APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Conner Lewis Bell, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated robbery. Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault, and the remaining counts were dismissed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received a sentence of three years as a Range I offender to be suspended on probation. Defendant requested judicial diversion, which the trial court denied following a hearing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of diversion.

In this interlocutory appeal of a health care liability action, the only issue for review is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss based on its finding that “extraordinary cause” existed to excuse the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In this divorce case, Claude Ellis (“Husband”) challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate, the award of spousal support and attorney’s fees to Melisa1 Jane Godfrey Ellis (“Wife”), and the trial court’s finding that Husband dissipated marital assets. We hold that the trial court misclassified some of the assets in contention as marital, and we remand for a reconsideration of the division of the marital estate in light of this holding. Because the issue of attorney’s fees as alimony in solido is only properly considered after the issues of estate valuation and distribution are settled, we vacate the award of alimony in solido, so that the trial court has the opportunity to reconsider the award if the court finds it necessary. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

A circuit court found that a motorist violated the city’s ordinance prohibiting speeding. On appeal, the motorist argues that the circuit court should have granted his motion to dismiss. He also argues that the court improperly excluded evidence from Google Maps showing his speed and that the evidence preponderates against the finding that he was speeding. Although the court erred in excluding the Google Maps evidence, we affirm. 

In this post-divorce case, Mother appeals the trial court’s grant of Father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan and its modification of her child support obligation.  Mother also appeals the denial of her petition to be named the Child’s primary residential parent.  Father requests attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.  Because the income the trial court imputed to Mother is not supported by the evidence in the record, and because the trial court failed to find a significant variance before modifying Mother’s child support obligation, we vacate the trial court’s order modifying Mother’s child support.  The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed, and Father’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

The Defendant-Appellant, Timothy M. Dawson, was convicted by a McMinn County Criminal Court jury of theft of property of more than $2,500 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103; 39-14-105(a)(3). During a consolidated sentencing hearing on the Defendant’s convictions from three separate trials, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to 12 years’ incarceration, to be served consecutively to the sentences from his other two convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that 1) the evidence was insufficient to establish the value of the stolen property; and 2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion of acquittal, or in the alternative, erred in denying his motion for new trial. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Daryl J. Carter, Petitioner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns valuation of a business after a partner was disaffiliated. The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking permanent injunctive relief and damages from the defendants for wrongful disaffiliation from their flavored moonshine business. The trial court entered a judgment of $23,000 and interest, which included discounts for marketability and lack of control against the defendants and Crystal Falls Spirits, LLC, jointly and severally, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 61-1-701(b). The plaintiff appealed. We reversed and remanded the trial court’s valuation of the plaintiff’s interest because it included a discount for lack of control in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 61-1-701. The trial court revaluated the plaintiff’s damages without the discount for lack of control and awarded him $35,000 and 2.5% interest from December 15, 2015. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Defendant, Devondre DeQuan Samel, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess 150 grams or more of heroin with intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school, a park, and a recreational center (Counts 1-3), conspiracy to sell 150 grams or more of heroin within 1,000 feet of a school, a park, and a recreational center (Counts 5-7), two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia (Counts 14 and 17), possession with intent to sell or deliver less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park (Count 15), and manufacture of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park (Count 16). The trial court imposed an effective fifteen-year sentence, as a Range I standard offender, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; that the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motion for a continuance; that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of Mr. Berry; that his sentence under the Drug-Free School Zone Act constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based upon prosecutorial vindictiveness. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

The Defendant, Tyrone De Angelo Shaw, appeals from his guilty plea conviction for aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the agreed-upon ten-year, Range II sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dan E. Durell, acting pro se, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for habeas corpus relief. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tony Latrell Greer, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of thirty-three years, ten years, and ten years, respectively. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Shawn L. Payne, pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years’ incarceration. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering him unable to make a “knowing and informed” guilty plea. Specifically, he asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the case adequately, failing to provide discovery to the Petitioner, and failing to apprise the Petitioner of all the consequences of his guilty plea. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The plaintiff, the title holder of the disputed real property, filed a detainer action seeking the removal of the defendants from a portion of her property.  The defendants were residing in a mobile home owned by the mother of one of the defendants.  The defendant’s mother had lived in the mobile home, which was located on the disputed parcel of real property, from 1984 until 2020 when she decided to relocate to an apartment and allow the defendants to live in her mobile home.  The defendants asserted adverse possession as a defense to the plaintiff’s detainer action, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-2-103, tacking the mother’s years of possession onto their own.  The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, determining that the defendants had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother’s possession of the property had been adverse for the requisite seven-year period.  The defendants appealed.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to award Father equal parenting time with the child, arguing that limitations are warranted under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406. We affirm the trial court’s findings that neither abandonment nor abusive conflict support limitations on parenting time under section 36-6-406. We vacate the trial court’s finding that limitations are not warranted due to physical abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse because the trial court made no finding as to whether such abuse occurred. Finally, Mother’s argument as to the exclusion of evidence is waived, as she made no offer of proof.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s decision to allow expenses and claims against an insolvent estate to have priority over a recorded deed of trust to the proceeds of the court-ordered sale of the decedent’s encumbered real property. We hold that the statutes governing the administration of insolvent estates do not affect amounts due under a perfected deed of trust. Accordingly, proceeds from the sale of decedent’s real property must first be used to satisfy the deed of trust. Any remaining surplus is available for distribution in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-317. The judgment of the probate court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Defendant, Rikealyn L. Fain, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective sixteen-year sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-12- 101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-17-1324(b)(1) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony) (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.

Petitioner, Robert Beham, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because (1) counsel failed to request a “mental evaluation” and (2) counsel failed to present mitigating evidence in sentencing, specifically a psychosexual evaluation. Following our review, we affirm.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Jovan Crawford, was convicted of aggravated assault, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years’ incarceration to be served consecutively to the defendant’s prior sentences in Shelby County Case Nos. 1308038 and 1501666. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charles Lawson, entered guilty pleas to unlawful possession of a weapon, evading arrest, attempted child abuse or neglect, felony escape, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and theft of property valued $10,000 or more, and he received an effective ten-year sentence, which he was to serve on probation. The Defendant was charged with new criminal offenses, and he entered into an agreement with the prosecution resolving both the new charges and the violation of probation. The trial court rejected the plea agreement. After a hearing, the court determined that the Defendant violated probation and ordered the sentences in the probation violation case to be served in confinement. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erroneously believed that the prosecution had no authority to make a plea offer for a violation of probation, that his due process rights were violated because the court relied on evidence outside the proceedings and interjected itself into the plea process, and that the sentences imposed were illegal. We conclude that the Defendant’s claims regarding the rejection of the plea agreement by the trial court are waived, that his due process rights were not violated during the hearing addressing revocation, and that the judgments, which reflect a thirty-five percent release eligibility date, are not rendered illegal by any error in the mittimus. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The pro se petitioner, Jamie Brock, appeals from the dismissal of his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“the Act”), which petition sought the appointment of counsel to assist him in seeking DNA testing of evidence related to his first degree murder conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.