APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Vernon Lee Ivey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner of his full sentencing exposure and statutory ineligibility for probation before Petitioner entered an open guilty plea. Petitioner also presents a stand-alone claim arguing that the post-conviction court erred when it determined that he intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Kevin Smith, appeals his conviction for vandalism of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, for which he received a thirty-year sentence as a career offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was indicted for one count of first degree premeditated murder for the shooting death of the victim, Michael Hawkins, Jr. Prior to trial, the Defendant filed two motions to suppress his statement to the police, both of which the trial court denied. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress a photographic line-up identification. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury convicted the Defendant of second degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty years of imprisonment. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his statement. The Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing one of the trial witnesses to identify him in court. Upon our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence. We remand this matter for the entry of a corrected judgment order.

The State appeals from the judgment of the trial court sentencing Defendant, Carmen Noe Garcia Guox, to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration for patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by imposing a Class A misdemeanor sentence because Defendant’s conviction is a Class B felony offense. Defendant responds that he entered a best interest plea to a Class A misdemeanor and that the relevant statute does not authorize a Class B felony conviction or sentence. Upon a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate Defendant’s plea, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this zoning matter, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent county and property development company and dismissed the petitioners’ declaratory judgment action. The petitioners had challenged a sector plan amendment and rezoning as illegal. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, the trial court specifically found that the county zoning body maintained the authority under Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 to impose conditions on the rezoning of the subject property. The petitioners have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In March 2019, the Petitioner, Sean William Lee, pleaded guilty to attempting to violate the Sex Offender Registry Act (“SORA”), and the trial court ordered him to serve 270 days in jail. In July 2025, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that a federal preliminary injunction issued in his favor applied retroactively and rendered void his conviction for attempting to violate the registry. He also alleged that the State and his trial counsel failed to give him proper notice that he was required to register as a sex offender. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining on appeal that his conviction for attempting to violate SORA is void, and that he was not properly informed by the State or his trial counsel that he would be required to register as a sex offender. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 3, 2025. The notice of appeal
was not provided to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility to mail to the
Appellate Court Clerk until December 26, 2025, more than thirty days from the date of
entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of
appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, Donavous Drennon, was indicted with one count of second degree murder in Count 1, one count of aggravated assault resulting in death in Count 2, one count of tampering with evidence in Count 3, two counts of possessing a handgun after being convicted of a felony drug offense in Counts 4 and 5, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after being convicted of a dangerous felony in Counts 6 and 7. Prior to trial, the trial court merged Count 5 into Count 4 and bifurcated Counts 6 and 7. After trial, a jury acquitted Defendant on Counts 1 and 2 but convicted him on Counts 3 and 4, and the trial court dismissed Counts 6 and 7. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court committed plain error by improperly implying to the jury that the defense of self-defense did not apply to Defendant’s charge of possessing a handgun after being convicted of a felony drug offense; (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution prevents retrial upon reversal of his conviction for the same; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for tampering with evidence. After review, we dismiss Defendant’s appeal.

CCD Oldsmith Henry, LLC and Oldsmith Group LLC (collectively, “Oldsmith”) brought this civil action in the Williamson County Circuit Court alleging that the Town of Nolensville wrongfully refused to issue building permits that it promised to provide as part of a development project. The Town answered the complaint and asserted counterclaims alleging that Oldsmith failed to fulfill its promise to help pay for intersection improvements needed to support the project.

The Petitioner, Santory Alexander Johnson, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal
Court’s dismissal of his untimely petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the
Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by (1) finding he forfeited his right to
counsel and requiring him to proceed pro se and (2) finding due process did not require the
tolling of the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Steve F. Mabe, Jr., appeals from his Smith County Criminal Court convictions for evading arrest, simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver, and manufacture of a Schedule VI controlled substance, for which he received a total effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress all evidence against him and that the indictment should have been dismissed based upon a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a will contest wherein the decedent executed the will at the hospital where he was a patient. Two hospital employees signed the will as attesting witnesses, and their signatures were then notarized by another staff member. After the decedent died, his son contested the validity of the will, and the matter was set for a hearing. The proponent of the will attempted to serve subpoenas on the two attesting witnesses at the hospital where they signed the will, one by process server and the other by certified mail. Neither attempt at service was successful, and consequently, neither of the attesting witnesses appeared at the will contest hearing. The notary did appear and testified as to the identity and presence of the attesting witnesses at the will’s execution. The proponent of the will sought to have both witnesses declared unavailable. The trial court declared unavailable the witness who was served using a process server but declined to do the same regarding the witness who was served by certified mail. Consequently, the court determined that the will was invalid. The proponent of the will appealed, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion when it made a distinction between serving a subpoena using a process server and serving a subpoena by certified mail. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jamie Cunningham, appeals the Grundy County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his untimely second amended petition for writ of error coram nobis. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, Lamar Lanair Denson, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of the sale of fentanyl, a Class C felony; possession of heroin with intent to sell or
deliver, a Class B felony; possession of fentanyl with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C
felony; possession of a firearm by one with a prior conviction for a felony drug offense, a
Class C felony; maintaining a dwelling for the unlawful selling of controlled substances, a
Class D felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial
court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration followed by five years
on supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss Count 5 of the indictment, a charge related
to the sale of fentanyl, due to the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence; and (2) reopening
the proof to allow the State to enter into evidence a stipulation regarding the defendant’s
status as having a prior conviction that would disqualify him from possessing a firearm .
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties,
we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County grand jury convicted the defendant, Todd Lee White, of unlawful
possession of a weapon by a convicted felon and resisting arrest, for which he received an
effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress and in sentencing him as a Range III persistent
offender. After reviewing the record, hearing oral argument, and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court granted Appellees’ joint motion to dismiss Appellant’s healthcare liability action based on its finding that Appellant failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Appellant appeals. We affirm.

