APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal by Mother from the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment. Mother contends that her actions were not willful such as to warrant termination, while also arguing that termination is not in the best interest of the child. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court’s termination.

This appeal involves the consideration of several issues contested among family members, including those pertaining to the fiduciary duties owed by a son who served as a trustee of trusts created by his parents. The trial court granted significant monetary relief to the son’s sisters following a bench trial, including for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, but it rejected other aspects of the sisters’ requested relief. The son presently maintains that he should be absolved of liability for his breach of fiduciary duties, whereas his sisters complain that the trial court did not award them sufficient relief. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Petitioner, George John Byrd, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his three aggravated rape convictions, his aggravated assault conviction, and the resulting effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by “opening the door” to evidence that was detrimental to the Petitioner, inadequately preparing for trial, failing to interview and call certain defense witnesses, and failing to prepare the Petitioner to testify at trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals this ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, Gregory Arnez Goff, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A jury convicted Douglas E. Linville of multiple drug offenses that occurred in a drug-free zone, in this case within 1,000 feet of a city park.  Because the offenses occurred in a drug-free zone, the trial court imposed sentences that required full service of at least the minimum term within the appropriate sentencing range prior to release.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(c) (2014) (amended 2020 & 2022).  On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected challenges to the convictions.  However, consistent with Mr. Linville’s brief, the intermediate appellate court noted that the judgment for one of the convictions erroneously referred to the controlled substance at issue—Xanax or Alprazolam—as Schedule III when it was actually Schedule IV.  In so noting, the court also concluded sua sponte that the felony class reflected on the judgment for that conviction was incorrect because Tennessee law required a one-class enhancement for an offense that occurred in a drug-free zone.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(b)(1) (2014).  We accepted Mr. Linville’s appeal.  Based on our review of the relevant statutory provisions, we conclude that because the drug-free zone in this case related to a public park, the offenses were not subject to a one-class enhancement.  We, however, further conclude that the offenses were subject to the requirement to serve in full at least the minimum sentence for the appropriate range prior to release.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in part, affirm the judgments of the trial court, and remand this matter to the trial court for correction of a clerical error in one judgment.

Aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, delivery and sale of a Schedule I controlled substance, and unlawful possession of a firearm, the defendant, Kenyon Demario Reynolds, appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the charges, denying his motion to suppress evidence, providing an incorrect jury instruction, and failing to merge two firearm convictions. Because the trial court erred by failing to merge Counts 13 and 14, we remand the case for merger of those counts and entry of corrected judgment forms. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

The pro se Pctitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 claim. Upon our review, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a cornplaint for divorce filed in 2018. The multi-faceted litigation of this matter included three interspousal tort claims tried together with the divorce action, the adjudication of a motion for an order of protection and a petition for a restraining order, two contempt proceedings, two motions to recuse, interlocutory appeals to this Court, the denial of permission to appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court, and the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. Proceedings in the trial court also precipitated two federal court actions. Following a six-day trial in 2020 and a stay of proceedings pending the Supreme Court's order on Wife's application for a writ of certiorari, the trial court entered final judgment in the matter in November 2021. Wife appeals the trial court's classification, valuation, and division of property. Wife also appeals the trial court's denial of her second motion to recuse. Discerning no evidence of bias, we affirm the trial court's denial of Wife's second motion to recuse. The trial court's classification, valuation, and division of property is reversed in part, and affirmed in part as modified.

Consumers discovered negative information on their credit reports.  Believing that the information was false, the consumers filed a Fair Credit Reporting Act claim against the bank that furnished the information.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o.  On the bank’s motion, the court summarily dismissed the action because the consumers were unable to prove an essential element of a Fair Credit Reporting Act claim.  The court also denied the bank’s request for an award of attorney’s fees.  Both sides appealed.  Based on the undisputed facts, we conclude that the bank was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the Fair Credit Reporting Act claim.  We also conclude that the bank did not prove that it was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.  So we affirm.

This is an Open Meetings Act case regarding the Dickson County Planning Commission’s approval and subsequent denial of a site plan for the construction and operation of a fuel terminal. A non-profit and two Dickson County residents filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the Planning Commission acted in violation of the Open Meetings Act when it held an unpublicized meeting and initially approved the site plan. The trial court found the case was moot because the Dickson County Planning Commission overturned its approval of the site plan at a subsequent meeting. We agree and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the case as moot.

In this certiorari review of the decision of a board of zoning appeals upholding the zoning director’s interpretation and application of the zoning resolutions to permit the building of a fuel terminal, the appellants challenge the decision as being arbitrary and unsupported by the evidence.  The trial court concluded that ample material evidence existed to support the decision of the director. Upon our de novo review, we agree and accordingly affirm the decision of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the defendant, Vincent Edward Crowson, Jr., guilty of driving under the influence (count 1), driving while his license was suspended because of a conviction for driving under the influence (count 2), possession of a weapon while under the influence of a controlled substance (count 4), being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm (count 5), driving while his license was suspended because of a conviction for driving under the influence, second offense (count 6), and driving under the influence, second offense (count 7).  The trial court imposed an effective twenty-year sentence, and the defendant appealed.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the constitutionality of the felon in possession of a firearm statute, and several pre-trial rulings of the trial court.  After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0in; mso-para-margin-right:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:8.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0in; line-height:107%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}

In this interlocutory appeal, we address whether the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“the TBI”) may refuse to comply with a final expungement order issued by a trial court. We conclude that the TBI lacks authority to refuse to comply with a final expungement order. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, grant the Plaintiff’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, and remand this matter to the trial court for any further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This consolidated appeal involves citizen challenges, via the common law writ of certiorari, to the procedure by which the Dickson County Planning Commission and Dickson County Commission approved a settlement agreement negotiated with Titan Partners, L.L.C.  Specifically, the Petitioners allege that they were entitled to notice that the settlement agreement was going to be discussed at the regularly scheduled meetings of the Planning Commission and County Commission.  They further allege that executive sessions were improperly utilized to discuss the settlement agreement in violation of the Open Meetings Act.  The trial court found no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirmed the actions of the Planning and County Commissions.  Upon our review of the record, we agree that there was no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirm the trial court in all respects.

This consolidated appeal involves citizen challenges, via the common law writ of certiorari, to the procedure by which the Dickson County Planning Commission and Dickson County Commission approved a settlement agreement negotiated with Titan Partners, L.L.C.  Specifically, the Petitioners allege that they were entitled to notice that the settlement agreement was going to be discussed at the regularly scheduled meetings of the Planning Commission and County Commission.  They further allege that executive sessions were improperly utilized to discuss the settlement agreement in violation of the Open Meetings Act.  The trial court found no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirmed the actions of the Planning and County Commissions.  Upon our review of the record, we agree that there was no violation of the Open Meetings Act and affirm the trial court in all respects.

A husband appeals a final decree of divorce in which the trial court classified the marital residence as marital property and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. Because the husband failed to file either a transcript or statement of the evidence, we conclusively presume that the record would have supported the trial court’s decision, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Nikos Burgins, appeals his conviction for solicitation of first degree murder and corresponding thirty-year sentence. The Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by qualifying three law enforcement officers as gang experts; (2) the court erred by allowing a layperson to offer expert testimony about handwriting; (3) the court erred by declining to issue an absent material witness instruction; (4) the court erred by admitting general gang evidence, including testimony regarding unrelated gang violence in a prison; and (5) the court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

This interlocutory appeal arises from a health care liability action. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. In response, the plaintiff invoked the discovery rule and argued that his claim was timely filed after he learned the identity of the defendant. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit of counsel in an effort to detail the due diligence undertaken by the plaintiff to ascertain the identity of the defendant. Upon considering the affidavit, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. However, the trial court granted permission for the defendant to seek an interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the defendant’s application. We now affirm the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of this cause of action on the basis that it was filed by a deceased plaintiff and therefore a nullity that could not be corrected via amendment. We affirm. 

An inmate filed this case alleging that he sustained injuries while in the county jail after slipping on water in his cell. The trial court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the county lacked actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. Because we conclude that the inmate submitted sufficient proof to create a dispute of material fact as to the county’s actual notice of the alleged dangerous condition, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Johnathan Robert Leonard, sought post-conviction relief from his convictions of three counts of rape of a child, two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective ninety-six-year sentence.  Relevant to this appeal, he alleged that counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to adequately meet and confer with him, preserve for appeal several issues related to prosecutorial misconduct during trial proceedings, and appeal his sentence.  See Johnathan Robert Leonard v. State, No. M2018-01737-CCA-R3-PC, 2019 WL 5885085, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2020).  Following a hearing, the post-conviction court granted the Petitioner relief in the form of a delayed appeal regarding his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal his sentence, but this court reversed and remanded for adjudication of the Petitioner’s remaining allegations.  Id. at *9.  On remand, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner’s remaining claims after a second evidentiary hearing.  The Petitioner appeals, maintaining that counsel failed to adequately meet and confer with him and to preserve for appeal claims related to prosecutorial misconduct.  We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";}

The Defendant, James Rodney Smith, was convicted of arson following a jury trial, and he was sentenced to four years on probation and ordered to pay $15,000 in restitution.  No appeal was filed, and the Defendant sought post-conviction relief and was permitted to file a delayed motion for a new trial and appeal.  James Rodney Smith v. State, No. M2019-00820-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 3832996, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2020) (reversing the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief and remanding for a hearing on due process tolling), no perm. app. filed.  On appeal of the conviction, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the unanimity of the jury verdict, and the restitution order.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this post-divorce action, the trial court conducted a hearing with respect to the mother’s request to relocate to Ohio with the parties’ minor child, a request which the father opposed.  Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order permitting relocation and modifying the parties’ permanent parenting plan to provide the father with more co-parenting time.  The trial court also granted an award of attorney’s fees to the mother.  The father has appealed.  Based on the trial court’s failure to render sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning its award of attorney’s fees to the mother, we vacate the attorney’s fee award and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the basis for its decision to award attorney’s fees to the mother and the reasonableness of the amount awarded.  The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects.