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that (1) the contractual provisions at issue did not render the records public; (2) Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. was not a governmental agency subject to the Public Records Act; and (3) retroactive application of 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts 960 in Morgan would be unconstitutional. We granted permission to appeal. Because we have determined, for the reasons outlined below, that Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. operates as the “functional equivalent” of a governmental (state) agency, we hold that all of its records are subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act and therefore
are accessible by the public. This resolution effectively resolves the audit issue, and a separate decision thereupon is unnecessary. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed
 

The defendant, Antonio Mitchell, appeals his Shelby County jury conviction of attempted first-degree murder and claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. We disagree and affirm.

The defendant, Harold J. Turner, was convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI") and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county workhouse, with all but seven days suspended and the balance to be served on probation. In addition, his driver's license was revoked for one year and he was ordered to attend alcohol safety school and pay a fine of $500. In his appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider whether he was guilty of driving while impaired without first having to determine that he was not guilty of DUI. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of facilitation of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary for his participation with a codefendant in robbing a resident of a Springfield motel and burglarizing his room. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of six years. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, he filed a timely appeal to this court, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court properly denied his motion for a new trial based on his claim of an improper closing by the State; and (2) whether the trial court properly denied his request for a jury instruction on accessory after the fact. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eddie L. Coley, Jr., was convicted of aggravated robbery in 1996 and sentenced to confinement for twelve years. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress a photographic lineup and not allowing him to testify at his trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition; and, following our review, we affirm that denial.

We granted this appeal to determine the propriety of the trial judge’s actions in the adjudication of these workers’ compensation cases. We hold that the trial judge failed to perform all the duties of the judge’s office prescribed by law in these consolidated cases by improperly delegating his authority to the clerk and master to adjudicate the cases. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the cases are remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Trial Court Reversed;

 

This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. Pursuant to an agreed plea entered in October 1992, the defendant pled nolo contendere to three counts of aggravated rape of his niece, one count of aggravated sexual battery of his niece, one count of aggravated rape of his daughter, and one count of aggravated sexual battery of his daughter for an effective 35-year sentence as a Range I standard offender. Both victims were under thirteen years of age. On appeal, the defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel rendering his plea unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff, provider of a tax preparation service, sued defendants, a tax preparation service and individual former employees of plaintiff, for damages and injunctive relief resulting from procurement of breach of contract by defendant tax preparation service and for breach of noncompetition contracts by former employees. The trial court found that the plaintiff had no right to relief from the defendants and entered judgment for all defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The defendant was convicted of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class B felony; possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, he filed a timely appeal to this court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions. We affirm the defendant's convictions. However, because the jury assessed, and the trial court imposed, a fine for possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance that exceeds the statutory maximum, we remand the case to the trial court for a new jury to be impaneled to assess an appropriate fine in Count 2 and for entry of a corrected judgment as to the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction in Count 3.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a standard Range I offender. In this appeal, he raises two issues. First, he maintains that a prior inconsistent statement was improperly used by the prosecution to impeach the testimony of a prosecution witness. Second, he claims the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument. We find neither of these alleged errors requires reversal of this case and thus we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1996, the petitioner, Steven Murphy, was convicted of first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft over $1,000. He received a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree murder, 25 years for especially aggravated robbery and four years for the theft. The trial court ordered the petitioner to serve his sentences consecutively, resulting in an effective sentence of life plus 29 years. Following a direct appeal to this Court the petitioner's convictions were affirmed, but his sentence for aggravated robbery was modified to 21 years. State v. Adrian Wilkerson and Steven Murphy, No. 01C01-9610-CR-00419 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 891, at *45 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville Aug. 26, 1998). The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on September 18, 2000. The petitioner filed a post-conviction petition on October 30, 2000, which alleged that his trial attorneys were ineffective thereby depriving him of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Following appointment of counsel and a hearing, the trial judge entered an order denying post-conviction relief on March 12, 2001, and the instant appeal followed. After a thorough review of the record we find no error in the trial court's decision. The judgment of the lower court is therefore affirmed.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation. He argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his original sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted for first degree murder and convicted by a Hamilton County jury of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. He was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court improperly limited cross-examination of a state witness regarding bias. After review, we affirm.

 The defendant pled guilty to six counts of arson, Class C felonies, and one count of setting fire to personal property, a Class E felony. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of fifteen years incarceration followed by five years of probation. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in conducting an independent investigation into pyromania; (2) the length of his individual sentences is excessive; (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (4) the trial court improperly denied alternative sentencing. We modify the defendant’s sentences to an effective term of ten years in the Department of Correction.