APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder and reckless homicide. The reckless homicide conviction was merged with the murder conviction and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal and in allowing a videotape and photograph of the crime scene into evidence.  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

David Wayne Fountain, who pleaded guilty to Class E felony attempted theft, appeals from the Rhea County Circuit Court's determination that he serve a two-year, split-confinement sentence for his crime. He claims that he should have received a minimum, one-year probationary sentence. We disagree and affirm the lower court's sentencing pronouncement. However, we modify the sentence imposed to the extent that it mandates day-for-day confinement.

The Defendant was indicted for driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license, evading arrest, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, vehicular assault, and violation of the implied consent law. A Rhea County jury convicted the Defendant of driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and vehicular assault. The trial court merged the DUI and reckless endangerment convictions into the vehicular assault conviction. It sentenced the Defendant to four years for vehicular assault and to six months for driving on a revoked license, to be served concurrently. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve one year in the county jail, perform one hundred hours of public service, pay $800 in restitution, and imposed a fine of $5,500. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following issues: (1) whether the trial court properly allowed testimony about the Defendant's erratic driving in Hamilton County; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the results of a blood alcohol test into evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by permitting witnesses to testify about the percentage of alcohol in the samples of blood tested; and (4) whether the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder by a Lawrence County jury and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, the trial court erred in allowing opinion testimony of a lay witness based on an experiment regarding the canning of green beans in a pressure cooker, and erred by allowing the statements of three witnesses to be read aloud by the witnesses to the jury and then become exhibits. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant was convicted in 1991 of second degree murder, and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He subsequently filed a "PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM CONVICTION OR SENTENCE PURSUANT TO TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED 40-30-301 THROUGH 40-30-312," and the trial court summarily dismissed the petition relying upon the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. The Appellant now appeals the summary dismissal of his opinion. Our review of the complete petition filed by the Appellant reveals that, despite the statutory sections inappropriately cited in its title, the Appellant sought relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand to the trial court for findings of fact pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act.

A trial court found the Defendant not guilty by reason of insanity of the offense of stalking. Following judicial hospitalization in the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, the Defendant filed a motion requesting the trial court to expunge all public records pertaining to the stalking offense. The trial court denied the Defendant's request. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's request to expunge her records. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the petitioner on multiple offenses. At the conclusion of a trial on the indictment first prosecuted, a jury convicted the petitioner of aggravated robbery. See State v. Robert E. Pugh, No. W1999-01260-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 298697, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 17, 2000). For this offense he received a twelve-year sentence as a standard offender. Id. He subsequently pled guilty to ten additional charges. The trial court then sentenced him as a multiple offender for nine of these counts and as a violent offender for one count. His agreed upon sentences for these offenses in combination with the aforementioned twelve-year sentence resulted in an effective twenty-six-year sentence for all eleven convictions. However, the petitioner later filed a pro se post-conviction petition attacking his pleas by alleging that his counsel at that time provided him ineffective assistance. The trial court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition also alleging ineffective assistance at trial. Following a hearing, the trial court found none of the petitioner's allegations meritorious and denied him relief. Through this appeal the petitioner continues to assert that he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his guilty pleas and the trial at issue. However, after reviewing the record provided and appropriate authorities, we affirm the trial court's denial of the post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Abebreellis Zandus Bond, was convicted by a jury of two sales of cocaine. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to a nine-year term and an eighteen-year term for these convictions, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The trial court also imposed the two $100,000 fines assessed by the jury. The Defendant now appeals as of right, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; the admission of certain testimony; the trial court's failure to issue a missing witness instruction; the chain of custody; and the sentences and fines. We modify the Defendant's fines to $25,000 each. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Appellant, Author R. Turner, appeals the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In 1995, the Appellant pled guilty to aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnaping, and two counts of aggravated rape.  As a result of these convictions, he was sentenced to forty years imprisonment. In April 1996, the Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging as grounds ineffective assistance of counsel and improper imposition of consecutive sentences. This petition was dismissed, and this court affirmed the dismissal on appeal. Arthur R. Turner¹ v. State, No. 01C01-9707-CR-00274 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 23, 1998), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1999). On January 7, 2002, the Appellant filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, which is the subject of this appeal, again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was involuntary because “. . . the State caused him to be influence (sic) by four mind-altering drugs.”

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant of attempt to possess with intent to sell or
deliver ten pounds or more of marijuana and conspiracy to sell or deliver between ten and seventy pounds of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a multiple offender to consecutive sentences of four years’ incarceration for attempt to possess with intent to sell or deliver ten pounds or more of marijuana and to two years’ incarceration for conspiracy to sell or deliver between ten and seventy pounds of marijuana. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant; (2) whether the trial court improperly allowed testimony regarding statements made by Defendant after the search; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to proceed on one count from an original presentment and one count from a superceding presentment; (4) whether the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal; and (5) whether the trial court improperly allowed testimony concerning statements made by a non-testifying accomplice. Following oral argument, this Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs concerning an additional issue: whether the Defendant was deprived of his right to confront a material witness and whether this was plain error. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Defendant’s confrontation rights were violated in this case, but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Derick Bailey, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of one count of felony murder and one count of premeditated first degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdicts. Although we conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction for premeditated murder, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of felony murder. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant's conviction for first degree felony murder.

On September 3, 1999, a Fentress County jury convicted the Defendant of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; five counts of rape, a Class B felony; and thirteen counts of incest, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years. The Defendant now appeals arguing that ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, along with newly discovered evidence, prejudiced the Defendant to the point of depriving him of a fair trial with a reliable result. After a review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant was denied due process through ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore reverse the Defendant's convictions and remand this case to the Fentress County Circuit Court for a new trial.

The defendant, Brian Antione Starks, was convicted, by jury, of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and eleven years as a Range I, standard offender for the robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to the life sentence. The defendant timely appealed, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the testimony of his accomplices was not sufficiently corroborated. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 2.

The defendant, Robert J. Williams, pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to one count of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and two counts of selling less than one half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. As a Range I, standard offender, he received one eight-year sentence and two three-year sentences to be served concurrently as one year in confinement and the remainder in a community corrections program. The defendant appeals, claiming that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the defendant’s sentences, but we remand the case for entry of corrected judgments.

The defendant, Sandra Lynn Baumgartner, appeals the mandatory outpatient treatment (MOT) plan imposed by the Shelby County Criminal Court following her acquittal of first degree murder due to her insanity at the time of the crime. She contends that the trial court erroneously required mandatory outpatient treatment because the evidence does not show that her mental condition is likely to deteriorate rapidly, making it substantially likely that she would cause serious harm. She also argues that the MOT plan imposed by the trial court is contrary to the medical proof, punitive, oppressive, and impossible to perform. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the MOT plan’s requirements that the defendant live in a supervised residential facility and have someone supervise the administration of her medicine. We affirm the MOT plan as modified to exclude these requirements and remand the case for the trial court to reinstate the original condition that the defendant reside with her parents in their home.