APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in all parts of the majority opinion except to that portion which holds that the felony sentence imposed in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Defendant, Carlos Sommerville, was convicted of second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it admitted certain autopsy x-rays and photographs into evidence at trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Jason White, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court improperly limited the scope of cross-examination of a State’s witness; (2) the trial court erred by admitting gruesome photographs of the deceased victim; (3) the trial court’s improper remarks in the presence of the jury prejudiced the appellant; (4) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence as an excited utterance; and (5) “[t]he form of the jury verdict [was] so lacking in meaning as to render it ineffective to convict the [appellant].” Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts, and (2) the trial court’s denial of his request for a mistrial. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for a mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in ruling that he could not use his peremptory challenges to “strike back” jurors after the first two rounds of challenges; and (2) the State failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, by failing to disclose a letter written by the defendant to his girlfriend, thus disadvantaging his trial preparation. Upon our review, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

Separate petitions for the appointment of conservator were filed, one by the two nieces of the disabled person and the other by a daughter. Notwithstanding the statutory preference given to the daughter, the probate court determined that it was in the best interest of the disabled person to grant the petition filed by the nieces. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Ryan James Moran, pled guilty to multiple offenses that occurred in 1995, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of seventy-five years in prison. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed because it was barred by the statute of limitations. The Petitioner appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

This appeal involves a trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Tennessee Department of Revenue. The taxpayer operates a brick and block business on a ten-acre tract of land in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, on which is located a block manufacturing facility and retail sales office. Upon undertaking an audit of the taxpayer, the department inspected the property in Murfreesboro. The department subsequently assessed a sales and use tax liability against the taxpayer for the Murfreesboro property. The department determined that the Murfreesboro property constituted one location, and sales of concrete blocks manufactured at the facility constituted less than fifty-one percent (51%) of the gross sales at this location. The taxpayer filed an action in the trial court alleging it was entitled to a sales tax exemption under section 67-6-206 of the Tennessee Code because it operated two "locations" at the Murfreesboro property under the fifty-one percent (51%) test used by the department. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the department's motion and denied the taxpayer's motion. The taxpayer filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Defendant, Malinda L. Mason, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, fifth offense, and sentenced to twenty-one months in the county workhouse as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant's sole issue on appeal challenges the trial court's denial of her request for a mistrial. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a wife's petition for civil contempt filed against her ex-husband. The wife sought an order holding the ex-husband in civil contempt for failing to pay alimony in solido pursuant to the divorce decree and commanding him to pay the amount of the arrearage. Following a hearing on Wife's petition, the chancery court entered an order reclassifying the husband's alimony obligation from alimony in solido to rehabilitative alimony due to the parties' cohabitation after their divorce. In addition, the chancery court found that the wife was not entitled to alimony during the periods the parties lived together following their divorce, and the court awarded the wife a reduced sum of rehabilitative alimony. The wife filed an appeal to this Court. We reverse and remand this case to the chancery court.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of John William Thomas ("Plaintiff") in the amount of $190,095, of which $53,295 was for relocation expenses and increased rent. Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Norma E. Pino-Rutkowski ("Defendant") while Defendant was backing out of a parking space. Due to his poor eyesight, Plaintiff does not have a driver's license and has to walk to work. Plaintiff claimed he was required to move much closer to work because he could no longer walk as far as he could before being injured. Plaintiff sought as part of his damages his relocation expenses and the $300 in his increased monthly rent. Defendant claims on appeal that Plaintiff was required to specifically plead these damages and because he failed to do so, that portion of the jury's verdict cannot stand. Defendant also claims the Trial Court erred when it allowed Plaintiff's granddaughter to testify and when it told the jury that "although the law in Tennessee may require insurance, you are not to consider the presence of insurance in this case." We agree with Defendant, and we vacate the judgment in its entirety and remand for a new trial.

The petitioner, La Southaphanh, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's dismissal of his two petitions for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and theft over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial for aggravated burglary and theft over one thousand dollars because his attorney failed to move to suppress his confession, failed to move for a mistrial when his co-defendant stated that the petitioner was in a gang, failed to attack the credibility of one of the investigating officers, and failed to meet with him and prepare for trial adequately. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial for aggravated assault because his attorney failed to meet with him and prepare for trial adequately. We affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Keith D. Henderson, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error in granting the plaintiff eight peremptory challenges during jury selection, whether the trial court properly denied a motion for a mistrial after the plaintiff cross-examined a defense expert witness with a prior statement, whether the trial court properly allowed the plaintiff to cross-examine a defense expert with an alleged learned treatise, and whether the trial court properly excluded the deposition of a defense expert witness. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error on these four issues, reversed the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and remanded for a new trial. The intermediate court chose not to review numerous remaining issues raised by the parties.

