APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit challenging the reapportionment plan for the districts of the Tennessee Senate that the Tennessee General Assembly enacted after the 2020 census.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that the reapportionment plan violates article II, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution because it fails to consecutively number the four Senatorial districts included in Davidson County.  The Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief.  The trial court granted a temporary injunction enjoining the Defendants from enforcing or giving any effect to the boundaries of the Senatorial districts.  The trial court provided the General Assembly with fifteen days to remedy the defect pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-18-105, stating that if the defect was not remedied, the trial court would impose an interim plan for the 2022 election.  Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-5-101(a)(1) sets the deadline for filing candidate nominating petitions as the first Thursday in April at noon.  Thus, the trial court further extended the statutory April 7, 2022 filing deadline for Senatorial candidates until May 5, 2022.  The Defendants filed an application for extraordinary appeal in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.  This Court assumed jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d)(3).  We conclude that the trial court erred by granting the injunction because it failed to adequately consider the harm the injunction will have on our election officials who are detrimentally impacted by the extension of the candidate filing deadline, as well as the public interest in ensuring orderly elections and avoiding voter confusion.  We vacate the injunction and remand to the trial court.  

Sharon G. Lee, J., dissenting.

On April 6, 2022, a three-judge panel granted a temporary injunction enjoining the defendants, William Lee, as Governor of Tennessee, in his official capacity, Tre Hargett, as Tennessee Secretary of State, in his official capacity, and Mark Goins, as Tennessee Coordinator of Elections, in his official capacity, from enforcing or giving effect to the reapportionment plan for the Tennessee Senate. The Senate reapportionment plan creates four senatorial districts within Davidson County that are not consecutively numbered (the districts are numbered 17, 19, 20, and 21). Yet article II, section 3, of the Tennessee Constitution requires that in a county with more than one senatorial district, the districts have to be numbered consecutively. The three-judge panel gave the General Assembly fifteen days (until April 21, 2022) to remedy the constitutional defect and extended the qualifying deadline for prospective Senatorial candidates from April 7, 2022, to May 5, 2022.

Defendant, Mark Dewayne McMurry, was indicted for and pleaded guilty to robbery.  Prior to sentencing, Defendant moved to recuse the trial judge.  The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for recusal and, following a sentencing hearing, sentenced Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to serve 10 years in incarceration.  In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges his sentence as excessive and argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for recusal.  Following our careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Derrick Himes, of three counts of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery.  The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years for each rape of a child conviction and eight years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction.  The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for each rape of a child conviction, concurrent sentences of eight years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, and ordered that the
twenty-five-year sentence and the eight-year sentence be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to elicit irrelevant and prejudicial testimony from the State’s witnesses, and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Amanda L. Moore, Defendant, appeals after a jury convicted her of two counts of vehicular assault, one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), and one count of reckless endangerment.  The trial court merged the DUI conviction into the convictions for vehicular assault.  Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of four years.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court improperly admitted the results of a blood draw used by the hospital for medical treatment; (2) the trial court improperly allowed her to be questioned extensively about her driving history on cross-examination; (3) the trial court improperly allowed the State to meet with its expert during cross-examination; and (4) the trial court had improper ex parte communication with the jury during deliberation.  After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment form for DUI.  

The Defendant, Wayne David Jones, was convicted by a jury of two counts of reckless homicide, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of child neglect, for which he received an effective twenty-five-year sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficent to support his convictions because the jury improperly weighed conflicting expert medical testimony regarding the thirteen-month-old victim’s head trauma and cause of death.  Following our review, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions.  However, we determine error with the classification of the Defendant’s child neglect conviction as a Class A misdmeanor and the imposition of a misdemeanor sentence.  Accordingly, we vacate the conviction and sentence for child neglect and remand for entry of a modified Class E felony child neglect conviction and for the trial court to impose a corresponding felony sentence.  In all other respects, we affirm. 

Appellant appeals the judgment entered against him by the trial court, ordering him to pay Appellee unpaid wages. We affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Lamario Hill, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment and concurrent sentences of nine and four years, respectively. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the judgment for his life sentence is void (1) because it was imposed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(i), which he claims is invalid, and because it was imposed in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-501(a)(2) and 40-28-115(b)(1); and (2) because it was imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Markist Cole, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that due process considerations warranted the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The pro se Petitioner, Tut Mayal Tut, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court but remand the case for entry of corrected judgments.

