APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Vanassa Hurst, was convicted by a Claiborne County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and second degree murder. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2019) (subsequently amended), 39-13-210(a)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended). The trial court imposed a life sentence for first degree murder, ordered a sentence of nineteen years for second degree murder, and merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her pretrial statements and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After being indicted for one count of sexual battery, Mannan Mehdi, Defendant, entered a best interest guilty plea with no agreement as to the sentence. The trial court denied judicial diversion, ordering Defendant to a one-year sentence, suspended to probation. The trial court also ordered Defendant to serve periodic confinement of “6 weekends in jail over the course of the probation.” Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly denied judicial diversion. After a review, we determine that the trial court considered irrelevant factors in denying diversion. As a result, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Frankie Joe Alfred Benton, appeals from the Hawkins County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions upon his guilty pleas to nine drug offenses, for which he received an effective nine-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

The Appellant, the Estate of Sedley Alley (“the Estate”), appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of its petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. The 2019 petition sought DNA testing of items from the Defendant’s trial despite the fact that the Defendant, who had received the death penalty, was executed in 2006. The Estate argued that the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act (“the DNA Act”) permitted the Estate to petition for DNA testing because the civil right of survivorship statute applied. The Estate additionally argued that United States and Tennessee Constitutions require that the Estate be allowed to petition for DNA testing under the DNA Act, citing to principles of due process and a “reputational guarantee.” Following our review of the applicable authorities, we hold that the Estate is not a “person” within the purview of the DNA Act and that neither due process nor any reputational guarantee require a remedy under these facts. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Jamie Lee Blankenship, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to violating a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO) order and driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, and received an effective sentence of one year, six months to be served at thirty percent release eligibility. The Appellant served some time in confinement and was released on probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s probation and ordered that he serve the remainder of his effective sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant acknowledges that he violated probation but contends that the trial court should have ordered a sentence of split confinement followed by reinstatement of probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2011, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Lizandro Guevara, of eight counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to sixty-nine years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed, and our court affirmed the convictions. State v. Lizandro Guevara, No. M2015-01719-CCA-R3- CD, 2016 WL 5266552 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 21, 2016), perm. app. denied. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appealed, and, after review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Corey Anderson, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of the two-year sentence imposed for his conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Garrick Graham, Petitioner, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Charvaris Donte Newsom, was convicted of felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction and imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of evidence of his other criminal acts; (3) the admission of hearsay evidence from a police report; (4) the prosecutor’s questioning of a detective and the Defendant regarding whether they believed witnesses were truthful; (5) the prosecutor’s questioning the Defendant regarding his invocation of his right to remain silent and his failure to produce evidence and witnesses at trial; and (6) the prosecutor’s comments during opening statements and closing arguments. The Defendant also seeks relief based upon cumulative error. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Melvin Jackson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his McNairy County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated robbery and unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Derrian Hill, was indicted with Co-Defendant, Miranda Barley, for aggravated kidnapping in count one and aggravated robbery in count two. Defendant then filed a Motion to Suppress the victim’s pretrial identification of Defendant, and the trial court denied the motion. Following a trial, the jury convicted Defendant as charged on both counts, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of eight years’ incarceration with a one hundred percent release eligibility for count one and twelve years’ incarceration with an eighty-five percent release eligibility for count two. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress the victim’s pretrial identification of Defendant. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, the defendant, Antoine Adams, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the consecutive alignment of his sentences.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Melvin Hopkins, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Appellant, Tharcisse John Nkurunziza, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to vehicular assault, a Class D felony, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to four years to be served as ten months in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant claims that his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied enhancement factors and that the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation. The State acknowledges that the trial court misapplied two of the three enhancement factors but contends that the record justifies the sentence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Desiree Petty, pleaded guilty to burning personal property or land, facilitation to commit felony arson, and multiple misdemeanor offenses. The trial court sentenced her to four years of incarceration, suspended in lieu of service of twelve years of probation, and $150 monthly restitution payments. In 2010, the trial court found that she had violated her probation and extended her probation for two years. In October 2019, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant based on allegations that she had failed to appear, failed a drug screen, and missed monthly restitution payments. At a hearing, the Defendant conceded that she failed the drug test. The trial court then, sua sponte, revisited the Defendant’s restitution and ordered her to pay an increased amount of monthly restitution. It also revoked her probation, required her to serve ninety days in jail, and returned her to probation, adding an additional year. The Defendant appeals. After review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Charles D. Johnson, filed for habeas corpus relief from his convictions of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and the accompanying total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. The Petitioner alleges that the judgments are void because he was never indicted for the offenses of which he was convicted and that the trial court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to try him or enter any judgment in his case. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Dontel Morgan, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty pleas and that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered.  Upon our review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Carlos Dewatherdo Ferguson, Jr., appeals his Hardin County Circuit Court jury convictions of second degree murder and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the State’s duty to preserve evidence; and the trial court erred by imposing a mid-range sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tommy Taylor, Defendant, was sentenced in Case No. RD 10835 to one year in split confinement followed by service of the balance of the sentence on community corrections. Defendant violated the rules of the institution where he was confined by being involved in two violent incidents with another inmate and one violent incident with a guard. The State moved to revoke Defendant’s community corrections sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s community corrections sentence and ordered Defendant to serve his original sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Lynn Frank Bristol, Defendant, was indicted by the Coffee County Grand Jury for “sexual battery and rape of a child” for incidents involving his step-daughter. Nearly three years later, and three days prior to trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to reflect a charge of aggravated sexual battery in Count One and to amend the dates encompassed in the indictment in both Count One and Count Two. Defendant objected to the amendment and asked for a continuance. The trial court allowed the State to amend the indictment and denied a continuance. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery in Count One and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in Count Two. Defendant was sentenced to ten years for each conviction and the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years to be served at 100 percent. Defendant appeals, arguing: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment; (2) that the trial court erred by denying a continuance; (3) that the trial court improperly relied on State v. Qualls, 482 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2016), for a variety of reasons, including failing to give an enhanced unanimity instruction; (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; and (5) that the sentence is excessive. Because we determine that the trial court erred by failing to submit the complete written charge to the jury, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(c), the judgments of the trial court are reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial.

