APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A member of a Tennessee limited liability company filed a complaint seeking the appointment of a receiver to operate the company and the dissolution and winding up of the company. The trial court appointed a receiver, the receiver moved to sell the company’s assets, and the member objected to the sale. The member also sought to amend his complaint to add additional claims against additional defendants. The trial court entered an order approving the receiver’s proposed sale of the assets and denying the member’s motion to amend his complaint. The trial court ordered that the proceeds of the sale are to be paid into the trial court’s registry and certified its order as a final judgment. We conclude that the trial court’s order was not a final judgment and that the trial court improvidently certified it as such. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and we dismiss this appeal.

Jarvis T. Emerson, Defendant, appeals from his convictions for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, three counts of assault, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of felon in possession of a firearm. He received an effective sentence of fifty-five years. Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to establish his identity; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the assault charges because the proof did not show the victims reasonably feared imminent bodily injury; (3) the evidence was insufficient to show Defendant was previously convicted of a felony; (4) the conviction for especially aggravated burglary should be reduced to aggravated burglary because the State relied on serious bodily injury to prosecute both the attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated burglary convictions; (5) the trial court erred in ordering partial consecutive sentencing by failing to find the required State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995), factors; (6) the State failed to prove Defendant was a Range II, multiple offender; and (7) Apprendi mandates that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt the serious bodily injury enhancement for attempted first degree murder and that this requirement makes the enhancement for attempted first degree murder the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.” After a thorough review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that serious bodily injury is not an element of attempted first degree murder, such that a prosecution for both attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated burglary are prohibited by statute. We also determine Defendant has waived any challenge under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and any challenge to his offender classification. However, we remand for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to make the requisite findings before ordering partial consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, Defendant’s convictions are affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the manner of service of the sentences.

Appellant, homeowner, appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee, real estate company’s, motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim arising from Appellant and Appellee’s contract for the sale of Appellant’s property. After the expiration of the initial period of the listing agreement, Appellant transferred the property by quitclaim deed to himself and another party. Appellee sought compensation under the contract. Appellant failed to respond to Appellee’s requests for admissions, and the trial court deemed the requests for admissions admitted. Appellant also failed to respond to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and Appellee’s statement of material facts for purposes of summary judgment was undisputed. Despite the admitted facts, the trial court erred in finding that Appellant breached the plain language of the contract. Because Appellee was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we reverse and remand.

The Defendant, Sedrick Darnell Cummings, pled guilty to weapons-related offenses after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized following the execution of a search warrant at his residence. As a part of the Defendant’s plea agreement, he sought to reserve a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s decision that the affidavit underlying the search warrant established probable cause to search based upon an anonymous tip and the smell of marijuana. Following our review, we conclude that the certified question clearly identifies the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) and that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the search warrant failed to establish probable cause. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the case is dismissed.

In this appeal, we address whether a defendant may obtain the dismissal of a lawsuit based on a challenge to the plaintiff’s standing asserted for the first time after the jury returned its verdict. Husband and wife Brett and Ceree Houghton were the sole shareholders of a corporation that operated a boat dealership. The company was an authorized dealer of manufacturer Malibu Boats, LLC. After that business relationship fell apart, the dealership went out of business, and the Houghtons each declared bankruptcy. Thereafter, the Houghtons successfully sued the manufacturer for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and promissory fraud. A jury awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages for the loss of equity in real property owned by the dealership that was sold at foreclosure when the dealership failed. The manufacturer filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial in which it raised various issues. At the hearing on the motion, however, the manufacturer orally raised a new issue: It questioned the Houghtons’ standing, given that the damages related to real property owned by the dealership instead of them. After the parties submitted briefing, the trial court determined that the Houghtons could not pursue the asserted claims in their own names. Instead, the claims belonged to the dealership and were available to the Houghtons only through a shareholder derivative proceeding. The Houghtons admittedly had not complied with the statutory mechanism for such a proceeding. Thus, the trial court concluded that the Houghtons lacked so-called “statutory standing.” Finding that the lack of statutory standing deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals reversed. The intermediate appellate court determined that so-called “shareholder standing” principles govern this case. Importantly, the court concluded that shareholder standing limitations are not jurisdictional and, therefore, are subject to waiver. The court further concluded that the manufacturer waived its challenge by not timely asserting the issue. We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Houghtons had constitutional standing to bring their suit. We further hold that the trial court erred in relying on statutory standing principles to dismiss the suit. Instead, the substance of the standing challenge implicated shareholder standing limitations, and the manufacturer forfeited its challenge. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

Appellant filed a petition to probate the will of her former husband, asking that she be awarded a life estate in the former husband’s residence, per the terms of the will. The estate was eventually closed by agreed order, which granted Appellant a life estate in the subject property. Appellant thereafter filed a motion to set aside the agreed final order, arguing that her and the decedent’s marital dissolution agreement awarded her at least a one-half ownership interest in the property. The trial court denied the motion after concluding that Appellant did not meet her burden under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Due to profound deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we dismiss this appeal and award Appellees their reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this appeal.

