APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Michael Domonic Sales, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of first degree premeditated murder for which he received a life sentence. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 because he was not sentenced by a jury, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, John F. Curran, III, appeals his Hardin County convictions for passing a worthless check and filing a false lien, for which he received a total effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to establish territorial jurisdiction because the offenses took place on federal property; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to recuse; (3) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw when counsel explained he lacked knowledge and experience in federal maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction; (4) the trial court violated the Defendant’s due process rights by initially granting his pretrial motion to present affirmative defenses but later ruling those defenses could not be presented to the jury; (5) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for passing a worthless check because the payment was for a pre-existing debt and not to induce services; (6) the State committed two Brady1 violations when it failed to disclose evidence proving the State lacked jurisdiction over the case, which led to false testimony from State witnesses; and (7) the trial court erred by imposing a sentence other than the statutory minimum and by imposing an illegal sentence when it failed to cite the victims for each count, failed to order restitution for passing a worthless check, and took no action to remove the lien from the property at issue. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Joseph Wert, appeals from his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, for which he received a six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by excluding a text message exchange between two non-testifying individuals discussing the victim’s statement on the day of the shooting; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to read in front of the jury several unauthenticated text messages on the victim’s ex-wife’s cell phone between the victim, his ex-wife, and their minor daughter; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument when it referenced the text messages between the victim, his ex-wife, and their minor daughter, and the trial court erred by overruling his contemporaneous objection thereto; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to provide a jury instruction regarding the presumed reasonableness of his use of deadly force against the victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(c), commonly known as “castle doctrine.”; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to disprove his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, he contends that cumulative error entitles him to a new trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Alan Joseph Robertson, appeals the Hickman County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his sale of methamphetamine in an amount of 0.5 gram or more conviction and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce action, the wife, Ann L. Shoemake (“Wife”), filed a petition against the husband, Ronald L. Shoemake (“Husband”), in the Sumner County Chancery Court (“trial court”) to receive her marital share of Husband’s pension payments through the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System (“TCRS”). Wife had been awarded a portion of Husband’s TCRS payments in the final decree of divorce (“Final Decree”). Husband filed a counter-petition seeking, inter alia, a reduction of his alimony in futuro obligation. After the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Wife for her portion of his TCRS payments, Husband unilaterally ceased paying his alimony in futuro obligation to Wife and failed to pay the court-ordered TCRS arrearages. This caused Wife to file two motions for contempt against Husband, one in February 2024 and the other in August 2024. In the February 2024 motion, Wife requested that the trial court find Husband in “willful contempt” until he purged himself of the TCRS shortage and alimony arrearage. On March 4, 2024, the trial court ordered Husband to pay the TCRS shortage and ruled that Husband should continue to pay the $600.00 monthly alimony but declined to rule on the motion for contempt, stating that the court “reserves the issue of granting a judgment pending the approval of the QDRO to be submitted.” Despite the trial court’s ruling, Husband did not resume his alimony payments and did not comply fully with the order concerning his TCRS obligation, and Wife accordingly filed a second motion for contempt in August 2024. In that motion, Wife requested that the trial court find Husband “in civil contempt for his failure to make payments for [Wife’s] share of TCRS up to August 14, 2024, alimony payments to date of $600.00 per month, and judgment be granted accordingly.” The trial court entered an order on October 9, 2024, granting to Wife a judgment of “$4,812.75 to be paid within 30 days” for Husband’s TCRS obligation and arrearage, but the trial court did not specifically address Wife’s two motions for contempt or her request for alimony arrearage. On October 11, 2024, the trial court entered a second order, denying Husband’s request for a reduction of alimony and granting to Wife her attorney’s fees as the prevailing party pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). Again, the trial court did not address Wife’s motions for contempt or her request for alimony arrearage. Husband has appealed. Because the trial court did not fully rule on Wife’s outstanding motions for contempt and did not render a decision regarding Wife’s request for an alimony arrearage in the amount of $3,000.00, there is no final judgment entered by the trial court, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand the case to the trial court for further action.

