APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a declaratory judgment action concerning an express ingress/egress easement that provides access via The Garden Inn at Bee Rock in Monterey, Tennessee, to a neighboring natural landmark owned by the Town of Monterey, Tennessee. After years of public use of the easement to access the landmark, The Garden Inn took steps to physically hinder the public’s use of the easement. As a consequence, the Town of Monterey and others commenced this action against The Garden Inn, LLC, to declare the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties. After years of litigation, The Garden Inn contended that a conservation foundation was an indispensable party. In doing so, The Garden Inn contended that failure to add the conservation foundation, which holds a conservation easement by which it may prohibit certain uses of the landmark property, would subject The Garden Inn to multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations. The trial court disagreed, holding that the conservation foundation “has no interest in the fight with respect to the interpretation of this easement for ingress and egress.” Thereafter, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town of Monterey concerning the scope and uses of the easement. The Garden Inn appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that the conservation foundation was not an indispensable party. We affirm.

In this post-divorce action, the trial court conducted a hearing with respect to the mother’s request to relocate to Ohio with the parties’ minor child, a request which the father opposed.  Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order permitting relocation and modifying the parties’ permanent parenting plan to provide the father with more co-parenting time.  The trial court also granted an award of attorney’s fees to the mother.  The father has appealed.  Based on the trial court’s failure to render sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning its award of attorney’s fees to the mother, we vacate the attorney’s fee award and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the basis for its decision to award attorney’s fees to the mother and the reasonableness of the amount awarded.  The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

A former wife sued her former husband for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of the disclosure warranty in the marital dissolution agreement entered in their divorce fifteen years earlier. Finding that the former wife released those claims through an agreed order entered three years before the underlying action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the former husband. We affirm.

This appeal is a health care liability case involving issues of pre-suit notice and the statutory requirements under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121.  The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment; granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment; and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice after determining she failed to give the defendant
pre-suit notice in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121.  The plaintiff appeals.  We affirm.

This appeal arises from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a construction dispute involving the purchase of a newly constructed townhome in Nashville.  The plaintiffs brought suit in the Davidson County Circuit Court, asserting claims of promissory fraud, breach of contract, and breach of implied warranty, while also attempting to pierce the corporate veil of one of the involved companies.  The defendants filed motions to dismiss and/or compel arbitration, contending that the contract between the parties required the matter to be resolved via arbitration.  The trial court denied the motions in an order finding that the arbitration clause relied upon by the defendants was part of a warranty that was not included in the initial contract and to which the plaintiffs had not agreed.  Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motions.

The Defendant, Ronald Edward Boykin, Jr., pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced to concurrent fifteen-year sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction with release eligibility after serving thirty percent of the sentences. The Defendant was also required to register as a sex offender and to be subject to community supervision for life. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to correct his
sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that “[t]he trial court erred in holding that the lifetime community supervision portion of [the Defendant’s] ,sentence is legal, where the statutory authority for that provision mandates lifetime supervision for certain offenses but not the offenses for which [the Defendant] was convicted.” The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

In this mandamus action, the petitioner/relator, acting on relation to the state, sought to have the trial court, inter alia, issue writs requiring the state governor and county health department administrator to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 68-5-104, which pertains to “[i]solation or quarantine.” The relator named the governor and health department administrator as respondents in both their official and “personal” capacities. Upon the respondents’ respective motions to dismiss the petition and following a hearing, the trial court entered separate orders granting the motions to dismiss as to each respondent, finding, as pertinent on appeal, that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to the claim against the governor in a mandamus action, (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to the claim against the health department administrator because the relator lacked standing, and (3) the relator otherwise failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The trial court also granted the health department administrator’s motion for a reasonable award of attorney’s fees and costs in defending against the lawsuit in her personal capacity pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-113. The relator filed motions to alter or amend, which the trial court denied following a hearing in orders certified as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The relator timely appealed. Concluding that (1) the trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction is dispositive as to the action against the governor in his official capacity, (2) the relator’s lack of standing is dispositive as to the action against the county health administrator in her official capacity, and (3) the relator’s actions against both respondents in their personal capacities failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal orders. We clarify, however, that the relator’s lack of standing with respect to his claim against the county health administrator did not equate to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court.

Petitioner/Appellee filed a petition in chancery court against Respondents/Appellants, alleging various claims related to allegedly false and defamatory statements made by the Respondents/Appellants. An objection was made to the chancery court’s subject matter jurisdiction, seeking dismissal or transfer of the action to circuit court. The chancery court denied the motion to dismiss or transfer and ultimately rendered judgment in favor of Petitioner/Appellee. We conclude that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the judgment of the chancery court regarding subject matter jurisdiction, vacate all other orders of judgment entered by the trial court, and remand the case for transfer to circuit court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellants, Glenn Roby, Jr., and Kevyn Deshawn Allen, of first degree premediated murder, and the trial court sentenced them to life in confinement.  On appeal, Roby contends that the trial court erred by allowing proof of a robbery and shooting that occurred just hours prior to the events in this case, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to play portions of a witness’s recorded interview for the jury as a prior inconsistent statement, that the trial court erred by denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, and that he was denied his right to subpoena witnesses.  Allen contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his severance motion.  In addition, both Appellants contend that the trial court erred by allowing inflammatory crime scene and autopsy photographs into evidence.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

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The petitioner, Harold Allen Vaughn, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in relying on our supreme court’s decision in Cordarius Maxwell v. State, No. 2018-00318-SC-R11-PC (Tenn. Sept. 3, 2019) (order) and finding his petition procedurally deficient. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the dismissal.

