APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

This is a long-running divorce case on appeal to this Court for the third time. The husband
raises several issues concerning the trial court’s classification of the parties’ interests and
award of attorney’s fees to the wife. We affirm.

Defendant, Michael Jason Holloway, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion following his guilty plea to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. He also contends that the State breached a material term of the plea agreement by taking a position on diversion at the sentencing hearing. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hamid Houbbadi, Petitioner, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated burglary and sentenced to life in prison plus twelve years. State v. Houbbadi, No. M2022-01751-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 8525144, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 15, 2024). He was unsuccessful on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, amended pro se petition, and second amended pro se petition. He insisted on proceeding pro se. After a two-day hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues: (1) his Fifth Amendment rights were violated; (2) the State committed a Brady violation;(3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (4) the post-conviction court failed to address all the issues of “ineffective assistance of counsel caused by the court”; (5) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by declining to appoint elbow counsel; (6) the post-conviction court improperly ruled that service of subpoena by text message is invalid; and (7) he was denied due process of law. After a full review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Howard Jefferson Atkins, acting pro se, appeals from the Tipton County
Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Rule 36 motion to correct an alleged clerical error
in a juvenile transfer order entered in 2000. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, the
briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jacquet Moore, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his underlying conviction for aggravated rape. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to (1) perform adequate investigation in preparation for trial, including seeking funds for investigative services, and (2) effectively impeach the victim on cross-examination. As a preliminary matter, we remanded the case to the post-conviction court for the entry of an amended order to include sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law on these two issues. After our review of the amended order, as well as the issues presented by the parties and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner/Mother seeks accelerated review of the trial court’s denial of her 12^th motion to recuse. A final judgment has been entered in the underlying termination of parental rights case, and Mother has appealed that judgment.  Issues related to the trial court’s denial of Mother’s motion to recuse may be raised in Mother’s appeal of the trial court’s final judgment.  Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Petitioner/Mother seeks accelerated review of the trial court’s denial of her 13^th motion to recuse. Because a final judgment has been entered in the underlying termination of parental rights case, and Mother has appealed that judgment, issues related to the trial court’s denial of Mother’s recusal motion may be raised in her appeal of the final judgment.  Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Following a bench trial, Deviest Patton (“Appellant”) was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court ordered Appellant to be diagnosed and evaluated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303(a)(1). Upon completion of the evaluation, the State filed a complaint for judicial commitment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court ordered Appellant to be judicially committed. On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by ordering judicial hospitalization. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The father of the minor child appeals the termination of his parental rights. The paternal aunt and uncle, who sought custody of the minor child, appeal the denial of their motion to intervene. We affirm both decisions.

The circuit court determined that two grounds for termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child had been proven by clear and convincing evidence but concluded that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The petitioners appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the circuit court’s decision.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights, the trial court determined
that clear and convincing evidence supported termination as to two statutory grounds:
abandonment by failure to visit and persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s
removal. The trial court did not find clear and convincing evidence to support the alleged
ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical
custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court further determined that
termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed,
contesting the termination of her parental rights and additionally arguing that the adoptive
father lacked standing to file the petition due to his criminal history and the fact that he is
not legally related to the child. Upon review, we determine that the adoptive father had
standing to file the termination petition because he had maintained physical custody of the
child for nearly a year before filing the termination petition. As to termination of the
mother’s parental rights, we reverse the trial court’s determination that the petitioners had
failed to establish the statutory ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to
assume legal and physical custody of the child. Accordingly, we find that statutory ground
also supports termination of the mother’s parental rights. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant, James Andrew Paige, appeals from his convictions for three counts of rape, for which he is serving an eleven-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by(1) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2)admitting the victim’s hearsay statements; and (3) failing to inquire into defense counsel’s unintentional contact with a juror or declare a mistrial. Defendant also avers that the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to relief. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal concerning the scope of a commercial property insurance policy and whether the insured has stated sufficient facts to invoke coverage. The insurer filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the policy at issue did not provide coverage for the insured’s claimed losses. The insured filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy provided coverage and asserting a breach of contract claim. The insurer filed a motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court denied. We granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. After interpreting the policy, we determine that the insured failed to invoke coverage, and we reverse the trial court’s contrary finding. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, finding that the counterclaim sufficiently stated a claim for a declaratory judgment. Because the pleadings had not closed when the trial court ruled on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises out of a health care liability claim. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury entered a verdict in favor of the appellee-defendant. The appellant-plaintiff appeals the trial court’s acceptance of two of defendant’s expert witnesses. Upon diligent review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing defendant’s causation expert witness to testify about his interpretation of a diagnostic image when his opinion about that image had not been properly disclosed as required by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We also conclude that this error more probably than not affected the judgment. We further conclude that the trial court erred in allowing defendant’s standard-of-care expert witness to testify despite not satisfying the locality rule contained in the Health Care Liability Act. However, we conclude that this error did not more probably than not affect the judgment. We vacate the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter for a new trial.