The Defendant, Cleotha Abston, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of eighty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to exclude reference to a firearm recovered from his vehicle following his arrest, (2) the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury regarding lost or destroyed evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to bifurcate his charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found two grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals only the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance.  We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance.  Although Father does not appeal the termination of his parental rights, we are required to review that decision.  The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to visit, failure to support, and wanton disregard; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court also found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

A self-represented petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because the filing does not comply with Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns a driveway easement. Robert Davis and Lala Davis (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued their neighbor Karen Edwards (“Edwards”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) to enforce an oral agreement whereby Edwards agreed to build her own driveway on her property. Edwards had been using Plaintiffs’ driveway under the terms of the Driveway Easement and Maintenance Agreement (“the DEMA”), an express easement agreed to by Plaintiffs and Jeanette Schlaeger (“Schlaeger”), the previous owner of Edwards’ property. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Edwards had reached a verbal agreement with Plaintiffs to build her own driveway, and that she must build it. Plaintiffs filed a motion for additional findings asking that the DEMA be terminated even though that was not an issue at trial. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion on grounds that the DEMA was meant to be temporary despite the DEMA’s unambiguous language to the contrary. Edwards appealed. Subsequently, Joe Hamby and Amber Hamby (“Defendants”) bought Edwards’ property and were substituted as appellants. We hold, inter alia, that the DEMA is permanent and runs with the land. The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for additional findings. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment nullifying the DEMA.

This matter is before the Court upon petition of the Defendant, Mikel Cecil, for an
accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The
Defendant asks this Court to review the trial judge’s order denying his motion to recuse.

This is an action for breach of contract, unlawful procurement of breach of contract, and civil conspiracy arising out of a purchase and sale agreement related to real property in Moore County, Tennessee. The buyers, Karl and Beth Ann Kokko, alleged that the sellers, Thomas and Wendy Moore, breached the contract by failing to fulfill their obligation to close. The Kokkos further alleged that Gregg and Daffney Driver induced the breach by conspiring with the Moores to sell the property to the Drivers’ company, MOCAR Enterprises, Inc. The listing realtor, Crye-Leike of Nashville, Inc., intervened to collect a commission. The trial court took several actions that are at issue on appeal. First, the court granted the Kokkos’ Motion for Sanctions against the Drivers and MOCAR and entered a default judgment against them on the claims for unlawful procurement and conspiracy. Second, the court granted the Kokko’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and entered judgment against the Moores on the claims for breach of contract and conspiracy. Third, the court set aside the MOCAR deed and ordered specific performance of the contract. And fourth, the court granted Crye-Leike’s claim against the Moores for a commission. This appeal followed. We conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate on the Kokkos’ claim for civil conspiracy but affirm the trial court in all other respects. Thus, we vacate the trial court’s judgment in part, affirm it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, an inmate incarcerated by the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of disciplinary proceedings held at Morgan County Correctional Complex. Because the petition was not notarized and because a notarized petition was not filed within sixty days of the denial of his administrative appeal of that decision, the trial court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. For these reasons, the trial court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals. Finding no error with the trial court’s decision, we affirm

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Jordan Worthington, for review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to modify the conditions of his pretrial release. See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by Senior Pastor Charles Dowell, Jr. and Priest Baldwin Hutchinson (“Petitioners”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioners and finding no reversible error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, James Robert Howell, of four counts of
sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of assault by offensive or provocative
touching, for which he received an effective sentence of four years and six months in
confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also contends that the trial court
erred in admitting hearsay evidence, in admitting evidence of prior abuse, and in imposing
an excessive sentence. Additionally, the defendant claims improper argument by the State
affected the verdict. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the fivecount
indictment against him on denial of speedy trial grounds. Following a thorough
review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we reverse the trial
court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, reinstate the indictments against the
defendant, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Following the denial of a motion to suppress, the defendant, Mark Ketron, pled guilty to
driving under the influence (“DUI”), DUI per se, and violation of the light law, for which
he was sentenced to an effective term of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended
to probation after service of forty-eight hours in jail. On appeal, the defendant asserts that,
as part of his plea, he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and the oral arguments of the parties,
we conclude the defendant failed to properly certify a question of law pursuant to Rule
37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, this Court is without
jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Omerrieal Dywane Woods, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal
Court jury of one count of facilitation of reckless homicide, two counts of facilitation of
attempted aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to
go armed. The defendant was sentenced to an effective six years in the Department of
Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

A Washington County jury convicted the defendant, Joshua M. Hammonds, of first-degree
murder in perpetration of a felony, theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than
$60,000, and evading arrest with risk of death. After a sentencing hearing, the defendant
received a sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree murder in
perpetration of a felony. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the
applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Petitioner, Baleke Kromah, of sexual battery by an authority figure. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. See State v. Kromah, No. M2011-01813-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 781600, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 1, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 17, 2013). In 2024, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, which the coram nobis court dismissed as untimely. The Petitioner appealed, and after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we dismiss this appeal because the Petitioner failed to file a timely notice of appeal.

Petitioner, Brittany Faith Swafford, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that she received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner argues trial counsel’s failure to retain an expert witness favorable to the defense and to adequately investigate Petitioner’s then undiagnosed mental health condition constituted the ineffective assistance of counsel. She further argues, in the context of her ineffective assistance claim, that trial counsel’s failure to investigate her undiagnosed mental health condition prevented her from entering a knowing and voluntary plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Belinda LeMaire ("Employee") sustained an injury to her right foot while working for
Lowe's Home Centers, LLC ("Employer"). The claim was accepted as compensable, and
the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("trial court") entered a compensation order
awarding permanent-partial disability benefits along with future reasonable and necessary
rnedical benefits. Employee subsequently filed a petition for benefit determination stating
that she had been discharged by her treating physician, and Employer was refusing to
provide additional medical treatment. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered Employer
to provide Employee with a new panel of physicians qualified and willing to treat her workrelated
injury. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("Appeals l3oard") affirmed.
Employer has appealed and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm
the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached
Appendix.