APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Charles Johnston appeals from his Carter County Criminal Court conviction of contempt of court. He claims that the evidence does not sufficiently support the conviction, that his due process rights were violated in the conviction proceedings, that the court erroneously admitted an audiotape of prior proceedings in the general sessions court, that he was sentenced too harshly and unfairly denied judicial diversion, and that the lower court abused its discretion in setting his appeal bond. Because we discern no reversible error, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

The appellant, Kevin Lamont Hutchison, was convicted by a jury in the Montgomery County Circuit Court of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to seventeen years imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and robbery. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) not properly transferring the case from juvenile court, (2) denying her request for a continuance, (3) admitting a tape recorded statement by the defendant, (4) admitting certain photographs of the victim, (5) refusing to allow expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental condition, (6) refusing to allow evidence of a co-defendant's subsequent crimes, (7) failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser included offenses, and (8) sentencing. We conclude that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factors six and ten. The trial court also erred in not applying the mitigating factor (victim released alive) to the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The sentence is reduced for (1) aggravated robbery from ten years to nine years, (2) aggravated kidnapping from ten years to nine years, and (3) especially aggravated kidnapping from twenty-one years to twenty years. We reverse the trial court's determination that the sentences should be served consecutively. We remand to the trial court to amend the judgment for case number 01-00564 to reflect that the defendant was a standard violent offender rather than a repeat violent offender. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The defendant was convicted of facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-three years. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 1) allowing testimony by Dozier that the defendant told her the victim had been involved in the robbery because the statement was inadmissible hearsay, and 2) refusing to admit the prior written statement of Dozier into evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 613(b). We remand for correction of the judgment form to reflect the correct felony classifications. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects.

A Franklin County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of Sale of a Schedule II Controlled Substance, cocaine, and one count of Delivery of a Controlled Substance, also cocaine. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eight years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions; and (2) that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After reviewing the record, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support the Defendant's convictions and the trial court did not err in sentencing the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Andre Anthony, was convicted of two counts of forgery over five hundred dollars, one count of forgery over one thousand dollars, one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. In his appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempt to commit first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that "serious bodily injury" is an element of the offense of especially aggravated robbery; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering Defendant's sentences for attempt to commit first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted by a Putnam County Grand Jury for one count of first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery and one count of especially aggravated burglary. On September 18, 2000, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment of Imprisonment for Life Without Possibility of Parole. The Grand Jury later returned a Superceding Indictment including charges of First Degree Felony Murder, First Degree Premeditated Murder, Especially Aggravated Robbery and Especially Aggravated Burglary. At trial, the trial court reduced the premeditated first degree murder count to second degree murder for consideration by the jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated burglary, and immediately sentenced the defendant to life without parole on the first degree felony murder count. The trial court merged the defendant's second degree murder conviction into the first degree felony murder conviction and sentenced the defendant to twenty-five (25) years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and to twelve (12) years for the especially aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ran the twenty-five (25) year sentence consecutive to the life without parole sentence and ran the twelve (12) year sentence concurrent to the twenty-five (25) year sentence. The defendant appeals from the trial court based on four issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) whether the Tennessee sentencing scheme for life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional if the aggravating circumstances, contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204, are not part of the indictment; and (4) whether the Tennessee sentencing scheme for life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional. We find these issues do not merit a reversal of this conviction and affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher C. Rigsby, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's denial of alternative sentencing following his conviction of aggravated assault. Because the record supports the trial court's ordering the defendant to serve the six-year sentence in the Department of Correction, we affirm.

This opinion adjudicates John Robert Tory, Jr.'s appeal from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his 1994 petition for post-conviction relief. He filed the petition to challenge his 1992 jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Following a hearing in which counsel argued but no evidence was presented, the post-conviction court rejected the petitioner's claims that his especially aggravated robbery conviction violated double jeopardy principles, that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder, and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to demand an instruction on second degree murder as a lesser included offense. Because the record and the applicable law support the denial of post-conviction relief, we affirm.

The appellant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The felony murder convictions were merged into the premeditated murder convictions. Thereafter, the jury sentenced the appellant to death based upon the existence of three aggravating circumstances: the appellant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of defendant or another; and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-five years imprisonment for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, to run consecutively to his sentences for first degree murder and to a prior out-of-state sentence. On appeal, appellant presents forty-five issues. After an extensive review of the record and the applicable law, we find that none of these issues warrants a reversal of this case. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are AFFIRMED.

We have this case on direct appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, from the judgment of the circuit court approving the order of a hearing committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility that suspended Charles F. Galbreath, the appellant, from the practice of law for a thirty-day period. The circuit court essentially adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the hearing committee. Galbreath does not contest those factual findings but argues that the sanction imposed is excessive. Upon review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the thirty-day suspension is appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

This lawsuit emanates from a 1989 sale of land, which included a portion of land to which the seller did not have title. Two subsequent assignees of the original buyer filed a cause of action against the seller, seeking rescission or reformation of the 1989 transaction and alternate relief. The trial court awarded plaintiffs’ damages and declined to award equitable relief. We affirm.

Defendant, Ricky Raymond Bryan, was first tried and convicted of the first degree murder of Charlotte Scott in 1995. At the conclusion of Defendant's first trial, the trial judge, acting in his capacity as thirteenth juror, granted Defendant's motion for a new trial. Defendant's second trial was held in April 1996, and the jury once again found Defendant guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, this Court remanded for a new trial because the introduction of Defendant's statement of November 15, 1994, violated Defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. At the same time, this Court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Bryan, 990 S.W.2d 231, 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Following a third jury trial, Defendant was again convicted of first degree murder and sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant now appeals his conviction arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was the person who killed the victim, Charlotte Scott. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation as required at the time of the offense in order to sustain a conviction of first degree murder. Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court properly granted the defendant post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed direct appeal on the ground that counsel's failure to file a motion for new trial resulted in the waiver of all issues on direct appeal except for sufficiency of the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal after concluding that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to grant a delayed appeal and that the defendant had not suffered any prejudice from counsel's performance. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court properly granted a delayed appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals, affirm the trial court's grant of a delayed appeal, and remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for review of the issues presented by the defendant's motion for a new trial.

The appellant, Benton William Pamplin, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of simple assault and resisting arrest. On appeal, Pamplin presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to strike, for cause, a prospective juror who was a uniformed deputy sheriff and whose office presented testimony at the trial, and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdicts. After review, we conclude that the trial court's refusal to strike the prospective juror constituted reversible error in that it denied Pamplin his right to a fair and impartial jury. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

The defendant, Doyle Gilbert Newsom, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of fifth offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant, driving on a revoked driver’s license, and violation of the implied consent law. He received sentences of six years at 60% incarceration as a career D.U.I. offender, and 11 months, 29 days for driving on a revoked license. In this appeal the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the D.U.I. conviction because the testimony of an accomplice was not sufficiently corroborated; (2) he was improperly sentenced to 11 months, 29 days for driving on a revoked license; and (3) the prior judgments of conviction are invalid. We find no merit to any of these contentions. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.