This case involves the interpretation of a commercial lease provision containing a tenant improvement allowance.  Following a hearing, the trial court initially entered an order in August 2020, granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs/assignees and directing the defendant/assignor, Young Street Partners II, LLC (“Young Street”), to reimburse the plaintiffs for $92,000.00 they had paid to a tenant claiming the improvement allowance, as well as costs, attorney’s fees, and statutory prejudgment interest.  Upon the filing of subsequent competing motions for summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court confirmed its prior judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and further dismissed Young Street’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees and costs in an order entered in January 2021, thereby denying Young Street’s motion for partial summary judgment.  Following entry of an order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice against all defendants except Young Street and upon the plaintiffs’ motion, the trial court entered an order certifying its January 2021 order as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02.  Young Street has appealed.  Determining that the trial court improvidently granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, we vacate the judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.  We deny the plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Quartez Gary, of attempted first degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments. State v. Quartez Gary, No. W2017-01495-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3689143 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2018), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner timely filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition through appointed counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Norris Ray, Defendant, appeals after the summary dismissal of a motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which Defendant argued that his life sentence was illegal for several different reasons. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review by the Petitioner, Romilus Caraway, is whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief based on an abuse of judicial process for failure to prosecute. We affirm.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the McMinn County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Donna McCullough (“Wife”) and Anthony McCullough (“Husband”) executed a marital dissolution agreement (the “MDA”) on June 14, 2018. The agreement provided that Husband was to pay Wife $4,521.00 per month in alimony and that the obligation terminated upon the death of either party. The parties were divorced by the General Sessions Court for Hardin County on September 21, 2018. Several months later, Husband sought to set aside the final decree of divorce, arguing that the alimony provision in the MDA was void. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Husband’s motion and granted Wife her attorney’s fees incurred in defending the action. Husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Demetris Lovell Merriweather, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Roy Michael Ford, Defendant, was indicted for several offenses in relation to the death of Scotty Brogan, the victim. Defendant sought severance of the second degree murder charge from the remaining offenses. The trial court granted the request and Defendant proceeded to trial on the second degree murder charge. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to 17 years in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the second degree murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting a photograph of the deceased victim; (3) the trial court improperly permitted a witness to testify about what she would have done had she been in Defendant’s position; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Franklin Sean Smith, was convicted of aggravated rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant received a 60-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State’s “numerous instances of improper prosecutorial arguments”; (2) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to introduce into evidence Defendant’s letter to his wife; (3) the State withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (4) the trial court committed plain error in admitting the victim’s forensic interview; (5) his convictions violated the protections of double jeopardy; (6) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (7) his convictions should be overturned based on the cumulative error doctrine; and (8) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Following a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Calvin Douglas, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence. Petitioner argues that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations. Upon review, we determine that the petition was properly dismissed and affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, Timothy Mitchell Dawson, appeals his McMinn County Criminal Court Jury conviction of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, challenging the admission of evidence about an unrelated theft purportedly committed by the defendant and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the defendant’s uncharged conduct and because that error cannot be classified as harmless, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

This case is before us on an interlocutory appeal limited to a single claim: Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the Tennessee Education Savings Account Pilot Program (the “ESA Act” or the “Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-6-2601 to -2612, under article XI, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution (the “Home Rule Amendment” or the “Amendment”).  The trial court held that Plaintiffs had standing to pursue this claim and denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss on that basis.  The court held that the ESA Act is unconstitutional under the Home Rule Amendment and granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.  The trial court then sua sponte granted Defendants an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Appeals granted their application for an interlocutory appeal by permission pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with respect to the issue of standing and the issue of the constitutionality of the ESA Act under the Home Rule Amendment.  We hold that Plaintiffs have standing to bring their Home Rule Amendment claim and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to that issue.  However, we hold that the ESA Act does not implicate the Home Rule Amendment such that the Act is not rendered unconstitutional by the Amendment, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to that issue.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim under the Home Rule Amendment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment dismissing that claim, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and for consideration of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. 

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Devin Royce Knight, of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder, aggravated domestic assault by strangulation, kidnapping, and vandalism under $1000, and the trial court imposed an effective twenty-two year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempt to commit first degree murder and kidnapping. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.