This appeal involves the calculation of post-judgment interest applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121. The trial court calculated
post-judgment interest utilizing the statutory interest rate that was applicable when the judgment was entered without modifying the interest rate when the statutory rate subsequently changed. Discerning no error, we affirm. We also deny the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death lawsuit.  James Williams (“Plaintiff”), individually as next of kin and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Granville Earl Williams, Jr., deceased (“Decedent”), sued Smyrna Residential, LLC d/b/a Azalea Court and Americare Systems, Inc. (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”).  Decedent was a resident of Azalea Court, an assisted living facility.  Plaintiff alleged his father died because of Defendants’ negligence.  Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration agreement (“the Agreement”) entered into by Decedent’s daughter and durable power of attorney Karen Sams (“Sams”) on behalf of Decedent when the latter was admitted to Azalea Court.  Notably, the durable power of attorney (“the POA”) did not cover healthcare decision-making.  The Trial Court held that Sams lacked authority to enter into the Agreement and that, in any event, the wrongful death beneficiaries would not be bound by the Agreement even if it were enforceable.  Defendants appeal.  We affirm.

The Petitioner, Billy Gene DeBow, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief from his first-degree murder conviction.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court abused its discretion by dismissing his petition without ruling on the merits of his claims and that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his judgment is void and his sentence is illegal.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition. 

This appeal arises from the denial of parole to an inmate by the Tennessee Board of Parole.  The Tennessee Board of Parole denied the inmate parole in March 2020.  The inmate’s administrative appeal was also denied.  Thereafter, the inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the chancery court.  However, the chancery court dismissed the petition without prejudice due to outstanding costs in prior civil cases.  The inmate then filed a second petition with the chancery court.  The chancery court dismissed the second petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not filed within sixty days of the Tennessee Board of Parole’s final decision in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102.  The inmate appeals.  We affirm.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, a fourth grade math and science teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff developer objected to the defendant town’s enforcement of a new energy code after the developer received preliminary plat approval.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant town.  We affirm. 

This appeal involves an award of attorney fees after a remand from this Court.  The appellant argues that the statute authorizing such fees is inapplicable by its terms and also unconstitutional as a violation of her right to access the courts.  We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court erred in its denial of her petition. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, a computer teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

The Defendant, Christopher Scott Montella, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2018).  He received a sentence of eleven years.  On appeal, the Defendantcontends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sever, (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search, (4) the Defendant suffered a violation of Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when the State failed to inform the Defendant the victim’s trial testimony would be different than the victim’s previous testimony, (5) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct, and (6) the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant to eleven years.  We conclude that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sever; however, the error was harmless.  We reverse the Defendant’s conviction based on juror misconduct and remand the case for a new trial.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, the school principal at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) and reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). With respect to her NIED claim, the principal alleged that by breaching its duty to keep the students safe, the employer foreseeably caused her severe emotional distress. As to her RIED claim, she averred that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving, despite receiving numerous warnings, disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss as to both claims, finding that the principal’s allegations satisfied the pleading requirements to sustain the claims. Employer appeals. We conclude that the principal did not allege the type of relationship to the injured or deceased party required for a plaintiff who did not witness the injury-producing event to recover under a NIED claim. The principal’s allegations also failed to show conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to both issues and remand the case for dismissal of the action against the employer.

The Defendant, Gerald N. Crawford, pleaded guilty to delivery of heroin, a Class B felony, and possession with the intent to sell heroin, a Class B felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(2), (4) (2018) (subsequently amended).  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent twelve-year, Range I sentences, and after a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the sentences in the Department of Correction.  The Defendant filed a motion to modify the manner of service of the sentences, which the court denied.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion.  We affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court determined that both the husband and the wife had proven their grounds for divorce and declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129(b). The trial court also (1) declined to adopt the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan, (2) determined that the separate assets she contributed to the marriage had become marital property through transmutation, and (3) declined to award attorney’s fees to her as alimony in solido. The wife has appealed, and the husband seeks attorney’s fees and costs on appeal, characterizing the wife’s appeal as frivolous. We affirm the trial court’s final order of divorce but modify the order to prohibit the husband from consuming alcohol during his co-parenting time. We decline to award the husband attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga. Woodmore’s school secretary sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The school secretary alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the school secretary had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the school secretary sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the secretary is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

The Petitioner, Michael Dillon Lambdin, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition seeking relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder and life sentence.In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because (1) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the Petitioner's police statement due to the Petitioner's intoxication; (2) counsel failed to object to crime scene and autopsy photographs; (3) counsel introduced a prejudicial crime scene photograph of the victim;(4) counsel failed to object to an improper statement made during the State's rebuttal argument; and (5) counsel failed to request an accomplice jury instruction in writing. The Petitioner also asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial.After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.