APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted the Defendant, Douglas E. Linville, of possession of 0.5 grams or less of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone, possession of Oxycodone with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone, possession of Xanax with intent to deliver in a drug free zone, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective twelve-year sentence. The Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court committed plain error by allowing a witness to testify about information the trial court previously ruled inadmissible. We affirm the trial court’s judgments, and we remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment form in count three in accordance with this opinion.

Defendant, Tanner Brady Burgess, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury in a three-count indictment for premeditated first degree murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated assault resulting in the victim’s death. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant’s shooting of the victim was the cause of the victim’s death. Accordingly, the trial court found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter in Count 1, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in Count 2 and aggravated assault in Count 3. The court did not identify the element forming the basis for Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction in Count 3. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of nine years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter because the proof did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to cause the victim’s death; and 2) the judgment of conviction in Count 3 incorrectly reflects a conviction for aggravated assault resulting in death, which carries a mandatory release eligibility of 75 percent, rather than aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury, which carries a standard release eligibility of 30 percent. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in Counts 1 and 2; however, because of inconsistencies between the verdict as announced by the trial court, the sentence as announced at the sentencing hearing, and the sentence as recorded on the judgment form, we remand for clarification and entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 3.

The Defendant, Conner Waid Holcomb, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to statutory rape, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-506 (2018). Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant received a two-year sentence, and the trial court granted the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion by placing him on the sexual offender registry during the diversionary period. We dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Weylin Trent Strode, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that his plea should not be allowed to stand due to uncertainties regarding his mental competency at the time of the plea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion.

The Defendant, Jennifer Murray Jewell, appeals the trial court’s order revoking her ten-year probationary sentence for theft of property valued at more than $60,000 but less than $100,000 after determining that she violated the conditions of her probation by committing a new theft. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the evidence was sufficient to support her probation revocation and when it ordered her to serve her original sentence in confinement without making “explicit findings about the efficacy of a probationary term with modified conditions.” After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Phillip Matthew Burgess, appeals as of right from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for premeditated first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated assault. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel3 because counsel (1) failed to file a motion or object at trial to the destruction of exculpatory evidence; (2) “coerced” the Petitioner into choosing not to testify; (3) failed to pursue a defense theory of diminished capacity; (4) failed to interview or call several witnesses and subpoena the Petitioner’s telephone records; and (5) failed to promptly file a motion to withdraw after a conflict of interest arose. The Petitioner also contends that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to call a witness at the sentencing hearing and failed to timely file an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court after this court filed its opinion in the direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm.

The Appellant, Donnie Bridges, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI) per se, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor; simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor; and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days for DUI to be served as 120 days in jail followed by supervised probation; eleven months, twenty-nine days for simple possession to be served on supervised probation consecutive to the DUI sentence; and six months for violating the driver’s license law to be served on supervised probation concurrently with the DUI sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the presentment or suppress his blood test results because the State failed to preserve his blood sample, that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the results of his blood test into evidence because the State failed to establish a chain of custody for his blood sample, and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of DUI per se, third offense, and driving on a revoked license. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, John Christopher Schubert, of aggravated robbery, robbery, theft, tampering with evidence, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. The Defendant received an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State presented insufficient proof regarding his identity, that his convictions for resisting arrest and disorderly conduct violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence, and that the trial court erroneously gave an instruction on flight. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Morris Long, was convicted by a Dickson County jury of first-degree premeditated murder, Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-202, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Zachary Pence, was convicted of aggravated rape of a child, aggravated child abuse, and child abuse. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-531, -15-401, -15-402. He was subsequently sentenced to sixty years. Following denial of his direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective based on the following grounds: (1) failing to prepare for trial and to prepare the Petitioner to testify at trial; (2) failing to investigate; and (3) failing to provide the Petitioner with audio recordings until the day prior to trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Regina Jackson, appeals her Cheatham County Circuit Court jury conviction of second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), arguing that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause and by denying her a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Terrell B. Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Appellant, Gary Wayne Bunch, pled guilty to two counts of theft under $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten years for each offense, and he was placed on supervised probation. Upon finding that the Appellant violated the conditions of his probation, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the ruling of the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur fully with the conclusion reached by the majority that there was evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Defendant’s probation and to order Defendant to serve the balance of his original sentence in incarceration. I write separately to affirm my belief expressed in my concurring opinion in State v. Craig Dagnan, No. M2020- 00152-CCA-R3-CD, 2021WL 289010, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2021), perm. app. filed, that once a determination is made that a defendant has violated the conditions of his or her probation, neither an additional hearing nor any additional findings are statutorily mandated of a trial court to determine the manner in which the original sentence should be served. Thus, there is no opportunity for an abuse of discretion when a “second exercise of discretion” is not required by either sections 40-35-310 or 40-35-311 of Tennessee Code Annotated.