A complaint for ouster was filed nominally on behalf of the Shelby County Attorney against Shelby County Clerk Wanda Halbert. The defendant clerk filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because the complaint was being prosecuted by a deputy county attorney and outside counsel due to a personal conflict of interest by the named county attorney. The plaintiff then filed a motion for default judgment, arguing that a motion to dismiss was not a proper pleading under the ouster statutes. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment and permitted the defendant clerk to file an answer. The trial court then dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing. We affirm the denial of the motion for default judgment, reverse the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court awarded attorney’s fees as sanctions against a petitioner and his attorney in this ouster proceeding, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-47-122(b), following a voluntary nonsuit of the petition.  The trial court based its award of sanctions upon, inter alia, its determination that the petition’s allegations were unsupported and that the petitioner’s attorney had acted recklessly when filing the petition by purporting to represent individuals with whom he had neither met nor spoken.  The petitioner and his counsel have appealed.  Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s award of sanctions against counsel, but we vacate the court’s award of sanctions against the individual petitioner.  We decline to award additional attorney’s fees on appeal.

The Petitioner, Dennis Wade Suttles, has filed an application for permission to appeal from the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10B. The Petitioner asserts that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (“SFFA”), announced a new rule of constitutional law that should be applied retroactively to his case.

This case originated as a breach of contract action for the sale of a business. Eventually, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in which the defendants agreed to pay $1,000,000.00 by a specified date. A few days before the deadline, the defendants attempted to gain an extension and/or renegotiate the terms. The negotiations did not result in written modification of the settlement agreement, the defendants failed to pay the agreed-upon sum by the deadline, and the plaintiff sued to enforce the settlement agreement. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that there was no meeting of the minds as to modification, no written modification, and no breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants appeal only the claim that the plaintiff did not breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm the decision of the trial court and award the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the settlement agreement

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is hereby DENIED. The Defendant’s Motion to Supplement the Record is also DENIED as moot. Costs associated with this appeal are hereby taxed to the Defendant.

This action arises from the Tennessee Board of Parole’s revocation of an inmate’s parole. Following the inmate’s filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking judicial review, the trial court dismissed the action for failure to make partial payment of the required filing fee. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for dismissal on this basis.

This appeal stems from the dismissal of a premises liability action. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s first amended complaint as time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations, finding that the amended complaint, which was filed more than a year after the incident, did not relate back to the original complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A member of a Tennessee limited liability company filed a complaint seeking the appointment of a receiver to operate the company and the dissolution and winding up of the company. The trial court appointed a receiver, the receiver moved to sell the company’s assets, and the member objected to the sale. The member also sought to amend his complaint to add additional claims against additional defendants. The trial court entered an order approving the receiver’s proposed sale of the assets and denying the member’s motion to amend his complaint. The trial court ordered that the proceeds of the sale are to be paid into the trial court’s registry and certified its order as a final judgment. We conclude that the trial court’s order was not a final judgment and that the trial court improvidently certified it as such. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and we dismiss this appeal.

Jarvis T. Emerson, Defendant, appeals from his convictions for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, three counts of assault, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of felon in possession of a firearm. He received an effective sentence of fifty-five years. Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to establish his identity; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the assault charges because the proof did not show the victims reasonably feared imminent bodily injury; (3) the evidence was insufficient to show Defendant was previously convicted of a felony; (4) the conviction for especially aggravated burglary should be reduced to aggravated burglary because the State relied on serious bodily injury to prosecute both the attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated burglary convictions; (5) the trial court erred in ordering partial consecutive sentencing by failing to find the required State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995), factors; (6) the State failed to prove Defendant was a Range II, multiple offender; and (7) Apprendi mandates that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt the serious bodily injury enhancement for attempted first degree murder and that this requirement makes the enhancement for attempted first degree murder the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.” After a thorough review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that serious bodily injury is not an element of attempted first degree murder, such that a prosecution for both attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated burglary are prohibited by statute. We also determine Defendant has waived any challenge under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and any challenge to his offender classification. However, we remand for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to make the requisite findings before ordering partial consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, Defendant’s convictions are affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the manner of service of the sentences.

