APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant bail bond company appeals the en banc order of the Criminal Courts of Davidson County which refused to reinstate its authority to write bail bonds. We conclude the appellant was not given proper notice of grounds relied upon for the refusal to reinstate its authority to write bonds, and the Criminal Courts of Davidson County erroneously refused to reinstate appellant's authority to write bail bonds based upon its alleged failure to notify a defendant of an arraignment date. Accordingly, the judgment refusing to reinstate appellant's ability to write bail bonds is reversed.

The defendant was convicted by a Sumner County jury of aggravated assault and attempted first degree murder. The defendant alleges on appeal that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt of aggravated assault; 2) the trial court erred in allowing victim Kevin Wynn to testify that he had previously seen the defendant with a gun; and 3) the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after testimony that the drug task force kicked in the defendant’s door on a prior occasion, and after testimony that the defendant had previously been arrested. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty in Hardin County Circuit Court to a three count indictment for theft of property, possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of a controlled substance. The defendant received an effective sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Corrections.  After seven months in Wayne County Boot Camp, he was placed on probation. A probation violation warrant was issued charging that the defendant had failed to make payments; failed to appear in court; left the state without permission; and been arrested on a new charge. Following a hearing, the probation was revoked, and the defendant timely appealed. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles Chesteen, served as the Clerk and Master of the Cocke County  Chancery Court from 1984 to 1996. In 1997, he was charged with theft relating to his service in the capacity as conservator of funds of two elderly ladies and with unlawful conversion related to funds misappropriated by him in his official capacity. He pleaded guilty, with the sentencing determination to be made by the trial court. The court imposed an effective six-year incarcerative sentence along with restitution of $101,821.73. Upon review, we hold that the trial court erred in some of its sentencing determinations. We affirm in part, modify in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further determination regarding aspects of the sentencing issues.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. However, I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the minor victims were particularly vulnerable because of their age as contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(4). In my opinion, the fact that the defendant, as clerk and master, had control over the minors’ funds because they were minors rendered them no more vulnerable than any other litigant or party whose funds had been paid into court or otherwise put within the control of the clerk and master. I would not apply enhancement factor (4) to the offense of embezzlement in an official capacity.

Petitioner appeals as of right from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal Petitioner challenges only the post-conviction court’s determination that his trial counsel was effective when Petitioner entered into a guilty plea. After a de novo review, we conclude that petitioner has not established either prong of the Strickland test, and we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

Defendant Jimmie C. Spratt was convicted of aggravated rape by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to a term of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant challenges his conviction and his sentence, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred when it ruled that he improperly struck potential jurors based on the jurors’ race; (2) whether the trial court should have dismissed the charges against him because there was an unnecessarily long delay between his arrest and his appearance before a magistrate; (3) whether the trial court erred when it refused to suppress a pretrial statement that he gave to police; (4) whether the trial court erred when it refused to suppress evidence that he had been identified by the victim during a physical lineup; (5) whether the trial court erred when it admitted an out of court statement by the victim into evidence; (6) whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence about the results of a DNA probability test; (7) whether the trial court erred when it allowed the State to call a rebuttal witness; (8) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (9) whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the potential range of punishment; and (10) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After a review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and we remand this matter for a new trial.

The defendant appeals from his Class C felony conviction of possession of a controlled substance in an amount less than .5 grams. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 1998).  After entering a best interest guilty plea, the defendant was sentenced to five years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender and fined $2000. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sentence imposed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James M. Lane, Jr. appeals by permission of the trial and appellate courts. Indicted for two counts of aggravated perjury, he alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to reverse the district attorney general’s denial of pretrial diversion. Because the prosecutor relied upon improper grounds for denying diversion, we reverse the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion in denying diversion. We remand to the trial court with instructions that the prosecutor enter into a memorandum of understanding for pretrial diversion with the defendant.