APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Wilmore Hatfield, was indicted for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, felony possession of a weapon, and driving under the influence (DUI). Following a jury trial, Hatfield was found guilty of felony reckless endangerment, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, and DUI. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of two years for the felony reckless endangerment conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction. On appeal, Hatfield raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether felony reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment; (2) whether the trial court's DUI instruction was proper; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; and (4) whether his sentences were excessive. We hold that felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault committed by intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to another by use or display of a deadly weapon. Therefore, the felony reckless endangerment conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial on the lesser charge of misdemeanor assault. Regarding Hatfield's DUI conviction, we conclude that the trial court properly charged the jury and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. However, we find that the trial court erred by ordering Hatfield to serve his entire eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence in the county jail. Accordingly, his DUI conviction is affirmed; however, his sentence is modified to reflect a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all time suspended except forty-eight hours to be served in the county jail.

The Appellant, Renne Efren Arellano, was indicted by a Maury County grand jury for one count of aggravated arson, a class A felony, eight counts of attempted first degree murder, class A felonies, and one count of felony possession of a weapon, a class E felony. A negotiated plea agreement allowed the Appellant to plead to one count of arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and one count of felony possession of a weapon in exchange for an effective twelve-year sentence. The manner of service of the twelve-year sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the twelve-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Arellano contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to any form of alternative incarceration. However, plain error dictates that the convictions be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings because aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder.

The Appellant, Billy Joe Porterfield, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnaping, especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of aggravated rape, all arising from a single criminal episode. As a result of these convictions, Porterfield received an effective sentence of one-hundred-fifteen years imprisonment. On appeal, Porterfield argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors in determining the appropriate sentences. Finding no merit to these issues, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jesse Wayne Baker, pled guilty to introduction of a controlled substance into a penal institution, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to four years to be served consecutively with a previous sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in imposing consecutive sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals the ruling of the Cocke County Circuit Court modifying the sentence of the Appellee, Bradley Ryan Webb, pursuant to Rule 35, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Webb received an effective six-year Department of Correction (DOC) sentence, which stemmed from six theft convictions in Cocke and Jefferson counties. The plea agreement provided that the six-year DOC sentence would be served concurrently with a federal sentence Webb was serving. Following a timely filed Rule 35 motion, the trial court modified Webb's DOC sentences to "time served" and ordered removal of the state detainer warrant lodged against Webb. The trial court found that modification was necessary to effectuate the intent of the plea agreement. The State argues that the trial court's ruling was improper because Webb's sentences were imposed as a result of an "agreed plea," and any post-sentencing developments complained of by Webb were not unforeseen. After review, we conclude that Webb's sentence was improperly modified. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded for reinstatement of the judgments of conviction as originally entered.

The Knox County Criminal Court denied petitioner Ronnie Lee Houck post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner challenged his 2000 conviction of aggravated sexual battery on the grounds that his guilty plea to that offense was unknowing and involuntary and the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. From the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner appeals. We find no error and affirm the lower court's judgment.

The Knox County Criminal Court denied petitioner Ronnie Lee Houck post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner challenged his 2000 conviction of aggravated sexual battery on the grounds that his guilty plea to that offense was unknowing and involuntary and the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. From the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner appeals. We find no error and affirm the lower court's judgment.

The defendant, Stacy R. Dowell, appeals as of right his conviction, following a bench trial before the Johnson County Criminal Court, for driving while his blood alcohol concentration was .10 or greater, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days with forty-eight hours to be served in the county jail and the remainder on probation. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence relative to his blood alcohol concentration. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her judicial diversion and full probation following her guilty plea for identity theft, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced her to two years in split confinement, with ninety days to be served in weekend confinement, and the balance served on probation. The trial court ordered the defendant to pay one thousand dollars ($1000) in restitution. Because the trial court failed to place its findings on the record, we remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, Edward Dean Mullins, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issues presented for review are (1) whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (2) whether the petitioner's guiltypleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying the petitioner's claim of prosecutorial misconduct; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying the petitioner's motion for severance; and (5) whether the trial court erred by ruling that the indictment need not include the applicable aggravating circumstances. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Edward Dean Mullins, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issues presented for review are (1) whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (2) whether the petitioner's guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying the petitioner's claim of prosecutorial misconduct; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying the petitioner's motion for severance; and (5) whether the trial court erred by ruling that the indictment need not include the applicable aggravating circumstances. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Stacy R. Dowell, appeals as of right his conviction, following a bench trial before the Johnson County Criminal Court, for driving while his blood alcohol concentration was .10 or greater, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days with forty-eight hours to be served in the county jail and the remainder on probation. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence relative to his blood alcohol concentration. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Gregory Pierce, pled guilty to attempted rape of a child, and the trial court accordingly sentenced him to serve eight years as a Range I standard offender for that conviction. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for alternative sentencing based upon the defendant's pre-sentence report, which includes a risk assessment evaluation outlining the defendant's potential to re-offend. The defendant now appeals the trial court's denial of his alternative sentencing request, arguing that the denial was improperly based on his polygraph results. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court acted properly and accordingly affirm the defendant's sentence.

The Defendant, Gregory Lamont Jordan, brings this appeal from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon. In this appeal, he argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the course of his plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dena Paulette Rackliff, was found guilty by a jury of falsely accusing her ex-husband of sexually abusing their seven-year-old daughter, which constitutes a class E felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to eighteen months in the Robertson County jail. The trial court further ordered that after the Defendant served ten days in jail, her sentence would be probated for six years. The Defendant presents three issues in this appeal as of right: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for falsely reporting child sexual abuse; (2) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the conduct that constitutes the crime of falsely reporting child sexual abuse; and (3) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Kennedy, pled nolo contendere to numerous burglary, theft and vandalism charges in Chester and Henderson Counties. He received an effective sentence of fifteen years. The cases were consolidated at the trial level and on appeal. Pursuant to the plea agreement reserving a certified question of law, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress items found during an illegal search. We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction as to three of the cases in Henderson County because the certified question of law is not dispositive of these cases. We affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, William Roy Gray, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Madison County of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail and imposed a one hundred fifty dollar fine ($150) for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction and six months in the county jail for the resisting arrest conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress, in failing to consider certain mitigating factors when sentencing the appellant, and in ordering the appellant to serve his sentences consecutively. After a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant entered guilty pleas to aggravated assault, A misdemeanor theft of services, E felony vandalism, and two counts of aggravated burglary. For these offenses the defendant received an agreed upon effective sentence of six years with the manner of service to be determined at a subsequent sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court denied the defendant alternative sentencing. Through the instant appeal the defendant contests this denial. However, after reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we find that the defendant waived this issue and that, even if not waived, the claim lacks merit. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's action

The Defendant, Rolando Rosas Contreras, was convicted by a jury of three counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of the three rape convictions, and he was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to six years for each of the two convictions for aggravated assault. The trial court ordered all sentences to be served concurrently for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by sentencing him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. We affirm the convictions and modify the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Defendant, Terry Lynn Carter, appeals her conviction in the Hardeman County Circuit Court for aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced, as a Range II multiple offender, to serve nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that the trial court erred by allowing the assistant district attorney to make improper comments at trial; and that the prosecuting attorney failed to provide defense counsel prior to trial with a copy of a letter that Defendant wrote to the victim. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the letter into evidence because the State violated its discovery obligation to Defendant. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.