APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On July 12, 2019, Defendant-Appellant, Robert Collier, entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt aggravated sexual battery and indecent exposure, for which he received an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, all of which was to be served on supervised probation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-504 (2019). As part of his sentence, the Defendant was also ordered to register as a violent sex offender and placed on community supervision for life. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-524 (2014). Within three months, on October 15, 2019, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s supervised probation based on a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(d)(1)(B) (2019), which restricts movement of violent sex offenders, and ordered the Defendant to serve the original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals the order of the trial court arguing that subsection (d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because certain terms including “playground,” “any other specific or legitimate reason,” “stand,” “sit idly,” and “remain” are not defined and ambiguous.” He additionally argues that subsection (d)(1)(B) is overbroad in violation of his First Amendment rights because (1) it applies to all sex offenders even if the offense did not involve a child victim; and (2) the term “playground” can include a church, an offender’s front yard, and places where other adults are present. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Milton Simpson, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and imposing an effective ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he violated the terms of his probation by breaking the law and that (2) his right of confrontation was violated when a court liaison testified in lieu of his probation officer and when a certified copy of an indictment was introduced as evidence. Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Coy McKaughan, filed a post-conviction petition in the Shelby County Criminal Court seeking relief from his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and accompanying twelve-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective, (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective, (3) his due process rights were violated by the State’s withholding evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, (4) his due process rights were violated by the State’s assembling a “rigged grand jury foreperson,” (5) the State violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, and (6) he was denied his constitutional right to a “full and fair” post-conviction hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Phillip Harvey Wallace, appeals the sentencing decision of the trial court that followed the revocation of his probation in case number 5263 and his pleading guilty in case number 5376, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to consider a community corrections placement and by ordering that the 12-year sentence imposed in case number 5376 be served consecutively to the remainder of the two-year sentence in case number 5263. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, John William Anderson, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and criminal simulation. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentencing decision of the trial court. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, but the trial court erred by imposing a sentence in the absence of a presentence report. Consequently, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but reverse the sentencing decision of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, Andre Bowen, and his co-defendant, Anthony Olivo, for two counts of first-degree, felony murder (Counts 1 and 2) and attempted especially aggravated robbery (Count 3). The grand jury also indicted the defendant for two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 4 and 5). After a joint trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on Count 1 but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first-degree, felony murder in Count 2, attempted especially aggravated robbery in Count 3, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Counts 4 and 5, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of seventy-two years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in sentencing. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand the case for a new sentencing hearing as to Counts 4 and 5 to reflect the appropriate felony classification for each offense and for entry of new sentences for each conviction.

The defendant, Robert Earl Grady, Jr., pleaded guilty to two counts of felon in possession of a firearm for which he received consecutive twelve-year sentences for an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred by imposing consecutive terms. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Joshua Michael Stewart, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. He argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jeremy Lee Fleming, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder in the perpetration of a theft or arson, arson, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court sentenced the Defendant to fifteen years for arson and to twelve years for theft, as a Range III, persistent offender, and the court imposed the arson and theft sentences concurrent to each other but consecutive to the life sentence, for an effective sentence of life plus fifteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the first degree murder and arson judgments, but we modify the judgment for theft to reflect a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days.

The Petitioner, Tywan Montrease Sykes, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely and as a second impermissible petition. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process requires tolling of the one-year limitations period, that he should have been given an evidentiary hearing to present additional proof of tolling, and that his first petition was not resolved on the merits. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition as untimely.

The Defendant appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his three-year sentence for one count each of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500 and forgery in the same amount. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation because: (1) the Defendant remained actively employed and made efforts to contact his probation officer; (2) the Defendant’s probation revocation “robbed victims of owed restitution and imposed an unnecessary financial burden upon the state’s taxpayers”; (3) the Defendant’s probation revocation “runs contrary to the Governor’s stated desire to use alternatives to incarceration for low-level, nonviolent offenders”; and (4) the Defendant’s probation revocation does “not reflect the trial court’s expectation that [he] would be released soon after his revocation hearing.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James Howard Theus, III, Defendant, was indicted for four counts of violating the sex offender registry. He pled guilty to the charges as stated in the indictment with an agreed upon sentence of three years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Defendant, Terrill J. Whitelow, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury on three counts: Count 1, attempted carjacking; Count 2, aggravated burglary; and Count 3, evading arrest. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty as charged on Counts 2 and 3. Defendant received an effective sentence of ten year’s incarceration. Defendant filed a motion for new trial in which he argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a judgment disposing of Count 1 of the indictment.

The Petitioner, William Pillars, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted Caitlyn Metz, Petitioner, of first-degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect in the death of her twenty-three-month-old son, the victim, and the trial court sentenced her to an effective life sentence. Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, a Brady violation, and improper prosecutorial argument, and the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to pursue a motion for severance from Joshua Starner, Co-Defendant, and other pretrial motions; failure to investigate Co-Defendant’s military records and Petitioner’s mental health; failure to present witnesses; and cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we conclude that Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, vacate and set aside the judgments of conviction, and remand for a new trial.

Tennessee Bonding Company, Appellant, surrendered the defendant, Larry Patton, to the Lewis County Sheriff’s Department but failed to notify the trial court of the surrender. Five weeks later, the trial court sua sponte entered an order exonerating Appellant on the bond but requiring Appellant to return “any and all premiums previously paid” and discharging the defendant from any remaining obligation for payment on the bond. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider asking for a hearing, which was summarily denied by the court. In this extraordinary appeal, Appellant claims the trial court erred by denying Appellant a hearing. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Julio Enrique Fernandez, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Maury County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Juan Ramon Chaves-Abrego, of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and he received an effective forty-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the Appellant’s convictions and effective sentence but remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgment of conviction in count two, rape of a child, to reflect that the trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range II offender.

The defendant, Brandon Middlebrook, appeals his 2015 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and arguing that the trial court erred by permitting the State to use the non-testifying co-defendant’s statement to question the defendant at trial. We hold that the trial court erred by permitting the State to cross-examine the defendant using the statement of his co-defendant but that the error can be classified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of attempted first degree murder. Because the defendant’s previous felony convictions do not qualify as prior convictions under the terms of Code section 39-17-1324, the defendant’s convictions of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of a dangerous felony in Counts 3, 7, 11, 15, 19, and 23 are vacated and those charges dismissed. The case is remanded to the trial court for the entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting the proper merger of the remaining convictions of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the imposition of a six-year mandatory minimum period of incarceration for each of those convictions. See T.C.A. § 39-17- 1324(h)(1). The judgments of the trial court are otherwise affirmed.

The State appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order dismissing the 2019 presentment charging the defendant, Teresa Ann Norwood, with a single count of passing a worthless check, arguing that the trial court impermissibly ruled on the sufficiency of the evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Justice Ball, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and evading arrest and his effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Kendrick Watson, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to conspiracy to introduce marijuana into a penal facility, money laundering, aggravated assault, being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and conspiracy to possess more than three hundred pounds of marijuana in exchange for a total effective sentence of seventeen years as a Range I, standard offender. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he had been denied due process prior to and during the plea process. The Petitioner also contended that the post-conviction court should recuse itself. The post-conviction court denied the recusal motion and denied post-conviction relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Indicted for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, Defendant, Laron Rashawn Lumpkin, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of five years for voluntary manslaughter and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery to be served concurrently for an effective twenty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery but reverse and vacate his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. In doing so, we impose a conviction for the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide and remand the case to the trial court for a sentencing hearing on the newly imposed conviction.