APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Clara Jean Neblett, was indicted by the Robertson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a weapon. A jury found Appellant guilty of both counts. Appellant was sentenced to four years for her aggravated assault conviction and thirty days for her possession of a weapon conviction, to be served concurrently. In this appeal, Appellant challenges: (1) the trial court's ruling that defense counsel could not impeach the victim's testimony using extrinsic evidence of a prior bad act; (2) the trial court's denial of post-trial diversion; and (3) the trial court's refusal to apply mitigating factors to Appellant's sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant was indicted for first degree premeditated murder and a Monroe County jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that he was denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to question police officers about the victim's reputation for violence; (3) that the trial court erred by excluding from evidence an audiotape of a pretrial statement by witness Casey Miller; and (4) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding first degree murder and second degree murder. After a careful review of the jury instructions in this case, which fail to define "knowingly," we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

A Cumberland County jury convicted the Defendant for possession of a handgun while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Hughes D. Cadwell, was convicted in the Williamson County General Sessions Court for driving on a suspended license on December 23, 1997. He received a ninety-day suspended sentence and six months probation. On June 22, 1998, a probation violation warrant was issued, alleging that Defendant had failed to maintain monthly contact with his probation officer and that he had failed to pay probation fees and respond to a written request for action. Defendant was not arrested on the warrant until February 6, 2002. At the February 13, 2002, hearing in Williamson County General Sessions Court, Defendant pled true to the probation violation, and the court ordered him to serve the ninety-day sentence. Defendant appealed to the Williamson County Circuit Court on February 15, 2002. The circuit court conducted a hearing to determine whether to reinstate Defendant's probation. The court then dismissed the appeal on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction because Defendant had pled true to the probation violation. We conclude that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear Defendant's appeal from the general sessions court, de novo, and therefore, we remand the case to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Wesley D. Whittington, entered guilty pleas to the charges of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant and the State agreed to sentences of one year for the felony conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction, to be served concurrently. The negotiated plea agreement further stated that the trial court would determine the manner in which Defendant would serve his sentences. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to be served in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court’s refusal to order alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County grand jury indicted the defendant for aggravated assault. Subsequently a trial jury convicted the defendant as charged. By the time of the sentencing hearing, the parties had reached an agreement involving a pending probation revocation matter, a pending assault charge, and the instant conviction. With respect to the probation revocation, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve four years at 30% as a standard offender. On the assault conviction, the court ordered the defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days at 75%. Finally, the defendant received an agreed upon four-and-one-half-year sentence to be served at 30% as a standard offender for the aggravated assault conviction at issue in this case.¹ The sentences were ordered run in such a manner that the defendant by agreement received an effective sentence of eight and one-half years. The defendant later filed a motion for new trial and an amended motion for new trial unsuccessfully raising five issues. Through this appeal the defendant continues to assert that 1) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated assault conviction; 2) the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to present evidence that the victim's bodily injury resulted from another incident, not the defendant's purported use of a deadly weapon; and 3) the trial court erred in admitting a photograph allegedly showing the victim's injuries and in admitting a shirt allegedly worn by the victim at the time of the offense as these items were not provided to the defense in pre-trial discovery. However, after reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we find that these contentions lack merit or have been waived. We, thus, affirm the lower court's denial of relief.

Petitioner, Roosevelt Malone, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing and failed to grant Petitioner sufficient time to amend his petition. Upon review of this matter, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The appellant, Stephen Daniel Grande, Sr., was convicted by a jury of the unlawful manufacturing of methamphetamine and of introducing contraband into a penal institution. He received two concurrent three year sentences to be served on community corrections following service of a year of incarceration. In this appeal the appellant raises seven issues including whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. However, in his brief the appellant cites no relevant authority to support his arguments. Indeed, the brief of the appellant is little more than a written diatribe describing alleged unlawful activities on the part of the authorities in Henry County, Tennessee, and characterizing those alleged activities as unconstitutional. Under these circumstances we find that the appellant has waived review of the issues on appeal. Nevertheless, we have in the interests of justice, reviewed the primary issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. We hold that the evidence is more than sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Montrell Clements, was convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated assault and sentenced to twenty-two years and six years, respectively, to be served concurrently. The defendant timely appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in No. 00-14457 to reflect the defendant's conviction offense, which was omitted from the judgment form.

The petitioner, Allen Oliver, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The petitioner pled guilty to various offenses pursuant to a plea agreement on July 2, 2001, and his petition for post-conviction relief was stamped filed in the clerk’s office on July 3, 2002. Because the judgment of conviction did not become final until thirty days after its entry, the petition for post-conviction relief was timely filed. Thus, we reverse and remand to the post-conviction court for further proceedings.

A Tipton County jury convicted the defendant, Robert Frost, of bribery of a public servant. The trial court subsequently ordered the defendant to serve three years as a standard offender in community based alternative sentencing. The defendant now brings this direct appeal of his conviction, challenging (1) the trial court's decision to admit certain exhibits over his objection; (2) a certain portion of the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding his indicted offense; and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we find that none of the defendant's allegations merit relief and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.