After carefully reviewing the record and authority, we conclude: 1) that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff eight peremptory challenges but the error did not affect the outcome or prejudice the administration of justice, 2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial after the plaintiff had cross-examined an expert witness with a prior statement, 3) that the trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to cross-examine a defense expert witness with an alleged learned treatise, and 4) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the deposition testimony of a defense expert witness. In addition, after reviewing the remaining issues, including those that were pretermitted by the Court of Appeals, we hold: 1) that the trial court erred in remitting the jury’s verdict by $1,500,000, 2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying prejudgment interest to the plaintiff, 3) that awarding damages for the loss of consortium did not violate the defendants’ rights under the United States or Tennessee constitutions, 4) that the trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff’s expert witness established the professional standard of care in the community in which the defendants practiced and in denying the defendants’ motion for directed verdict on this basis, 5) that the trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to introduce hearsay statements from medical literature or make arguments as to the presence or absence of medical literature, 6) that the trial court did not err in denying a motion for a mistrial or a continuance based on the unavailability of a defense expert witness, and 7) that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defendants a credit against the jury’s verdict based on a payment received by the plaintiff under the decedent’s executive insurance plan. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

Richard E. Miller, in his capacity as an officer and director of Duncan Electric Company, Inc. ("Duncan Electric"), brought this action against the company's other directors, Bernard Stone and Greta B. Lindsay (collectively "the defendants"), alleging that they had breached certain fiduciary duties owed to him. Stone and Lindsay each moved for summary judgment on the basis that a settlement agreement and release entered into by the parties in a prior and separate lawsuit barred the plaintiff's present action. The trial court granted the defendants' motions and ordered the plaintiff to pay their attorney's fees. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

The Appellant, Antonio Jackson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, Jackson contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that his trial attorneys were ineffective by failing to pursue an alibi defense and by failing to properly investigate and prepare the case for trial.  After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Anthony L. Harris, was found guilty by a jury of armed robbery by use of a deadly weapon and aggravated kidnapping. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of ninety years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a finding of contempt following the enrollment of a foreign decree. The issue presented is whether Mr. Pickern could be held in civil contempt of court for his failure to pay alimony upon the enrollment of the foreign decree when a petition for contempt had not been filed.  Following a hearing, the trial court enrolled the foreign decree, found Mr. Pickern in willful contempt of court, awarded Ms. Pickern judgment for the alimony arrearage and her attorney’s fees, and ordered the sale of Mr. Pickern’s real property to satisfy the alimony arrearage unless he paid the judgment within ninety days. We hold that the trial court properly enrolled the foreign decree, but its actions were premature regarding the civil contempt because no petition had been filed seeking this relief. Therefore, we affirm the enrollment of the foreign decree and the judgment for the alimony arrearage, but vacate the finding of civil contempt and the award of attorney’s fees.

James Neil Rice ("Mr. Rice") applied to Mountain Life Insurance Company ("Mountain Life") for a credit life insurance policy to cover the principal amount of a loan made to him by Andrew Johnson Bank ("the Bank"). When Mr. Rice died, Randy E. Rice, Personal Representative of the Estate of James Neil Rice ("Plaintiff"), made demand upon Mountain Life and the Bank to tender the policy proceeds to satisfy the loan. When Mountain Life and the Bank refused this demand, Plaintiff filed suit. Both Mountain Life and the Bank filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted the motions for summary judgment holding, inter alia, that no contract of insurance existed because Mr. Rice's application never was approved or accepted by Mountain Life and, therefore, no insurance policy was issued to Mr. Rice. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment. We vacate and remand.

The petitioner pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault on February 7, 2003. The trial court sentenced him to twenty (20) years and five (5) years, respectively, for the above convictions. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court held a hearing and stated upon the record that the petition was denied. However, a written order was never entered by the trial court. Because there is no final order from which the petitioner may appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant was found guilty by jury verdict of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days with the sentence suspended, conditioned upon his successful completion of probation. The Defendant now appeals, raising three issues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for domestic assault; (2) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to elect the particular offense the Defendant was guilty of; and (3) the Defendant suffered a due process right violation when he was denied immediate access to his personal property. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a contract dispute between a retail seller and manufacturer of hair replacement products. The parties entered into an exclusive dealing contract, whereby the manufacturer agreed to sell four models of hair replacement units exclusively to the retailer within a geographically defined area of Tennessee. In return, the retailer agreed to purchase all hair replacement units from themanufacturer and paya $10.00 premium for the units purchased. The manufacturer subsequently sold hair replacement units to a competitor of the retailer in Tennessee. The retailer filed a complaint against the manufacturer for inducement of breach of contract, pursuant to section 47-50-109 of the Tennessee Code, and breach of contract. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion as to both causes of action alleged in the complaint.  We affirm.

The Defendant, William D. Busby, was convicted by a jury of four counts of rape of a child. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to four concurrent terms of twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury about the State's election of offenses. Finding that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.