APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Timothy Aaron Baxter, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his pro se motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Based on our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jordan Harp, appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition. Petitioner was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Pursuant to a March 2022 negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of second degree murder and to especially aggravated kidnapping and received an effective sentence of forty years.1 Petitioner timely sought post-conviction relief, alleging several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After only hearing from Petitioner’s trial counsel, the post-conviction court stated, “I don’t need to hear anything from [Petitioner],” and denied Petitioner the opportunity to testify and present witnesses. The post-conviction court then denied relief. Because we conclude that Petitioner was not afforded a full and fair hearing on his post-conviction petition, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for a new hearing on his post-conviction petition.

The Defendant, Dallas Wayne Tomes, Jr., was convicted in the Criminal Court of Bradley
County of five counts of burglary of a building other than a habitation, two counts of theft
of property valued at more than $1000 but less than $2500, and one count of theft of
property valued at $1000 or less. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motion to dismiss his charges pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (“IAD”) and its classification of him as a career offender, arguing that the trial
court failed to conduct a foreign judgments test prior to sentencing. Discerning no error,
we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

I concur in the majority’s conclusions that the trial court did not err in denying the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss and in classifying him as a career offender. I write
separately to address my departure from the majority’s analysis on the standard of review
to be employed for the sentencing range determination issue.

Defendant, Rebecca M. Davis, appeals her convictions for one count of aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, one count of aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, and two counts of aggravated child endangerment of child eight years of age or less. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant received an effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying her motion for judgments of acquittal for aggravated child endangerment and aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less; (2) the trial court erred by not merging her convictions for aggravated child endangerment with her respective convictions for aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less and aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less; and (3) the trial court violated her due process rights by allowing the State to comment on and elicit testimony regarding her pre-arrest, post-Miranda silence. After review, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal for her aggravated child neglect conviction but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Victor Curtell Scruggs, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for the attempted first degree murder of his wife, the victim in this case. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant entered a guilty plea to attempted second degree murder, with the length and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sentence and in ordering confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Daversea Armen Fitts, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the amended post-conviction petition was not properly before the post-conviction court; however, the court retained jurisdiction over the original pro se petition. Additionally, we affirm the post-conviction court’s determination that the petitioner failed to meet the burden required of him and is not entitled to relief.

The pro se Petitioner, Tony S. Walker, appeals the summary denial of his petition seeking various forms of relief from his first degree felony murder conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 9, seeking review of the October 22, 2025 order permitting appointed counsel to withdraw from representation. Because the application is procedurally insufficient for this court’s review, an answer from the State is not necessary and the application is respectfully DENIED.

The Defendant, Christian Deshawn Hyde, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve the original three-year sentence for his aggravated assault conviction in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in fully revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement and in failing to consider any other alternative to incarceration. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Sade Janae Burrow, appeals from the partial consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court upon resentencing following the revocation of her community corrections supervision, increasing her effective sentence from ten to sixteen years. She contends that the trial court erred by failing to weigh the relevant mitigating factors against applicable enhancement factors and abused its discretion by inappropriately imposing partial consecutive sentences as punishment for committing a violation of her original community corrections supervision. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Mitchell Stanley Pozezinski, Jr., was found guilty after a bench trial before the Montgomery County Circuit Court of two counts of violating the conditions of his community supervision for life by failing to comply with a polygraph assessment and by failing to complete a psychosexual evaluation. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-524 (Supp. 2002) (subsequently amended) (sentence of community supervision for life); 39-13-526 (2018) (violations of community supervision). On appeal, the Defendant asserts the p

Defendant, Tyler David Mashburn, entered an open plea of guilt to one count of aggravated assault with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Defendant requested judicial diversion and submitted a certificate of eligibility. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied diversion and imposed a five-year sentence of split confinement, with nine months to serve and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Isaac McDonald, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately review or provide him copies of discovery materials, by failing to adequately explain the terms of his plea agreement, and by coercing him into pleading guilty. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Steven Griffin, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner argues his sentence is illegal because the trial court failed to find he qualified as a dangerous offender and, accordingly, its imposition of partially consecutive sentences was improper. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Steven Griffin, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner argues his sentence is illegal because the trial court failed to find he qualified as a dangerous offender and, accordingly, its imposition of partially consecutive sentences was improper. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Keelan Washington, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for judicial diversion. Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set forth its reasons for denying diversion and by failing to comply with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. After a review of the record, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Doryon Booth, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original four-year sentence in confinement, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he violated the terms of his probation and by failing to make adequate findings in support of its decision to revoke his suspended sentence. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mario Perkins, Petitioner, appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to reopen his post-conviction proceeding because the “grounds alleged in the petition do not satisfy any of the criteria set out in Tenn[essee] Code Ann[otated section] 40-30-117 as ground to reopen, and have clearly been raised outside the statute of limitation[s]. . . .” Because the notice of appeal in this case fails to satisfy the requirements for an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c), we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

In 2017, the Petitioner, Jacquiz McBee, pled guilty to aggravated assault and was placed on judicial diversion for a period of three years. Following his later conviction for another crime in April 2022, the trial court rescinded the diversion, entered an adjudication of guilt, and sentenced the Defendant to serve a term of three years for the aggravated assault conviction. In 2024, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in his aggravated assault case and that his original plea was invalid. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as being untimely, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we agree that the post-conviction petition was untimely and that principles of due process did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Takyris Seandale Simms, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from the Petitioner’s guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Bryan Ray Dudley, appeals his Franklin County Circuit Court convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus thirty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his suicide attempt following the victim’s murder and by neglecting to instruct the jury regarding proximate causation. Because we conclude that both the Defendant’s motion for a new trial and notice of appeal were untimely filed and that the interests of justice do not merit the waiver of the untimeliness of the Defendant’s notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal.