APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Chauncey Daugherty, of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days and ordered 180 days be served in the county workhouse followed by probation. On appeal, the defendant maintains the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Willie Lee Davidson, pled guilty to the offenses of hindering a secured creditor and the sale of cocaine. As part of the plea agreement the appellant agreed to a sentence of two years for the former offense and three years for the latter. By agreement the sentences were to run concurrently, with the manner of service to be left to the trial court. The trial court denied any form of alternative service of the appellant's effective three-year sentence and ordered the appellant to serve his sentence in incarceration. From this decision the appellant brings this appeal. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we hold there is no reversible error in this case. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

After pleading guilty in the Cheatham County Circuit Court to felony possession of a firearm, the appellant, Douglas R. Beecham, was placed on probation. Immediately after the institution of probation, the appellant submitted a falsified urine sample to his probation officer to use in a drug screen. Based upon the falsified sample, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered the appellant to serve a portion of his sentence in confinement and the balance on probation. On appeal, the appellant complains that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, four years for the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, six years for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction, and twelve years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction. The attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction was ordered concurrent with the other three convictions which were ordered consecutive to one another, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court committed plain error by allowing testimony concerning his gang affiliations; and (3) whether the trial court appropriately sentenced the defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, George Glenn King, Jr., appeals his convictions by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury for first degree murder for which he received an effective sentence of life in prison. He was also convicted of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, for which he received a concurrent sentence of eight years. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the state's eliciting expert testimony on the ultimate issue of his insanity and prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument constitute plain error. He also argues that the trial court should have merged his convictions for premeditated and felony murder arising from a single killing. We agree that the defendant's first degree murder convictions should be merged, but we otherwise discern no plain error and affirm the judgments of conviction as modified.

The Defendant, Jerry Lee Honey, was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant on charges of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. A trial jury subsequently convicted him of first degree premeditated murder and acquitted him of the remaining charges. The defendant then unsuccessfully pursued a new trial motion. In this appeal the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statement and that the jury's verdict is inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we find neither of the defendant's claims meritorious. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ronald W. Jenkins, II, pled guilty to reckless homicide, felony reckless endangerment, and DUI, second offense. The Defendant was thereafter sentenced to two years for the homicide, one year for the reckless endangerment, to be served concurrently, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI, to be served consecutively. The Defendant's driver's license was also suspended for a period of two years. The Defendant's sentences were suspended after service of 150 days, and he was placed on three years of probation. Within a few months of beginning his probationary period, the Defendant was arrested and convicted of driving on a revoked license. A probation violation warrant was filed, a hearing conducted, and the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. The Defendant now appeals, complaining that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentence is excessive. Because this Court previously determined that the petitioner's sentence was not excessive on direct appeal, we dismiss this issue. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court and affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, N'Kosi Tuggle, entered a plea of guilt to aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of eight years. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that he should have been classified as an especially mitigated offender. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Darrell M. Anderson, was convicted of aggravated assault and simple assault. The trial court imposed a Range III, ten-year sentence for the aggravated assault and a concurrent 11-month, 29-day sentence for the assault. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction. The judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Michael Allen Conrad, appeals as of right the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to three counts of attempted statutory rape, a Class A misdemeanor. He received the agreed sentences of two consecutive and one concurrent eleven-month-twenty-nine-day terms on probation. The defendant contends that his guilty pleas were involuntary because his attorney erroneously advised him that he would not have to register with Tennessee's sexual offender registry. He argues that had he known that he was subject to the registry, he would not have pled guilty but would have gone to trial. We conclude that the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas to prevent manifest injustice.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner contends his trial counsel failed to investigate his case and meet with him regularly. He further contends his trial counsel never held a hearing on his motion to suppress his identification, thus rendering his plea involuntary. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Donald Clark, guilty of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to serve twenty-seven years as a violent offender. The defendant now appeals his conviction, (1) challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and (2) the trial court's failure to charge the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, but that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the offense of reckless aggravated assault. However, we find that error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Todd Drinnon appeals the dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief and attacks his convictions for a variety of reasons, mostly related to the claimed ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as raising issues that had been previously determined and for failure to allege or establish grounds for reopening his previous petition. We affirm.