APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Tommy Lynn Hollingsworth, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his six-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the revocation of the defendant’s probation. As to the disposition of the defendant’s probation, while we affirm the judgment of the trial court to order confinement in case number 96-195, the trial court erred in imposing that disposition in case number 96-193, which had expired.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial in probation revocation proceedings attached on December 26, 2024, which is when the July 8, 2002 violation of probation warrant was served and the Defendant was arrested. In Allen, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “a probation revocation proceeding is a continuation of the criminal prosecution, and as such, the defendant . . . has a constitutional right to a speedy trial on ‘the offense of violation of the terms of probation.’” Allen v. State, 505 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tenn. 1974). The Allen court then concluded that the “two year, eight month delay” between the issuance of the probation violation warrant and the revocation hearing violated the defendant’s right to a trial. Id. at 716-19.

The Carroll County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Dale Maurice Teague, with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 1), possession of marijuana (Count 2), possession with the intent to use drug paraphernalia (Count 3), and possession of a prohibited weapon, to wit, knuckles (Count 4). After the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on the marijuana count, the jury convicted the Defendant of the remaining offenses, and the trial court imposed an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a prohibited weapon, knuckles; (2) the State violated two pretrial orders that resulted in the improper admission of hearsay and prior bad act evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his initial motion to suppress and in denying his motion to reconsider the motion to suppress. After review, we affirm.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to two minor children after finding that the mother abandoned the children through failure to support and subjected the children to severe abuse. The mother appeals to this Court, and, discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant was charged with first degree premeditated murder after shooting and
killing the victim during an argument. The Defendant was tried before a jury, and the trial
court instructed the jury on the defense of self-defense. The jury convicted the Defendant
of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced the
Defendant to five years of incarceration, suspended after the service of eleven months,
twenty-nine days. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
allowing an eyewitness to offer opinion testimony, simultaneously infringing on the
Defendant’s constitutional right to not testify, and that the trial court erred in ordering the
Defendant to serve a portion of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

Defendant, George Harris Patterson, III, who was described at oral argument as a First Amendment Auditor, was indicted for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and assault on a first responder after an incident at a Davidson County Post Office. A jury found Defendant not guilty of resisting arrest but guilty of disorderly conduct and assault. Defendant appeals, raising several issues. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute under the First Amendment as applied to him, the trial court’s failure to give a special jury instruction, the trial court’s admission of a piece of evidence and testimony from a postal employee, and the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial. He also insists he is entitled to cumulative error relief. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Sneed, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of the sale of methamphetamine in an amount over 0.5 gram, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a), (c)(1) (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a sixteen-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant, a Range II offender, contends the court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Justin Johnson-a/k/a Straight Drop, appeals his convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder, first degree premeditated murder, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty-five years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the admission of photographs of the victim’s body at the crime scene and during the autopsy, the trial court’s denial of his request to sit at counsel table during trial, and the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments. Defendant also contends that he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of multiple errors. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendants Pauline Virginia Spalding and Charles Martin Johnson were jointly indicted for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and impersonating a police officer. The Defendants were tried together by a jury, and the jury convicted both Defendants as charged. The trial court sentenced Ms. Spalding to fifteen years for the kidnapping conviction, three years for the assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the impersonation conviction. The trial court ordered Ms. Spalding’s sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective term of incarceration of fifteen years. The trial court sentenced Mr. Johnson to seventeen years for the kidnapping conviction, four years for the assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the impersonation conviction. The trial court ordered Mr. Johnson’s sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective term of incarceration of seventeen years. In this consolidated direct appeal, Mr. Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and also contends that his dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. Ms. Spalding contends that the trial court erred in denying the admission of certain evidence; that purported dishonesty from one of the jurors during voir dire entitles her to a new trial; and that the trial court erred in sentencing her. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Kenneth George Arnold, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape,
aggravated sexual battery, and sexual battery by an authority figure, for which he is serving
an effective thirteen-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court
erred in denying relief on his claims that he received the ineffective assistance of pretrial,
trial, and appellate counsel and that relief was required due to the cumulative effect of
multiple instances of deficient performance by his attorneys in the conviction proceedings.
We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from an order denying relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

A father filed several documents in the Juvenile Court for Madison County (the “trial court”) seeking, inter alia, parenting time with his minor child. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition, and the father filed a timely appeal to this Court. Because the father’s brief fails to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure addressing briefing, father waives any issues purportedly raised. This appeal is dismissed.

A music publisher sued a musician for breach of contract. The musician, saddled with legal fees related to this litigation, eventually filed for bankruptcy and claimed certain musical works as his own intellectual property during the bankruptcy proceedings. The parties settled by agreeing that ownership rights to a subset of the musician’s songs would be transferred to the publisher. Subsequently, the publisher contacted a licensing agency in pursuit of royalties, claiming ownership of more songs than were actually provided for under the settlement. The musician objected to the licensing agency, asserting that the publisher misrepresented the breadth of works it obtained in the settlement. This led to a second lawsuit with the music publisher asserting breach of contract against the musician. The musician filed a counterclaim against the publisher in this second lawsuit, asserting that the publisher’s communications with the licensing agency amounted to tortious interference with the musician’s existing and prospective business relationships. The publisher sought to dismiss the musician’s counterclaim under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). The trial court dismissed the publisher’s TPPA petition. The publisher appeals the denial of its TPPA petition. We affirm.

The Defendant, John Bassett, appeals from his conviction for first degree premeditated
murder, for which he received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. On appeal,
the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was responsible for the
victim’s death and that he acted with premeditation and (2) the evidence was insufficient
to support an enhanced sentence based upon the aggravating circumstance that the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court with respect to the Defendant’s conviction. However, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court with respect to the Defendant’s sentence and remand the case for the entry
of an amended judgment sentencing the Defendant to imprisonment for life.

The defendant, Vidal Chad Bryant, pled guilty to attempted possession with the intent to
sell butyrylfentanyl, a Class C felony; possession with the intent to sell less than half a
gram of methamphetamine, a Class C felony; and possession of a firearm after having been
previously convicted of a felony drug offense, a Class C felony, for an agreed-upon
effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On
appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to suspend the remainder of his sentence to probation. Following our review of the record,
the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion.

Defendant, Raymond Antonio Smith, appeals from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, for which he is serving a sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient relative to premeditation and to the stolen property’s value. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

The Defendant, Cedric Peter Hopgood, pleaded guilty to multiple felony drug possession offenses and received an agreed-upon sentence of thirty-three years. See T.C.A. § 39-17- 417 (2025). The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to reconsider. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

Movant, John Valentine, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, he argues that the indictment was defective and that his double jeopardy rights were violated. After our review, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial with neither the mother nor her counsel present, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother argues on appeal, inter alia, that the court erred in permitting counsel to withdraw on the day of the hearing. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Tony Charles Davenport, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of
reckless homicide, attempted second degree murder, and attempted voluntary
manslaughter, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years’
incarceration to be served as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant
claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of attempted second
degree murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter and that the trial court erred in
imposing consecutive sentencing. The State responds that the Defendant’s appeal is
untimely and should be dismissed. Because we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of
appeal was untimely filed and that the interests of justice do not merit waiver of the
untimeliness, we dismiss the appeal.

In this divorce matter, the trial court classified and valued the parties’ assets, subsequently fashioning a distribution of the marital assets and liabilities that the court deemed equitable. The husband has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination regarding the classification and valuation of two assets and remand those issues to the trial court for further determination. Accordingly, because of these unresolved classification and valuation issues, we vacate the trial court’s overall distribution of marital property and remand that issue for further determination as well.

This case arises out of the demise of a 20-year marriage. The trial court declared the parties divorced, equitably divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife alimony in solido, transitional alimony, and alimony in futuro. The husband appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

On February 4, 2026, the pro se Appellant filed an application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. On February 6, 2026, this Court issued an order noting that the Appellant failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 10 by failing to attach to his application any order issued by the trial court for which review may be available. See Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a), (c). However, the Appellant also requested relief pursuant to the writ of mandamus, asserting that the trial court had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. This Court requested a response from the State regarding the current status of the trial court proceedings and the appropriateness of the writ of mandamus.

The Petitioner, Jacob Evan Coyne, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s (1) failure to
investigate or file pretrial motions challenging the credibility of an officer who investigated
his case, (2) failure to sufficiently meet with or to advise the Petitioner regarding the nature
of his case, and (3) failure to adequately advise the Petitioner regarding the status of plea
negotiations. Discerning no error, we affirm.