APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Fred Allen Owens, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings and also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marcus W. Keener, petitioned for post-conviction relief from his jury-trial conviction of second degree murder, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. The defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Danny Avery Stewart and Dorothy Ann Stewart, pled guilty to numerous drug charges and received effective sentences of thirty-one years and forty-two years, respectively. Their only contention on appeal is that their sentences are excessive because the trial court erred in the application of several enhancement factors. We conclude that the defendants have failed to show that the trial court erred in sentencing. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Raymond R. Kennebrew, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner asserts (1) that his pleas were neither knowingly nor voluntarily entered and (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

A Grainger County jury convicted the defendant of premeditated first degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft under $500. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the premeditated first degree murder conviction and ordered the defendant to serve an effective life sentence. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statement to law enforcement officials; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to allow the defense to introduce proof that the victim regularly dealt in illegal drugs and firearms; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his murder convictions. We remand for entry of an order merging the theft conviction into the especially aggravated robbery conviction but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On May 22, 2001, the defendant, Michael Armstrong, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a habitual motor vehicle offender and banned from driving. He was sentenced to one year in the work house and one year of probation. The defendant reserved a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). This question concerns the admissibility into evidence of the defendant’s statement to police that he had driven to the police station to report two cars stolen from his employer. This statement was made in response to a police officer’s question as to how the defendant had gotten to the station. This question was asked after the police officer had found out the defendant was an habitual motor vehicle offender whose Tennessee driver’s license was revoked, but before any Miranda warnings were given to the defendant. The defendant’s response to this question formed the basis of his arrest. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress concluding that the defendant was not in custody at the time he answered the officer’s question. We find that the record clearly indicates the defendant was not in custody at the time he admitted he had driven to the police station and that therefore no Miranda warnings were required. The judgment of the trial court is therefore AFFIRMED.

The petitioner, Donald Terry Moore, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that (1) he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel and (2) the post-conviction court erred by denying his motion to re-open the petition after the close of proof. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, RichardOdom, was convicted of felonymurder and sentenced to death in 1992. This Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal but remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 21, 33 (Tenn. 1996). After the new sentencing proceeding, a jury again imposed the death sentence after finding that the evidence of one aggravating circumstance, i.e., the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, the statutory elements of which involved the use of violence to the person, outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1991). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence. After the appeal was automatically docketed in this Court, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206 (1991), we entered an order specifying five issues for oral argument.1 We now hold as follows: (1) the trial court committed reversible error by applying a 1998 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) and allowing the introduction of evidence regarding the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s prior felonies to support the aggravating circumstance in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(2); (2) the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the victim in this case but did err in admitting photographs of the victim of a prior felony offense committed by the defendant; (3) the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for continuance to complete psychiatric or neuropsychological testing; (4) the death sentence was not invalid based on the failure of the indictment to charge the aggravating circumstance; and (5) the issue of whether the death penalty was excessive, arbitrary, or disproportionate in this case under the mandatory provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)-(D) need not be addressed at this time. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues and have included the relevant portions of that  opinion in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for re-sentencing.

Larry Gene Varner and Todd Duncan (“Defendants”) contracted with Joel Frazier d/b/a Timberline Construction Company (“Timberline”) for construction of a building on Defendants’ property. Timberline then contracted with Ruffin Building Systems, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) for Plaintiff to provide certain materials for the construction. Defendants paid Timberline, but Timberline never paid Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Defendants on its materialman’s lien. The Trial Court granted Defendants summary judgment holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff did not comply with the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11-115. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
 

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief

The petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated assault on July 29, 1987. On January 22, 2003, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. On May 14, 2003, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition without a hearing, and this motion was granted on May 15, 2003. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the petition is time barred, and the petitioner has not advanced any grounds for which the statute of limitations should be tolled.

The petitioner, Leon Terrell Phillips, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to attempted first degree murder and received a sentence of thirty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, which sentence was to be served at thirty percent. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Jeffery Lee Mason, was indicted for attempted first degree murder, felony escape and theft over $1000. He was convicted by a jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter and theft over $1000. He entered a plea of guilty to felony escape. The trial court imposed sentences of four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, four years for theft over $1000, and two years for felony escape, to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal of right, he asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and theft over $1000; (2) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder; and (3) that the sentence is excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Tipton County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for one count of aggravated assault. After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault. He was sentenced to three years as a Range I Standard Offender. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve 180 days in incarceration and the balance of the sentence in community corrections. 1 The defendant argues two issues in his appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated assault because he was acting in self-defense; and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant full probation. We affirm the actions of the trial court.

I am unable to join with the majority in concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter and that an instruction on this offense was warranted under the facts of this case. I find nothing in the record which establishes that, at the time of the attempted homicide, the defendant was “in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211(a) (2003). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent on the majority’s application of both the law and facts

The petitioner, Howard Eugene Buchanan, was convicted by a jury in the Dickson County Circuit Court of aggravated kidnapping, assault, and evading arrest. He received a total effective sentence of eighteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the defense of alibi and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Clay Jones,1 appeals from the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court revoking his community corrections sentences. In May of 2001, Jones pled guilty to two counts of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Jones received concurrent two-year sentences with placement in the Community Corrections Program. On October 22, 2002, a warrant was issued alleging violations of his behavioral contract. However, the warrant only listed one indictment number. Following a revocation hearing, he was found in violation of his community corrections sentences under both indictment numbers. On appeal, Jones raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether, prior to waiver of his right to counsel and subsequent inculpatory admissions at the revocation hearing, due process required the trial court to inform him that he could be resentenced to consecutive terms if his sentences were revoked; (2) whether lack of proper notice of revocation deprived him of due process; and (3) whether resentencing him to consecutive terms was proper. After review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of Jones’ sentence in the case in which notice was received. However, with regard to revocation of his sentence in which no notice was received, we find that the proceedings failed to afford fundamental due process protections and reverse the trial court’s order of revocation.

This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident, which resulted in the death of Deceased, a farepaying passenger of a bus. Plaintiffs, Deceased’s heirs, brought a wrongful death action against the driver of the Cadillac in the bus/car collision and Defendants, the driver of the bus and the Memphis Area Transit Authority. At the close of Plaintiffs’ proof, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.