APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Bonzie Lavender, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case is about nuisance and infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff homeowners and their minor child lived in a house in a subdivision. The defendant landowner owned a house next door to the plaintiffs’ home. The defendant landowner rented his house to tenants. The tenants allegedly began to engage in disturbing conduct, including illegal drug use, discharging firearms, and harassment. The plaintiffs sued the tenants and the defendant landowner for nuisance and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant landowner filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs had no medical evidence of their emotional distress. Counsel for the plaintiffs did not respond to the motion for summary judgment and did not notify the plaintiffs of the pending motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. The plaintiffs later got a new attorney and filed a motion to set aside this judgment. The trial court set aside the grant of summary judgment, to enable the plaintiffs to file a response. After the plaintiffs filed a response, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and reverse as to claims of nuisance and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner is appealing the lower court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.

The petitioner, Eugene J. Kovalsky, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Gary Randall Yarnell, the petitioner, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The lower court found his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas unsupported by the evidence and denied relief. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm.

Following a bench trial, the Appellant, Antonio D. Jones, was convicted of one count of Class B felony possession of cocaine, one count of simple possession of marijuana, and one count of criminal trespass. The Appellant was sentenced to twelve years for felony possession of cocaine, eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of marijuana, and thirty days for trespassing. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently for an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. He also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Jones’ motion to suppress. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction for possession of marijuana and felony possession of cocaine are reversed and remanded for a new trial. Jones’ conviction for criminal trespass is affirmed.

The petitioner, Kevin White, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner presents one issue for review: whether the trial court erred in refusing to exclude his trial counsel from the courtroom during his testimony at the post-conviction hearing. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I fully concur with Judge Hayes' notable and well-written opinion. Like Judge Hayes, I believe that the defendant was seized when the officer asked him to step out of his vehicle and that the seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. I also agree that the defendant's consent to search his person was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure so as to be free from any taint. In consequence, the convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

I concur in all respects with the majority opinion save its view of the admissibility of the search warrant under Rule 41(c), Tenn. R. Crim. P. The defendant complains that his trial counsel failed to object to the state’s introduction of a copy of the search warrant into evidence. He asserts that the warrant states that “there is probable and reasonable cause to believe that Marvin O. Norton B/M is now in unlawful possession of the following . . . cocaine or derivatives of same . . . .” He argues that the content of the search warrant was objectionable because it contained hearsay, was irrelevant to the facts at issue, and made specific reference to the defendant as the individual in possession of the cocaine.

I respectfully dissent. Based upon my review of the record, the encounter leading up to Defendant’s consent to submit to a search was a brief police-citizen encounter requiring no objective justification. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Robertson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Marvin Norton, of possessing twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and (2) that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, John R. Black, a/k/a Rene J. Black, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, as amended, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that trial counsel's assistance was ineffective (1) for failing to prepare an adequate record for appeal; (2) for failing to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of false imprisonment or raise the trial court's failure to do so on appeal; and (3) for failing to object to the prosecutor's improper questions and comments during Petitioner's cross-examination at trial and during closing argument. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Kendrick D. Hutton, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant requests this Court to remand the matter for a new probation revocation hearing because the trial court failed to follow the statutory procedure governing probation revocations. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, E & W Bonding Company, appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for relief of its obligation under a bail bond of $100,000 in the case of criminal defendant Carlos Albert Cabellero-Grajeda. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffrey Casey, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is affirmed.

In Case No. 15207, the Bedford County Grand Jury charged Defendant, Gregory Bernard Grier, with the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine in Count 1, and with delivery of the same cocaine in Count 2. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of both charges. The trial court merged the conviction in Count 2 with the conviction in Count 1, and, following a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to serve nine (9) years in the Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender for his Class C felony conviction. Due to the unique procedural history of this case pertaining to the preparation of the record on appeal and the status of Defendant's former counsel at the time of filing a statement of the evidence in lieu of a verbatim transcript, we are compelled to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Francis Sanschargrin, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding no grounds entitling Petitioner to habeas corpus relief. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a parental termination case. The parents' next door neighbors overheard the mother striking, cursing, and threatening her daughter over a baby monitor and recorded the incident. The tape also captured the father coming home from work and asking the mother about certain marks on the child. The neighbors subsequently turned the tape over to the Tennessee Department of Children's Services. The juvenile court placed the children in the protective custody of the department, and the department implemented a permanency plan requiring the mother and father, among other things, to undergo therapy. The department subsequently filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking to terminate the parents' parental rights. The juvenile court found that the department proved each ground alleged by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the children's best interest. We affirm.

The petitioner, Mark Medley, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief. In his petition, and now in this appeal, he alleges that he entered an involuntary guilty plea based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner, Cumecus R. Cates, has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to release him from various sentences. We are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case, i.e., that the search of the defendant's car was permissible. However, I dissent to the extent that the majority opinion implies that probable cause existed upon the arrival of the described vehicle. I would not find probable cause had the driver, in a similar vehicle, been an individual not associated with Bobby Perkins, the target of this operation.

This is an appeal of a modification of alimony. The parties were divorced in February 2003. In the decree, the trial court awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony for eighteen months, but reserved jurisdiction to evaluate and review the award at the end of the eighteen-month period based on competent medical proof, noting that the wife was expected to pursue disability benefits during that time. During the interim, the wife’s second application for Social Security disability benefits was denied on the grounds that she had not worked long enough to qualify for such benefits. Over a year after entry of the divorce decree, the wife filed a motion for the trial court to review the alimony award. The trial court conducted a hearing and the wife entered into evidence medical proof that she could not be rehabilitated. The trial court did not require the wife to show a material change in circumstances, explaining that it had mistakenly classified the original award as being “rehabilitative.” Therefore, based on the additional proof, the trial court reduced the monthly amount and designated the award as alimony in futuro. The husband now appeals, arguing that the wife was required to show a substantial and material change in circumstances to warrant a modification of the original rehabilitative alimony award. We affirm, finding that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the medical proof and did not err in changing the award to alimony in futuro.

In this appeal the defendant, Roxa Perkins, contests her conviction of possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver same. She raises four (4) issues for review: (1) whether the warrantless seizure and detention of the defendant violated her constitutional rights; (2) whether probable cause and exigent circumstances existed which justified a warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle; (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury with respect to lesser included offenses of facilitation, attempt, and facilitation of attempt to possess drugs with the intent to sell or deliver; and (4) whether the defendant received the effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable legal authorities we find no reversible error or ineffective assistance of counsel and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the courts' power to require a property owner to post a bond to regain possession of real property on which a public nuisance had been maintained. After the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County filed suit in the Criminal Court for Davidson County seeking to enjoin the operation of a brothel at a Nashville address, the property owner conveyed the property to a Nevada corporation. Even though the new property owner agreed to the entry of an order permanently enjoining the operation of a house of prostitution on the premises, the city insisted that the new owner should also be required to post a $20,000 bond to assure compliance with the injunction. The trial court acceded to the city's request and conditioned the restoration of the property to the owner's control on the owner posting a $20,000 cash bond. The owner has appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by conditioning the property owner's lawful use of its property on the filing of an open-ended bond.

This is a direct appeal as of right upon a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2). The Defendant, Paul Dotterweich, was convicted of DUI and underage consumption, both Class A misdemeanors, following his entry of guilty pleas. The Defendant received concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days and loss of driving privileges for one year. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence upon which his convictions were based because the evidence was obtained during an unlawful investigatory stop. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.