Defendants appeal from a final judgment in a dispute over a construction contract. Because the defendants did not file their notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

This is an action to enforce an oral agreement for the transfer of stock in a corporation formed to purchase a parcel of commercial real estate. The plaintiff alleged that he helped obtain financing for the purchase in exchange for 50% of the company. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff had only an option to buy a 50% interest within one year of closing. The trial court credited the plaintiff’s testimony and awarded him a judgment for his share of the company’s profits. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This appeal arises from post-divorce petitions and counterpetitions for enforcement and modification of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (the “MDA”), and permanent parenting plan (the “PPP”). The dispositive issue on appeal is whether either party is the prevailing party for the purpose of recovering his or her attorney’s fees. Because the final decree of divorce incorporated a mandatory dispute resolution provision, we must first determine whether either party qualifies as the prevailing party concerning claims “to procure enforcement” of the MDA or PPP. We then consider whether either party qualifies as the prevailing party pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), (the “Statute”), which has a broader application but is discretionary. During the pendency of the action, the defendant/father delivered two checks to the plaintiff/mother, one in satisfaction of the mother’s claim for past due child support and a second check in satisfaction of her claim for past due alimony. Thereafter, the remaining claims went to mediation, after which the parties approved an agreed order resolving all remaining claims except attorney’s fees, reserving the fee issue for the trial court. Each party, claiming to be the prevailing party, sought to recover their respective attorney’s fees. The trial court ruled that “[s]ince both parties were awarded their beneficial, judicial relief that materially altered the other party’s behavior, the court cannot consider either party the sole ‘prevailing party.’” Thus, neither was awarded any attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. Because the father paid the child support and alimony arrearages after the mother filed her petition and motion to enforce the MDA and PPP, we find that the mother is the prevailing party on the enforcement claims, for which she is contractually entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the dispute resolution clause in the MDA. As for the respective claims and defenses related to modification of the MDA and PPP, for which the Statute applies, we affirm the trial court’s decision to not award attorney’s fees based on the finding that neither party can be considered the prevailing party. Thus, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to award the mother a judgment for the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs she incurred to enforce the father’s obligations to pay child support and alimony pursuant to the MDA 03/13/2026 - 2 - and PPP. Because neither party can be considered the sole prevailing party on appeal, we deny both parties’ requests to recover their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Dewaine Love, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for
writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he is entitled to relief because his multiple convictions
violate due process and double jeopardy protections and that his sentence is unlawful
because it was imposed without the preparation of a presentence report. Upon our review
of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petitioner’s notice of appeal was
untimely and that the interest of justice does not mandate waiver of the requirement. The
appeal is dismissed.

This is a dispute between a neighborhood homeowners’ association (“HOA”) and a homeowner in the HOA’s neighborhood. On remand after a prior appeal, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the homeowner. The homeowner appealed the declaratory judgment and then filed multiple motions in the trial court seeking inherent authority sanctions and costs against certain attorneys who had been involved in the case. The trial court denied the motions, and the homeowner appealed those determinations. We affirm the trial court’s decisions in all respects.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Jomo Kenyatta Berry, of one count of
attempted first-degree murder, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission
of a dangerous felony, two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
one count of aggravated stalking, two counts of vandalism, three counts of reckless
endangerment, one count of theft, one count of burglary of a vehicle, one count of
attempted second-degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault, for which he
received an effective sentence of forty-one years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant
contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for
aggravated assault. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion
to sever, the trial court failed to give complete and accurate jury instructions, and improper
argument by the State affected the verdict. After reviewing the record and considering the
applicable law, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms
in counts five, eight, eleven, and fourteen. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Justin Lloyd, for review of the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion to revoke his pretrial bond. See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes. For the reasons stated below, the Defendant’s motion is denied.

Defendant, Demontrey Monquisze Logsdon, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury, along with two co-defendants, for two counts of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, along with several other charges. Defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts as charged, and Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that he is entitled to plain error relief based on the admission of testimony by a detective who did not conduct the cell phone data extraction about which he testified. Defendant asserts he was denied his right to confront the witness who conducted the extraction. Because Defendant did not establish plain error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.