APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Jeffery L. Vaughn appeals from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. He contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial because jurors allegedly overheard a bench conference  egarding his prior criminal record. He also contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial due to his counsels’ failure to inform him of the correct sentencing range, to have the cocaine independently weighed, to present the testimony of his drug counselor, and to move for an acquittal at the end of the proof. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Ronald C. Mitchell appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. He contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief from a conviction for felonious possession of cocaine because (1) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (2) he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, (3) the convicting trial court’s admission of a pager and money violated his right to due process, and (4) the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the position of grand jury foreperson violated his right to equal protection. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition.

The defendant, Robert H. Harper, Jr. appeals upon a certified question of law his conviction in the Hardin County Circuit Court for felonious possession of marijuana for which he received a three year sentence as a Range I, standard offender and a fine of five thousand dollars. The defendant asserts that the stop of his vehicle was not based upon reasonable suspicion and that the subsequent warrantless search was unlawful. We conclude that the stop and search were improper, and we reverse the judgment of conviction and dismiss the case.

A Davidson County jury convicted the appellant, Jeremy M. Batey, of one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to three years incarceration in the local workhouse. On appeal the appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence solely on the basis that the crime involved a death. We hold that where the legislature has provided for alternative sentencing in certain homicide offenses, the denial of an alternative sentence solely on the basis of the victim’s death is erroneous. However, in the instant case the circumstances of the offense, including illegal drug and alcohol use which contributed to the offense, and the appellant’s history of alcohol and drug abuse, including the use of marijuana 2 ½ years after the offense and approximately four months prior to his trial justify the denial of alternative sentencing.