APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Carlito D. Adams, was convicted in 1995 of two counts of felony murder and two counts of attempted felony murder, with the latter being reversed and dismissed. See State v. Carlito D. Adams, No. 02C01-9608-CR-00267, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1247 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 1997), perm. to appeal denied concurring in results only (Tenn. Nov. 9, 1998). In November 1999, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which, according to the petitioner, was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Additionally, he alleges that this court denied, on January 25, 2002, his motion to reconsider the dismissal. On January 19, 2005, he filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, claiming that a new right, which he sought to assert, had been recognized in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and that there was new scientific evidence establishing his actual innocence. The post-conviction court denied the motion to reopen, and the petitioner appealed. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas
company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are
resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property
owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas
company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are
resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property
owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas
company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are
resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property
owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints.

Petitioner, Grover L. Dunigan, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his conviction for second degree murder. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing on the grounds that the petition was time-barred. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations because his trial attorney never told him that the supreme court had denied his Rule 11 application. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the lower court properly dismissed the petition. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Carlos L. Rice, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Plaintiff sued for attorney's fees under contract of employment with defendant. The Trial Court awarded Judgment for fees. Both parties appealed. We affirm.

The issue presented in this case is whether the policemen and firemen's rule applies to an animal control officer who was bitten by a Doberman pinscher while performing the duties of his employment. The plaintiff, an animal control officer for the Chattanooga Police Department, was bitten when, in the course and scope of his employment, he attempted to take possession of the defendants' dog at their home. The plaintiff sued the defendants for compensatory damages, claiming that they were negligent in failing to warn him about the dangerous nature of the dog. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment upon its determination that the dog's owners owed no duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances pursuant to the policemen and firemen's rule which precludes police officers and firefighters from recovering for injuries arising out of risks peculiar to their employment. Upon review, we find that the dog's owners owed no duty of ordinary care to the animal control officer and therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Edna Phelps, was found guilty by a Madison County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years, all suspended except for eleven months and twenty-nine days with the balance to be served on intensive probation. On appeal, she argues the trial court erred in overruling her objections to certain questions asked by the State. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Steven Murphy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and two counts of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the first degree felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, for which the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, merged the two theft convictions, and sentenced the defendant to two years for the theft conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence without parole. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to allow hearsay statements of the victim into evidence, in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police, and in not instructing the jury on the adverse inference that could be drawn from the State’s failure to preserve the tape recording of the defendant’s statements. Having reviewed the record and found no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Case No. 01-02751 to reflect the defendant’s conviction offense which was omitted.