The Defendant, Michele Lee Ridgeway, pled guilty to two counts of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years suspended to supervised probation. Thereafter, the Defendant allegedly violated the terms of her probation by possessing drug paraphernalia in her residence. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s suspended sentences and ordered her to serve the remainder of her sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the State proved that she violated the conditions of her suspended sentences; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in fully revoking her probation as a consequence of the alleged violation. Upon our review, we conclude that the State did not prove that the Defendant violated the terms of her probation. Because we resolve the appeal on that basis, we do not reach the second issue. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the revocation order and remand the case for dismissal of the revocation proceedings.

Defendant, Joshua Daniel Gibbons, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury conviction of disorderly conduct, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erredin its instructions to the jury. We find that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on a mode of disorderly conduct not included in the charging instrument and that, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictionunder either mode of liability charged to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge.

Defendant, Todd Allen Burrows, Jr., appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

A Henderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Cordero Klein Blake, of driving while
under the influence (“DUI”) of marijuana, first offense, possession of a handgun while
under the influence, driving on a suspended license, speeding, violation of registration law,
and violation of financial responsibility law. The trial court imposed a total effective
sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to community corrections
supervision following service of seven days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for DUI and possession
of a handgun while under the influence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a Rule 10B interlocutory appeal of the denial of a second recusal motion. We find, as the trial court did, that the second motion is repetitive of the first and should be denied. We further grant attorney’s fees for a frivolous appeal.

This action involves the trial court’s denial of a petition for termination of a biological
father’s parental rights to his minor child. We now affirm.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s decision to charge the costs of a conservatorship proceeding against the petitioner under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114. The petitioner sought a conservatorship for the respondent—the petitioner’s 84-year-old father—to protect his father and to prevent him from wasting his assets. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservatorship and that it was in the respondent’s best interest that the petitioner be appointed his conservator. But the court charged the costs of the proceedings to the petitioner rather than the property of the respondent. The court reasoned, inter alia, that the petitioner benefited from the conservatorship and that the respondent’s need for a conservatorship was “borderline” and “not clear cut.” The petitioner appeals. Having reviewed the trial court’s discretionary decisions pursuant to the three-part analysis set forth in Lee Medical Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010), we have determined that the trial court’s decision to charge the costs of the proceedings to the petitioner was based on an erroneous assessment of the relevant facts and a misapplication of the relevant legal principles. Accordingly, we vacate the decision and remand with instructions to assess all the guardian ad litem fees against the property of the respondent, the amount of which has already been approved, and to assess against the property of the respondent the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs the petitioner incurred in the trial court and on appeal, the amount of which is to be determined on remand. The trial court shall also determine the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the attorney ad litem in this appeal and assess those charges against the property of the respondent.

The majority concludes that Antonio Demetrius Adkisson’s confession to law enforcement officers was involuntary and vacates his two convictions for second-degree murder. Whether Adkisson’s confession was voluntary under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions is a close question. But applying the same totality-of-the circumstances test as the majority, I conclude that the confession here was the product of Adkisson’s own free will, not police coercion. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis of that issue and from the Court’s judgment vacating Adkisson’s convictions.

Husband and Wife divorced. In ruling upon contested matters, the trial court awarded Wife transitional alimony and alimony in futuro as well as attorney’s fees. Husband appealed. He argues the trial court’s award of alimony was error because the court miscalculated his income, because it errantly excluded certain evidence, and because it awarded the wrong type of alimony. He also argues that Wife’s attorney’s fees affidavit was insufficient to support an award of attorney’s fees. We affirm.

The Defendant, Roy Gene Nicholson, III, appeals from his Williamson County Circuit Court convictions of reckless aggravated assault, evading arrest, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-204 and that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to continue his trial, during which time the State procured a superseding indictment. Discerning no error, we affirm.