APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Jessie Levent Tharpe, was convicted by a Henry County jury of evading arrest, possession of drug paraphernalia, and Class B felony possession of cocaine. He was subsequently sentenced to an effective eight-year sentence, which was suspended upon conditions of probation. On appeal, Tharpe raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, Tharpe challenges his convictions based upon inconsistencies in the testimony of the State’s witnesses.  After review of the evidence presented, we find the evidence sufficient and affirm the judgments of conviction.

The petitioner challenges the denial of his post-conviction petition, in which he contended, inter alia, that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the composition of the jury pool. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the venire was violative of his Sixth Amendment rights. As such, he has likewise failed to prove that counsel’s failure to object to the venire amounted to deficient performance or resulted in prejudice to him. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The State has appealed to this Court pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from an interlocutory order of the trial court suppressing evidence resulting from a search and seizure. The question presented for our review is whether the defendant had standing to contest the search of an outbuilding located on property near his premises. Upon review of the record, we affirm the trial court's findings that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the outbuilding but not in the area surrounding the outbuilding.

The trial court dismissed an action against the county arising from a deputy sheriff's allegedly negligent failure to arrest a man who had just assaulted his former girlfriend, the mother of his child. The man later murdered his young son. The mother of the child appealed. Because the public duty doctrine provided a shield from liability, and the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to establish the special duty exception, we affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Larry Walcott, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to five and one-half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises four issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to recuse itself; 2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to sequester the jury; 3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and 4) whether the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Finding no reversible error in the issues raised by the Defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce action, Robert William Fuller, Jr. ("Father") filed a petition seeking, among other things, a modification of the custody arrangement with respect to the parties' minor son, Ryan; an enforcement of parenting time with both Ryan and his daughter, Caitlyn; and a finding of contempt against his former wife, Lynn Gail Harrison, formerly Fuller ("Mother"). Mother filed a counterclaim, seeking an increase in child support. Following a hearing, the trial court essentially denied Father's petition. It left Mother as the primary residential parent of both children. In addition, the trial court ordered that Father's visitation with Caitlyn would be at the sole discretion of a named counselor. The trial court did not find Mother in contempt. Father appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify in part.

I agree with the result reached by the majority. I write separately to point out that the applicable statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105, expressly provides that an application for a beer permit “shall disclose” that “no . . . person to be employed . . . has been convicted of any violation of the laws [pertaining to beer or other alcoholic beverages] or any crime involving moral turpitude within the past ten (10) years.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105(c)(7). In addition to this requirement pertaining to the contents of the application, Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105(b), dealing with what “an applicant must establish,” contains a proof requirement using the same language. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105(b)(4).

This is an appeal of a divorce action in which the Wife argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate and the trial court erred in dismissing her independent lawsuit against Husband, and a corporation owned by Husband, for wages claimed to be earned by Wife and owing by the corporation. We hold that the distribution of marital property should be modified so as to award Wife sole ownership of the marital home, subject to Husband's right of first refusal to purchase the home in the event it is sold, and Husband's right to visit and maintain the gravesite of the parties' daughter, located near the home on part of the marital estate, upon Husband's providing reasonable notice to Wife. We further find that the trial court erred in dismissing Wife's lawsuit against Husband and therefore vacate the trial court's order dismissing with prejudice the Wife's lawsuit against Husband and the corporation. We affirm the trial court's ruling in all other respects.

This case involves the Petitioner’s application for a permit to sell beer both on and off-premises of her proposed business establishment. The trial court affirmed the Appellee McMinn County Commission’s decision to deny the permit, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105, on grounds that Petitioner’s application contained a false statement. Petitioner contends on appeal that she should have been granted the permit because she did not know the statement was false at the time she made it, and because she attempted to amend the application to correct the false statement prior to the hearing before the McMinn County Chancery Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding the employee temporary total disability benefits in excess of 400 weeks where the employee had not attained maximum medical improvement within the 400-week period. We hold that the statutory "maximum total benefit" of 400 weeks applies to temporary total disability benefits. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold that the employer's liability for temporary total disability benefits is statutorily limited to 400 weeks. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Calvin O. Tankesly, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the trial court should have granted him relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence allegedly showing that extraneous prejudicial information was imparted to the jury at his trial. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the petition.