The Defendant, Leon Noel, pled guilty to several offenses over a period of years, and the trial court suspended each of his sentences to probation. In 2024, the State alleged that he violated a special condition requiring inpatient drug treatment. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court found a violation on that basis and ordered him to serve the balance of each of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his conduct amounted only to a technical violation and that the trial court erred in revoking all of his suspended sentence. Upon our review, we conclude that the record does not establish whether the treatment condition applied to the suspended sentences in four of the cases, and we remand those cases for additional findings. As to the remaining case, which includes suspended felony and misdemeanor sentences, we hold that the violation constituted a first instance of a technical violation. The trial court, therefore, lacked authority to revoke the suspended felony sentence, but the revocation of the suspended misdemeanor sentence was within its discretion. We accordingly affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Property owners brought an action seeking an injunction to prohibit an adjoining property owner from blocking access to their properties. The trial court granted the request for an injunction after concluding that the land at issue was a public road that had not been abandoned. The adjoining property owner appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

A Coffee County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Gavin Allen Clark, with first-degree felony murder by aggravated child abuse (count one), first-degree felony murder by child neglect (count two), aggravated child abuse (count three), and aggravated child neglect (count four). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide in counts one and two, and he was convicted as charged in counts three and four of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect. He received an effective sentence of twenty-three years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for review: (1) as an issue of first impression in Tennessee, whether the verdict is defective for ambiguity because within each count the jury simultaneously convicted and acquitted; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to act or serve as the thirteenth juror; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated child neglect; (4) whether the trial court erred in deciding the McDaniel motions when the trial judge employed an erroneous legal standard and conducted an arbitrary hearing; (5) whether the trial court erred in permitting witnesses to testify about the Defendant’s callous demeanor; (6) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress data from the Defendant’s cell phone; (7) whether the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument; (8) whether the State violated the Defendant’s speedy trial rights; and (9) whether the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal. 1 Upon review, we conclude that the verdicts returned by the jury in this case were ambiguous because they purport to simultaneously convict and acquit the Defendant. As such, the verdicts are unenforceable and cannot be given full effect. Under the circumstances of this case, we also conclude that the Defendant’s convictions are not barred from retrial based on double jeopardy principles, and we remand for a new trial. We further conclude that the trial court failed to fulfill its duty as the thirteenth juror, which also mandates reversal of the Defendant’s convictions, and remand for a new trial. We address the Defendant’s remaining issues in the event of further appellate review.

While I agree with the lion’s share of the majority opinion’s meticulous review of the issues presented by Defendant on appeal, there are a couple of distinct issues on which I disagree: whether the trial court erred in failing to act or serve as the thirteenth juror; and the proper remedy for retrial of offenses, based upon an ambiguous verdict. For the reasons set forth below, I find that the trial court satisfied its role as the thirteenth juror. Furthermore, on retrial, I conclude that the State can proceed on the original charges of felony murder (counts 1 and 2), aggravated child abuse (count three), and aggravated child neglect (count four). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion on these issues.

Defendant, Joseph Kade Abbott, pled guilty in two consolidated cases to three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure in exchange for concurrent six-year sentences, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years’ incarceration to be served at 100%. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant filed a petition to probate the will of her former husband, asking that she be awarded a life estate in the former husband’s residence, per the terms of the will. The estate was eventually closed by agreed order, which granted Appellant a life estate in the subject property. Appellant thereafter filed a motion to set aside the agreed final order, arguing that her and the decedent’s marital dissolution agreement awarded her at least a one-half ownership interest in the property. The trial court denied the motion after concluding that Appellant did not meet her burden under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Due to profound deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we dismiss this appeal and award Appellees their reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this appeal.

