APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jereme Walker Amis, was convicted in the Benton County Circuit Court of possession of a firearm after having been convicted ofa felony crime of violence, a Class B felony, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of felony drug offense, a Class C felony, and violating the conditions of his community supervision, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions ofpossessing a firearm and sentenced himto an effective sentence of twenty-four years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendantcontends thatthe trial court committed plain errorby refusing to accept his offer to stipulate tohis prior felony convictions,that the trial court abused its discretionby denying his request to bifurcatethe chargeofviolating the conditions of his community supervision, and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Verchaunt Joshua Williams, has filed an application for permission to appeal the trial court’s order denying his motion to reopen his prior post-conviction petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117; Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, Sec. 10(B). For the reasons stated below, the Court hereby denies the Petitioner’s application.

The Defendant, Mawule Tepe, has filed a pro se petition seeking the recusal of
Bradley County General Sessions Court Judge Clayton Collins and Bradley County
Criminal Court Judge Andrew M. Freiberg from presiding over any of the Defendant’s
pending proceedings in those courts. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.01. We have
determined that an answer from the State is not necessary. Id. §2.05 (“[i]f the appellate
court, based upon its review of the petition and supporting documents, determines that no
answer from the other parties is needed, the court may act summarily on the appeal”).
Following our review, the Defendant’s petition is summarily DISMISSED.

Defendant, Thomas Koontz, appeals the judgment of the Criminal Court for Hamblen County revoking his probation and ordering execution of his original eight‑year,
six‑month sentence. He argues that the trial court (1) imposed an illegal sentence by altering his release eligibility from thirty percent to one hundred percent, and (2) failed to make the requisite findings on the record to justify ordering him to serve the entire sentence in confinement. Following our review of the record, the arguments and briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Defendant violated his probation and the revocation of probation; however, the trial court failed to articulate sufficient findings regarding the consequences imposed, as required by State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2022). Because the record is insufficiently developed for meaningful de novo review, we remand for entry of findings on the record consistent with Dagnan.

The Defendant, Scott A. Stiner, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-529(soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor)1(2018)(subsequently amended), 39-13-504 (aggravated sexual battery) (2018)(subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective fifty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1)he did not receive a fair trial because the allegations and acts that constitute the basis of the convictions were different than the allegations in the indictment and the bill of particulars;(2) the court erred by failing to sever the offenses during the trial; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age conviction in Count 6;(4) he did not receive a unanimous verdict for aggravated sexual battery in Count 3; (5) the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial; (6) the court erred in admitting evidence in contravention of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (7) the court erred in admitting a diagram that was not properly authenticated; (8)the court erred by allowing expert testimony that went beyond the scope of the witness’s expertise; and (9) the court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing on all counts. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority in affirming the trial court’s judgments and legal conclusions, save for one issue. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority opinion regarding the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of an uncharged sexual assault of a baby pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). I would find that the introduction of this evidence was in error; however, I would further find that the error was harmless in these circumstances and would affirm the convictions despite the error.

Defendant, Louis L. Steele, was convicted by a Hardeman County Jury of one count of indecent exposure in a penal facility, and the trial court imposed a Range II, three-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction, consecutively to his Davidson County sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ulester A. Cross, pled guilty to three counts of driving while his license was suspended, and one count each of simple possession of marijuanaand introducing contraband into a penal facility. He received an effective sentence of four years as a Range I offender, to be served on probationfollowing service of forty-five days. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking probationwithout making sufficient findings. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hardeman County jury convicted the Defendant, Danterrio Devonta Poplar, of evading arrest in a motor vehicle while creating a risk of death or injury to others. The trial court imposed a three-year sentence, with 75 days of incarceration and the balance to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of law enforcement witnesses during voir dire and rebuttal closing argument and that the trial court should have given a curative instruction following the prosecutor’s statement. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Devan Denton, of several crimes, including three counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and the Petitioner wassubsequentlyhoused in the Turney Center Industrial Complex in Hickman County, Tennessee. However, he was temporarily moved to the Shelby County Jailfor proceedings stemming from his post-conviction petition. While being held in Shelby County, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas corpus court denied after a hearing. It is from this habeas corpus proceeding that the Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Xavier Young, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction
relief from his guilty plea to one count of carjacking. The Petitioner argues that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and
involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a complaint originally filed in the Shelby County chancery court
that sought the removal of the trustee of a trust based on alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties, breach of trust, conversion of trust property, and other claims. The chancellor who
was assigned the case determined that he had a conflict of interest requiring him to recuse
himself. The other chancellors in the judicial district were also unable to hear the case, and
the original chancellor signed an order transferring the case to the circuit court. The circuit
court entered an order removing the trustee. The defendants filed this appeal. Finding that
the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the removal of the trustee and
remand for transfer of the case back to a court of appropriate jurisdiction.

