APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

City-County Federal Credit Union ("Plaintiff") filed suit in the General Sessions Court seeking over $12,000 it claimed was owed on a VISA credit card it had issued to Suzanne E. Linboe ("Defendant"). After Plaintiff was awarded a judgment by the General Sessions Court, Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The Circuit Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, awarding Plaintiff a judgment for $15,323.10. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

Plaintiff/Appellant owner of jet ski customizing business brought defamation action against defendants alleging libel, civil conspiracy and false light invasion of privacy stemming from statements defendants made about plaintiff, which were published on an Internet news group. The trial court held that venue was proper in Warren County, Tennessee, and that the court had jurisdiction over out-of-state resident defendants. Finding that plaintiff was a public figure for purposes of libel action, that plaintiff could not prove actual malice, and that plaintiff failed to show actual damage, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The issues in this case are whether the trial court erred in granting a non-custodial parent unsupervised visitation and in limiting the number of witnesses at trial. Father, the custodial parent of the minor child, contends that the trial court's grant of unsupervised visitation to mother is not in the child's best interest and ignores evidence that mother abused the child. Father also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to hear witness testimony as to mother's abuse of the child and as to mother's mendacity. We find that the evidence supports a finding that unsupervised visitation is in the child's best interest and, therefore, the trial court's award of unsupervised visitation to mother was not an abuse of discretion. We further find that the witness testimony excluded by the trial court was cumulative, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the witnesses. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.

The defendant, Harvey Lillard Webb, was indicted for premeditated first degree murder. He was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. He was sentenced to twenty years in confinement as a violent offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Trial Court refused to terminate the mother's parental rights to MEI. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Joseph Miles, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Rolando Contreras, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Jay Homer Chambers, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand for reconsideration of the petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective.

The Defendant, Wayne E. Mitchell, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jeffery Allen Hopkins, appeals his Tipton County convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, arising from the December 20, 2003 shooting death of Ricky Lumpkin. The defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction and 20 years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support these convictions. Unpersuaded that the state’s evidence was legally insufficient, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Antowan Antonio Williams, pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated robbery. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve a 2.7 year probationary sentence as a mitigated offender but denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion. The defendant now brings the instant appeal challenging the trial court's denial of judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Shane Holt, pled guilty to three counts of money laundering and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three concurrent terms of eight years. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were constitutionally infirm and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his pleas. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found the defendant, Michael N. Smith, guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an investigatory stop. Following our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, John Thomas Bingham, was convicted by jury of possession of contraband (marijuana) in a penal institution, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to five years six months for this conviction. The trial court ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant does not challenge the length of his sentence. In this appeal,
Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated robbery; (2) that the indictment fails to state an offense; and (3) that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged offense occurred prior to the return of the indictment. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Richard A. Childress, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a direct appeal as of right from a jury conviction of aggravated rape and criminal exposure of another to HIV. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty-five years and six years, for an effective sentence of thirty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant raises only one issue: there is insufficient evidence to find him guilty of the two offenses for which he was convicted. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Rodney Buford, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for especially aggravated burglary and six years for aggravated burglary for an effective thirty-one year sentence. On appeal, Buford argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a bill of particulars; and (2) that his sentences are excessive, and the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences.

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mr. Hopper injured his back February 19, 1996 while working in the warehouse of his employer. On November 17, 1997 Mr. Hopper settled this claim for 20% vocational disability. All told, Mr. Hopper initiated four workers’ compensation claims during his employment with OshKosh resulting in 100% vocational disability. Several years later, after he lost his job with OshKosh, Mr. Hopper filed a motion to reconsider his earlier settlement of the February 19, 1996 claim against the Second Injury Fund only. The trial court granted this relief, increased Mr. Hopper’s vocational disability by 30%, and assigned liability to the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund appeals on the grounds that the employee’s motion was untimely, that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the employee had suffered subsequent injuries, and that the evidence preponderated against increasing the employee’s vocational disability. After carefully reviewing the record, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

Originally indicted for second degree murder, Defendant, Jermaine Nelson, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to serve ten (10) years in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a Range II offender. We agree, and affirm the conviction, but reverse the sentence and remand for an amended judgment imposing a Range I sentence of six (6) years.

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mr. Hopper injured his back February 19, 1996 while working in the warehouse of his employer. On November 17, 1997 Mr. Hopper settled this claim for 20% vocational disability. All told, Mr. Hopper initiated four workers’ compensation claims during his employment with OshKosh resulting in 100% vocational disability. Several years later, after he lost his job with OshKosh, Mr. Hopper filed a motion to reconsider his earlier settlement of the February 19, 1996 claim against the Second Injury Fund only. The trial court granted this relief, increased Mr. Hopper’s vocational disability by 30%, and assigned liability to the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund appeals on the grounds that the employee’s motion was untimely, that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the employee had suffered subsequent injuries, and that the evidence preponderated against increasing the employee’s vocational disability. After carefully reviewing the record, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

The Appellant, Maurice Garrett, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Garrett argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Aggrieved of her convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver and of simple possession of marijuana, the defendant, Gloria A. Porter, appeals. Because we have determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for dismissal of the charges.

This is a defamation case. After listening to a local talk radio show, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants, asserting that the defendants had broadcast defamatory material on the radio show concerning the plaintiffs’ business practices. There was no recording of the talk radio show. In a bench trial, many witnesses testified about statements made on the show. After the trial, the trial court found that there were so many different versions, there was no way to determine what was actually said on the radio program. The trial court concluded that, assuming unflattering statements were made, they did not damage the plaintiffs’ reputations. The trial court also concluded that, even if the statements made were defamatory, the plaintiffs did not prove any injury. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.

Ford vehicles leased by its dealers are simultaneously purchased by Ford Credit, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company. Ford Credit is subject to a franchise tax which is determined by the book value of its tangible personal property owned or used in Tennessee. If the leased vehicles are finished goods inventory, their value is excluded from the calculation of franchise taxes. The trial court ruled that the leased vehicles were not held by Ford Credit for sale, and thus did not qualify as finished goods inventory. Ford Credit appeals. The judgment is affirmed.