The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment with the trial court. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order which amounted to a denial of the plaintiff’s motion.  Accordingly, the trial court’s order does not constitute a final judgment which the plaintiff may appeal to this Court. This appeal stands dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

A Greene County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bronzo Gosnell, Jr., of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's conviction on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed as time-barred. Because we agree that the petition is time-barred, we affirm.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion. I believe the judgments of conviction provide illegal sentences and are, therefore, void. I believe the case should be remanded for the trial court to transfer the case to the Marshall County Circuit Court for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee 100 percent permanent disability. The employer contends the trial court was in error in calculating the average weekly wage and in finding the employee was totally disabled.  Judgment is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the case finding plaintiff had not established sufficient evidence to prove notice and causation of injury. Plaintiff insists the court was in error in weighing the evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Tyris Lemont Harvey, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to burglary and theft of property valued over $500. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective four-year sentence, as a Range II offender, and ordered that the Petitioner's sentences run consecutively to a prior sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his habeas petition, contending that the judgments reflect thirty percent release eligibility rather than the statutorily mandated one hundred percent service required of multiple rapists. Because the petitioner was convicted by a jury, as opposed to pleading guilty, we conclude that the trial court was required to impose the one hundred percent service requirement.  Therefore, the trial court’s failure to properly mark the judgments does not render the judgments void but should be amended as a clerical error, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.  We affirm the denial of habeas relief.

The Appellant, Yolando Odom, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Odom pled guilty to one count of robbery and accepted an eight-year sentence as a Range II offender, despite only meeting the statutory criteria for a Range I offender. On appeal, Odom contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to inform him of possible defenses at trial and in failing to review the proof with respect to the elements of the indicted offense of aggravated robbery. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Sanders, of two counts of  first degree felony murder; two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; one count of  aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and five counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the two counts of first degree murder together and the two counts of aggravated robbery together and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder, eight years for the aggravated robbery, three years for the aggravated burglary, and three years for each count of attempted robbery, all to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient, that the trial court improperly approved the use of an interpreter at trial, and that the trial court erred in ordering the sequestration of the jury. We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Joseph A. Maine, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary and that his trial counsel was ineffective for, among other things, erroneously advising him that he would be eligible for release after serving only twenty-five years of his life sentence.1 Because the record reflects that the petitioner was similarly misinformed by the trial court as to the release eligibility date for his life sentence, we conclude that his pleas were not knowing or voluntary. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition and remand the case for the petitioner to withdraw his pleas of guilty.

The defendant, Martez Towen Fitts, pled guilty to sale of cocaine over .5 grams and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years, all suspended except for forty-eight hours and the balance to be served on probation, with the first six months on intensive probation. Additionally, he was ordered to comply with alcohol and drug assessment programs, obtain his GED, and pay a $2000 fine. The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant's probation, and he appealed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Nursing home brought suit against former resident's daughters seeking to recover amounts owed for resident's care by setting aside alleged fraudulent conveyances to the daughters. We affirm the judgment of the trial court setting aside a portion of the conveyances as fraudulent.

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits to the injured employee for the period prior to the date the employee notified the employer of his gradually-occurring injury. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel held that the trial court correctly determined that the employee had timely notified the employer of his injury, but reversed the trial court's determination that the injury was compensable prior to the date of notification. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel. We hold that the notice was timely, that the employee is entitled to temporary total disability benefits for the period he was off work following his surgery, and that the trial court correctly determined that the employee sustained a 70% vocational disability, affirming the trial court on the separate grounds set forth herein.

Emerson E. Russell ("the plaintiff") and his wife, Angie Russell, brought this suit for medical malpractice against Dr. Ted W. Brown, Jr., seeking damages associated with injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff as a result of a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Brown. The plaintiff also named as a defendant Dr. S. Morgan Smith, the anesthesiologist who attended the plaintiff's surgery. In the complaint, the plaintiff averred, among other allegations, that he was not adequately informed of alternative treatments for his snoring problem, and that he was not fully advised of the attendant risks of the procedure performed by Dr. Brown. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Following the trial, the defendants filed separate motions for discretionary costs, which motions were granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff and his wife appeal, arguing that the plaintiff was not furnished sufficient information to enable him to give "informed" consent to the surgery performed by Dr. Brown. They also contend that the trial court's charge to the jury on the issue of informed consent did not adequately instruct the jury on the subject. Finally, they raise several issues pertaining to evidentiary matters. As a separate issue, the defendants contend that the trial court's awards of discretionary costs were inadequate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the jury's verdict. We modify the trial court's two awards of discretionary costs. As modified, those awards are affirmed.