A Davidson County jury found Defendant, Kenzi Eugene Anderson, guilty on two counts each of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated robbery, for which the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to sever defendants and by imposing an excessive sentence and that the trial court committed plain error by failing to sever his offenses for trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Eli Kea, was convicted by a jury of four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless aggravated assault, and two counts of reckless endangerment of another by discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation. Thereafter, the trial court merged several of the convictions and imposed an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of his vehicle based solely on a general description of the vehicle; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the episode involving four counts of attempted aggravated robbery and four counts of aggravated assault; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach a co-defendant with a prior statement because the jury was unlikely to consider the prior statement only for credibility purposes given the prejudicial nature of the statement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Nathaniel Shawn Declue, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, driving on revoked license, violation of the vehicle registration law, simple possession of a Schedule VI substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged multiple convictions and imposed an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply a mitigating factor and by failing to consider the economic resources available to state prisons in its decision to impose a twenty-year effective sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Kelly Lee Pitts, was convicted by a jury of seven counts each of attempted first degree murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an effective fifty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted first degree murder, specifically, challenging the element of premeditation; (2) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing based upon the dangerous offender criterion; (3) and the trial court erred in imposing Class C felony convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony when he was convicted only of possessing such a firearm, a Class D felony.1 The State concedes that the sentences and judgments for employment of a firearm were in error, and we agree. In all other respects, we affirm. Accordingly, though we affirm the Defendant’s convictions, we vacate and modify certain judgment forms and sentences consistent with this opinion. The case is remanded.

Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the defendant, Alfred Lee Boykin, III, appeals two certified questions of law related to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss his case due to excessive delay in prosecuting the case. Because the defendant failed to establish prejudice flowing from the more than two-year delay in this case, the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss. The judgments of the trial court are, therefore, affirmed.

Trenton Jermaine Bell, Defendant, was arrested and charged with first degree premediated murder, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse in connection with the death of the victim, Sydney Green. A Wilson County jury convicted Defendant as charged on all counts, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to issue a curative instruction when a police detective offered improper lay testimony. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and that he was denied a jury venire comprising a fair cross section of the community. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeffrey Neal Olive, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of second-degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Jesus Baltazar Diaz Ramos, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the petition.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Edward Seaton, was convicted of facilitation of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class E felony, and one count each of vandalism, evading arrest, and driving with a revoked license, second offense, Class A misdemeanors. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-403, -14-103, -14-105, - 14-408, -16-603, 55-50-504. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial when a court officer, who was acting as jury custodian, was called and sworn as a rebuttal witness; (2) that the court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the court elicited from a defense witness the name of the witness’s father-in-law, who was “a notorious criminal and murderer”; (3) that the court erred by admitting reputation or opinion evidence from three law enforcement officers regarding a defense witness’s character for truthfulness; (4) that plain error occurred when the State cross-examined a defense witness regarding prior criminal behavior not resulting in a conviction; and (5) that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. Following our review, we conclude that the admission of reputation and opinion evidence from law enforcement officers constitutes reversible error such that the Defendant is entitled to a new trial. Alternatively, we conclude that the Defendant would be entitled to relief due to cumulative error.

Defendant, Michelle Bennington, filed a pro se motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to correct an alleged clerical error in a July 22, 2019 probation revocation order. The motion sought entry of a corrected order providing 827 days of postjudgment jail credit. The trial court determined that there was no clerical error in the revocation order and denied the motion. However, the trial court determined that there was a clerical error in the May 23, 2016 judgments of conviction and entered corrected judgments providing two additional days of pretrial jail credit. Finding no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Tommie Phillips, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2011 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder, reckless homicide, attempted first degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated sexual battery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. He argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.