Appellant, homeowner, appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee, real estate company’s, motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim arising from Appellant and Appellee’s contract for the sale of Appellant’s property. After the expiration of the initial period of the listing agreement, Appellant transferred the property by quitclaim deed to himself and another party. Appellee sought compensation under the contract. Appellant failed to respond to Appellee’s requests for admissions, and the trial court deemed the requests for admissions admitted. Appellant also failed to respond to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and Appellee’s statement of material facts for purposes of summary judgment was undisputed. Despite the admitted facts, the trial court erred in finding that Appellant breached the plain language of the contract. Because Appellee was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we reverse and remand.

The Defendant, Sedrick Darnell Cummings, pled guilty to weapons-related offenses after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized following the execution of a search warrant at his residence. As a part of the Defendant’s plea agreement, he sought to reserve a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s decision that the affidavit underlying the search warrant established probable cause to search based upon an anonymous tip and the smell of marijuana. Following our review, we conclude that the certified question clearly identifies the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) and that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the search warrant failed to establish probable cause. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the case is dismissed.

In this appeal, we address whether a defendant may obtain the dismissal of a lawsuit based on a challenge to the plaintiff’s standing asserted for the first time after the jury returned its verdict. Husband and wife Brett and Ceree Houghton were the sole shareholders of a corporation that operated a boat dealership. The company was an authorized dealer of manufacturer Malibu Boats, LLC. After that business relationship fell apart, the dealership went out of business, and the Houghtons each declared bankruptcy. Thereafter, the Houghtons successfully sued the manufacturer for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and promissory fraud. A jury awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages for the loss of equity in real property owned by the dealership that was sold at foreclosure when the dealership failed. The manufacturer filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial in which it raised various issues. At the hearing on the motion, however, the manufacturer orally raised a new issue: It questioned the Houghtons’ standing, given that the damages related to real property owned by the dealership instead of them. After the parties submitted briefing, the trial court determined that the Houghtons could not pursue the asserted claims in their own names. Instead, the claims belonged to the dealership and were available to the Houghtons only through a shareholder derivative proceeding. The Houghtons admittedly had not complied with the statutory mechanism for such a proceeding. Thus, the trial court concluded that the Houghtons lacked so-called “statutory standing.” Finding that the lack of statutory standing deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals reversed. The intermediate appellate court determined that so-called “shareholder standing” principles govern this case. Importantly, the court concluded that shareholder standing limitations are not jurisdictional and, therefore, are subject to waiver. The court further concluded that the manufacturer waived its challenge by not timely asserting the issue. We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Houghtons had constitutional standing to bring their suit. We further hold that the trial court erred in relying on statutory standing principles to dismiss the suit. Instead, the substance of the standing challenge implicated shareholder standing limitations, and the manufacturer forfeited its challenge. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

This appeal concerns a driveway easement. Robert Davis and Lala Davis (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued their neighbor Karen Edwards (“Edwards”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) to enforce an oral agreement whereby Edwards agreed to build her own driveway on her property. Edwards had been using Plaintiffs’ driveway under the terms of the Driveway Easement and Maintenance Agreement (“the DEMA”), an express easement agreed to by Plaintiffs and Jeanette Schlaeger (“Schlaeger”), the previous owner of Edwards’ property. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Edwards had reached a verbal agreement with Plaintiffs to build her own driveway, and that she must build it. Plaintiffs filed a motion for additional findings asking that the DEMA be terminated even though that was not an issue at trial. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion on grounds that the DEMA was meant to be temporary despite the DEMA’s unambiguous language to the contrary. Edwards appealed. Subsequently, Joe Hamby and Amber Hamby (“Defendants”) bought Edwards’ property and were substituted as appellants. We hold, inter alia, that the DEMA is permanent and runs with the land. The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for additional findings. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment nullifying the DEMA.

This matter is before the Court upon petition of the Defendant, Mikel Cecil, for an
accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The
Defendant asks this Court to review the trial judge’s order denying his motion to recuse.