A homeowner brought suit against the owner of the house next door, asserting a claim for breach of a joint driveway agreement and an alternative action for a declaratory judgment that the neighbor had abandoned the easement created by the driveway agreement. The neighbor filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment, trespass, and an alternative claim for rescission for failure of consideration. After a trial, the trial court entered a final order determining the boundaries of the easement established by the driveway agreement; the court rejected the plaintiff’s claims for breach of the easement and abandonment as well as the defendant’s claim for trespass. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its rulings regarding the boundaries of the easement, its denial of her claims for breach of the easement and abandonment, and in its award of discretionary costs to the defendant. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bobby V. Summers, acting pro se, appeals from the summary dismissal of
his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner’s handwritten brief is largely
incoherent and difficult to decipher; however, we understand him to present four primary
arguments: (1) that facilitation of first degree murder is not a valid offense; (2) that his
conviction is void because no principal offender was prosecuted or convicted; (3) that the
indictment or charging instrument was defective and therefore void; and (4) that his guilty
plea was involuntary because counsel “tricked,” “duped,” or “coerced” him. The habeas
corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it procedurally defective and raising
no cognizable claim. After careful review, we affirm.

A Carroll County jury convicted the Defendant, Bruce Allen Ivy, Jr., of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of fifty-two years imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Thisis an appeal from the dismissal ofa nonprofitcorporation’s complaint pursuant to the doctrine of prior suit pendingbecausethe nonprofit had previously filed a lawsuit in another courtagainst the same defendantbased onsimilar claims. The nonprofit appealed. After review, we have determined that the circuit court correctly dismissed the complaint. We also use our discretion to deny the appellee’s request for fees under the frivolous appeal statute.

In this termination action, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights to his
minor child based upon two statutory grounds, finding that those grounds had been
proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we
affirm.

This is the third appeal arising from more than a decade of litigation between Plaintiff/Appellant and Defendant/Appellee regarding claims of unpaid leasing commissions and breach of contract. The sole issue on appeal is from what date should mandatory post-judgment interest begin to accrue after a remand by this court. Discerning no error in the determination of the trial court, we affirm.

Defendant, Demetriona Chameree Harper, was convicted at a jury trial of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and assault, for which she received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, the trial court’s admission of the recording of the victim’s forensic interview, the trial court’s exclusion of records from the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the trial court’s limiting the defense’s cross-examination of witnesses and presentation of proof, and the State’s recording of a meeting between defense counsel and the defense investigator at the District Attorney General’s Office. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss, Appellant sought relief from the order pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion. The trial court then denied Appellant’s request pursuant to Rule 59.04 for relief from the denial of his Rule 60.02 motion. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, John Champion, of one count of sexual
battery by an authority figure. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred
in denying the defendant the use of two peremptory challenges; (2) the trial court’s failure
to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s failure to preserve evidence resulted in a
fundamentally unfair trial; (3) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial following
a prejudicial misstatement by a witness; (4) the trial court failed to require the State to elect
which incident it was relying on to establish the offense; and (5) the trial court improperly
sentenced the defendant to confinement. Following a thorough review of the record, the
briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case comes to this court by way of a delayed appeal. The Defendant, Houston Thomas
Wilkes, was convicted in the Carroll County Circuit Court of domestic assault, violation
of a no-contact order, possession of more than .5 grams of methamphetamine with the
intent to deliver, and possession of fentanyl with the intent to deliver, for which he received
an effective sentence of thirty years as a career offender. The trial court denied the
Defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds that it was untimely, and the Defendant
did not file a direct appeal to this court. In a post-conviction petition, the Defendant raised
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based, in part, on trial counsel’s failure to file
a timely motion for new trial and a notice of appeal. Without holding an evidentiary
hearing, the post-conviction court entered an agreed order granting a delayed appeal.
Because a delayed appeal cannot be granted by agreement of the parties, we reverse and
remand to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact
regarding whether a delayed appeal is appropriate in this case.

The Petitioner, Toran Harper, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because Appellant failed to provide this Court with a copy of the motion to recuse filed in the trial court,the appeal is dismissed.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.