APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Bedford County Circuit Court jury found Appellant Venson Woodard guilty of two counts of aggravated assault. As a Range II multiple offender, he received a sentence of nine years and eight months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served consecutive to a sente nce for which Appellant was on parole at the tim e of the offense. In this appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for review: whether the trial court violated its duty to act as a thirteenth juror by refusing to grant Appellant’s motion for a new trial. Specifically Appellant maintains the weight of the evidence shows he was acting in self-defense.
 

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial co urt.

The defendant, Tyrone Watkins, was convicted on July 18, 1994, of two Class A misdemeanors. While allowing pretrial jail credit, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, the remainder of which was to be served on probation. On February 16, 1996, a warrant was issued which resulted in the revocation of probation. The question of law certified for review is whether the probationary term had expired prior to the commencement of the revocation proceeding. Rule 37(b)(2)(i), Tenn. R. Crim. P. We must reverse the judgment of the trial court; the cause is dismissed.

The defendant, Buffy Mae Twadell, has been indicted on two counts of aggravated perjury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-703. The district attorney general denied the defendant's application for pretrial diversion. Thereafter, the trial court denied her petition for a writ of certiorari. In this extraordinary appeal made pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the defendant insists that the district attorney general abused his discretion by the denial of pretrial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Dennis P. Neilan, appeals from the judgment of the Sevier County Circuit Court which dismissed, without hearing, his petition seeking postconviction relief. We affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Phillip W. Pomeroy, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for  post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

The issue which this court must resolve is whether the statute of limitations commences in an accessory after the fact prosecution when (a) the crime is committed or (b) the principal offender is convicted. The trial court found the statute of limitations does not commence until the principal offender is convicted. The defendant contends the statute of limitations commences when the crime of accessory after the fact is committed. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law pertaining to the issue presented for review, it is the opinion of this court the statute of limitations commenced to run in this prosecution for accessory after the fact when the offense was committed. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the prosecution is dismissed since the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations.

The defendant, Ricky Hill Krantz, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court for felony murder and aggravated assault, a Class C Felony. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years in the custody of the Department of Correction for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered the defendant’s sentences to be served consecutively. The defendant contends that:

(1) the evidence is insufficient to support the first degree
murder conviction;
(2) the trial court erred by not dismissing the indictment due to
the state’s failure to preserve a blood sample taken from the
defendant on the evening of the offense;
(3) the trial court erred by not dismissing the indictment upon
grounds of fundamental fairness because the defendant
should not have been retried after a mistrial upon a theory that
was not relied upon by the state in the first trial; and
(4) the trial court erred by allowing the state to use a
peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner in violation of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the
Tennessee Constitution.

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court did not err as the defendant claims. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, Gerome J. Smith, appeals as of right from a conviction of first degree murder following a jury trial in the Sumner County Criminal Court. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the Defendant committed premeditated firstdegree murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial co urt.

Defendant, Tracey E. Stigall, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offense of aggravated burglary. The sole issue in this direct appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to charge lesser offenses. We AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Rogers L. McKinley, appeals the Bledsoe County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In 1990, the appellant entered guilty pleas and was convicted of two counts of rape and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II multiple offender to concurrent sentences of fifteen (15) years for each rape and ten (10) years for the aggravated burglary. No direct appeal was taken from those convictions and sentences.

In this appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing. Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.