APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case arises from the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on interpretation of T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a). Finding that T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a) requires couples to obtain a marriage license for a valid marriage in Tennessee and that Marriage by Estoppel does not apply, we affirm.

This case involves a default judgment. The plaintiffs filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the defendant for intentional infliction of physical injuries. The defendant did not appear, and the plaintiffs obtained a judgment by default. The defendant appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. The circuit court set the case for trial. On the trial date, however, neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared, and the default judgment was reinstated. The defendant filed a Rule 60.02 motion to have the default judgment set aside, based on excusable neglect. The defendant's lawyer attached his own affidavit, which explained that the lawyer was in the midst of closing his law office after thirty-eight years of practice and, in the confusion, failed to put the hearing date on his calendar. The motion to set aside was denied. The defendant now appeals. We vacate and remand to the trial court to consider whether the defendant has a colorable defense to the plaintiffs' claims and to reweigh the pertinent factors in light of that finding.

The defendant, Preston Young, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of probation and imposition of a two-year sentence for his jury conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Because the record is insufficient for our statutorily mandated de novo review of the sentence, we affirm.

The Defendant, William J. Parker, Jr., was indicted for driving under the influence and driving on a revoked license. A jury acquitted him of the DUI charge, but found him guilty of driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of six months, with sixty days to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on probation. In this appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: 1) whether the State’s failure to provide him with a copy of his driving record constitutes a violation of his due process rights; 2) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a sworn affidavit; and 3) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive.  We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the affidavit into evidence. Because we are unable to conclude that the error was harmless, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which finds reversible error in this case due to the erroneous admission into evidence of Mr. Birdwell’s affidavit. While I agree that admission of the affidavit was error, under the particularly unique facts of this case, I conclude that it is harmless error.

The petitioner, Monroe Brown, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish either a void judgment or an expired sentence. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Jason C. Polston, of reckless aggravated assault.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years in the workhouse, suspended except for 60 days to serve on weekends, a $500.00 fine, and 200 hours of community service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress the Defendant’s statement made in a telephone conversation with a police officer because the State did not disclose the statement prior to trial; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; (4) the trial court erred by failing to charge the defenses of necessity and duress; (5) the trial court erred bydenying the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion; and (6) the trial court erred by ordering the Defendant to serve sixty days in jail. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the Defendant’s telephone conversation with a police officer because the State did not disclose the statement to the Defendant prior to trial in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Therefore, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

Plaintiffs, horse-drawn carriage operators, filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a provision of one section of an ordinance adopted by theMemphis City Council. The trial court elided the provision as an unlawful delegation of the City’s police power and enforced the remainder of the ordinance. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting the trial court erred in its application of the doctrine of elision. Defendants cross-appeal, asserting the trial court erred by finding the elided portion unconstitutional. We affirm.

We granted this appeal to define "nursing services" as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1) and to determine whether the caretaking services that an injured employee's mother provides are nursing services for which the Workers' Compensation Law mandates the employer compensate her. The trial court found that the mother had failed to carry her burden of proof on the issue of whether she was entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded that the plain meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 contemplates only professional nursing services ordered by the attending physician, and that the mother is not a professional nurse providing professional nursing services. The employee appealed, arguing that the statute provides compensation for a broader range of caretaking services. The appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), but the appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision, and oral argument was heard by the full Court. We hold that in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1), "nursing services" refers to the services of a professional nurse. Because the mother providing caretaking services here is not a professional nurse, the Workers' Compensation Law does not require the employer to compensate the mother for her services. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's denial of compensation for her services. The question of whether the Workers' Compensation Law should provide compensation when a family member provides care for an injured worker is an issue that must be addressed by the Legislature.

Plaintiff appeals the award of summary judgment to defendant physician based on the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. The circuit court found that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, that she failed to remedy the persistent conditions that prevented her child's return, and that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. The record contains numerous extraneous documents that do not pertain to the petition to terminate parental rights or the issues raised on appeal. The parties and the clerk have a responsibility to abridge the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 8A(c). Failure to abridge the record may result in a reduction of the circuit court clerk's fee for the cost of preparing and transmitting the record.

The pro se petitioner, James P. Hyde, appeals from the trial court's order denying the petitioner's motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. The states moves the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of this court's rules. The motion was properly denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an unemployment compensation case in which Appellant was denied benefits by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development. At all administrative levels it was determined that Appellant was discharged for “misconduct connected with such claimant’s work” and that he was, therefore, disqualified from receiving benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303. This ruling was then affirmed by the lower court. Appellant then timely filed this appeal challenging the ruling of the lower court. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This is a child custody dispute. The mother and father entered into a permanent parenting plan naming the mother the primary residential parent of their daughter. Under the plan, the father had supervised visitation because the mother was concerned about sexual abuse by the father. The father later sought to modify the parenting plan to allow for unsupervised visitation. The mother then filed a notice that she intended to move to Florida with the daughter, which the father opposed. The trial court granted the father's petition for unsupervised visitation and denied the mother's request to relocate to Florida with the child. The mother and daughter then left for a scheduled trip to Florida, with the understanding that they would return for the father's scheduled visitation. The mother remained in Florida with the daughter for six weeks, asserting that she, the mother, was too ill to travel. The father was granted an emergency change of custody. The father then retrieved the daughter through a private investigator, coordinating with Florida officials. Upon return to Tennessee, the trial court found the mother in criminal contempt for interfering with the father's visitation and for moving to Florida. The father was named the primary residential parent and the mother was granted supervised visitation. The mother was also required to pay the father for the cost of the private investigator. The mother appeals the denial of her request to move to Florida with the child, the award of unsupervised visitation to the father, the finding of contempt, the change of custody, the requirement that her visitation be supervised, and the requirement that she pay the private investigator's fee. We affirm.

Mother appeals termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court found that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, that she failed to remedy the persistent conditions that prevented her child's return, and that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. The record contains numerous extraneous documents that do not pertain to the petition to terminate parental rights or the issues raised on appeal. The parties and the clerk have a responsibility to abridge the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 8A(c). Failure to abridge the record may result in a reduction of the juvenile court clerk's fee for the cost of preparing and transmitting the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 40(g).

This litigation arises out of a two-vehicle collision in Hawkins County. Teresa A. Martin ("the plaintiff") and her husband sued the driver of the other vehicle, Johnny L. Drinnon ("the defendant"), seeking damages and charging him with common law and statutory acts of negligence. The defendant answered and filed a counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict, finding the parties equally at fault. Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict and the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The plaintiff appeals, raising, in effect, three issues. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, James Clark, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the petitioner has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b), the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served forty-eight hours of confinement followed by probation. As a part of the guilty plea, the defendant reserved for appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). The judgment is affirmed.

This appeal presents a multifaceted challenge to the constitutionality of Tennessee’s abortion statutes. After a physician and a clinic in Knoxville were charged with violating these statutes, two other clinics in Memphis and Nashville, joined by three physicians, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Constitution of Tennessee. The trial court struck down the residency requirement, the waiting period, and the requirement that physicians inform their patients that an abortion is a major surgical procedure. After making its own substantive revisions in the statutory text, the trial court upheld the mandatory hospitalization requirement, the remaining informed consent requirements, and the newly enacted parental consent requirement. We have determined that the trial court erred by revising the text of several provisions. We have also determined that the emergency medical exception enacted by the General Assembly is unconstitutionally narrow, that the combined effect of the waiting period and the physician-only counseling requirement places an undue burden on women’s procreational choice, and that the remaining challenged provisions as construed herein pass constitutional muster.
 

I concur with the court’s conclusion that Mr. Montague’s complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223 through 4-5-225 (1991 & Supp. 1997).

This is a suit by David T. Bailey and E. Lynn Wagner in their own right and derivatively for the use and benefit of Southeastern Healthcare Services, L.P., a Limited Partnership in which they were partners, against Tom Holbert, as general partner, Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., D/B/A Marcum's Healthcare Services, and Carl Marcum and Gina Marcum Pinney, as Officers and Directors and/or Employees and Agents of and for Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., and Tom HOlbert, Carl Marcum and gina Marcum Pinney, Individually. The suit stems from the purchase by Southeastern Healthcare Services of a unit dosage pharmacy business from Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., for the sum of $275,000. The complaint alleged a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation and breach of warranty.

This is a suit for damages arising out of personal injuries sustained by Mike T. Hunter (Hunter) when he was hit by an automobile driven by the defendant Damian V. Burke (Burke). Burke's vehicle ws owned by the defendants Donnie Wear (Wear) and Joe Guffey (Guffey). The trial court directed a verdict against all of the appealing defendants. 1. The jury then awarded Hunter compensatory damages of $270,000. These defendants appealed, raising the following questions for our resolution:

Patty Jean Talbott and her husband, Sam Talbott, appeal a judgment entered in the Circuit Court for KNox County which, in accordance with a jury verdict, awarded her $2264.59 for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. The jury obviously found that Mr. Talbott suffered no damages and fixed his recovery at zero.

The appellant, Terry Wayne Perkins, was indicted on charges of driving under the influence, fourth offense, operating a motor vehicle after being declared an habitual motor vehicle offender, violation of the implied consent law, and driving on a revoked license. He was acquitted of the D.U.I. charge. A jury convicted him of violation of the implied consent law and driving on a revoked license. He was sentenced to an 11- month-and-29-day sentence at 75% for the violation of the implied consent law and six months at 75% for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The two sentences were ordered to run concurrently and the trial court ordered the appellant to serve 15 days of the sentence in the county jail, after which he would be released on probation, and assessed a $100 fine for each conviction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's decision to order him to serve 15 days in jail. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, owner of an apartment complex, filed suit seeking damages caused by a fire in an apartment occupied by Defendants. The parties consented to arbitration. The parties stipulated to the damages in the amount of $73,414.64. Further, it was stipulated that Plaintiff settled with two of the three Defendants whereby the two Defendants payed 50%, $36,707.32, of the property damage. Subsequently, the arbiter ruled that the remaining Defendant was 100% at fault and liable for the total amount of damages, $73,414.64. Plaintiff filed a motion with the trial court to confirm the arbiter's award. In response, the remaining Defendant filed a motion to modify, correct, and/or to vacate the arbitration award and a motion for credit, set off and reduction of award. The trial court confirmed the arbiter's award, thereby denying Defendant's motions. Defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and modify the arbitration award.