The Defendant, Aaron Evan Perry, was convicted by a jury of three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card of an amount of $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105(a)(1), -118(b). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to time served. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that a Belk department store loss prevention manager acted as an agent of the State when he seized the Defendant’s identification card and credit card, that the police conducted a pretextual traffic stop of the Defendant to investigate the Belk incident, and that the warrantless search of his vehicle was not justified as a search incident to arrest or inventory search; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred by admitting information generated by a hand-held credit card scanner without an adequate foundation; and (4) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of illegal possession of a credit card instead of fraudulent use of a credit card. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions and that reversible error occurred when the trial court mistakenly instructed the jury on the elements of illegal possession of a credit card. As a result, we remand the case for the entry of amended judgments reflecting the new conviction offenses of attempted theft, a Class B misdemeanor. In addition, in the interest of judicial economy, we modify the sentence in each count to reflect concurrent sentences of six months and apply to the Defendant’s two years of jail credit to satisfy his sentences.

Kevion McDonald, Defendant, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of both counts as charged in the indictment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-one years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. Defendant initiated this appeal, arguing that the trial court: (1) improperly admitted a photographic lineup into evidence; (2) committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the definition of premeditation; and (3) improperly sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years in incarceration for attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with the definition of premeditation, an element of the offense of attempted first degree murder. However, we find the error harmless because the proof of premeditation was overwhelming. As a result, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

In 2020, the Defendant, Rickey Benson, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jimmie Liddell, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony; and one count of solicitation of aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-528 (2018) (solicitation of a person under eighteen years of age). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 110 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Damon Johnson, of second-degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, argues the trial court improperly commented on his right not to testify, and asserts the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.