APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Eddie Erwin, was convicted by a jury of the sale of cocaine, a Class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, he agues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by convicting the Defendant based on the original indictment rather than the re-indictment; (3) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress a videotape containing statements the Defendant made while talking on a telephone in the jail; (4) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a photographic lineup; and (5) that the trial court erred by enhancing the Defendant's sentence based on three prior Illinois felony convictions and based on post-offense conduct. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, that the Defendant was not convicted based on the wrong indictment, and that the trial court did not err by admitting the videotape and the photographic lineup into evidence; thus, we affirm the Defendant's conviction. We do, however, find that the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, based on three prior Illinois felony convictions, because those convictions would have been misdemeanors under Tennessee law. We therefore modify the Defendant's sentence to ten years as a Range II, multiple offender. We also remand for correction of the judgment, which contains a clerical error reflecting an incorrect offense date.

Anthony Ray Lawson appeals his conviction of especially aggravated robbery and contests the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charlie M. Gardner, was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of reckless aggravated assault. The jury sentenced the Defendant to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years for each reckless aggravated assault conviction, all sentences to be served consecutively. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the admissibility of hearsay statements as falling within the excited utterance exception, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence as to all three convictions and (3) the fatal variance between the allegations in count two of the indictment and the proof offered at trial. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Mathis T. Vaughn, filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, which the post-conviction court subsequently denied. Petitioner challenges the denial of his petition, raising the following issue: whether the trial court erred in dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, based upon a ruling that Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

The petitioner, Tyrone V. Turner, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Norman B. Thompson, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation. We find no abuse of discretion in the revocation; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant’s probation.

Defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder and received a life sentence. In this appeal, defendant alleges: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress both his oral and written statements given to authorities; and (2) the state improperly exercised its peremptory challenges based upon race and gender. Upon our review, we are unable to resolve the suppression issue due to inadequate findings of fact and, therefore, remand for further findings regarding the oral and written statements. We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that there were legitimate race and gender-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges. The judgment of the trial court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further findings and/or proceedings.

We affirm the defendant’s convictions of first degree murder and attempted second degree murder and the death sentence imposed on the murder charge, despite the defendant’s claims that: (1) the trial court erroneously disallowed expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification; (2) the jury’s capital sentencing verdict was infirm; (3) the trial court erroneously allowed the impeachment of a defense character witness during the penalty phase of the trial; (4) the trial court erred in allowing victim impact evidence that related to the impact of the victim’s death on persons or institutions other than the victim’s family; (5) the trial court erroneously limited the defendant’s argument to the jury during the penalty phase; (6) cumulative errors require reversal of the death sentence; (7) the Tennessee death penalty statute is, for various reasons, unconstitutional. We find no error and hold that the death penalty in this case was proportionate to the death penalty imposed in similar cases, the sentence was not arbitrarily imposed, and the evidence supports the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance and its finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighs any mitigating circumstances. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (1997).

The Defendant was convicted of DUI, second offense, and driving on a revoked license, second offense. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, and he subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his request for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial; that he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge refused to recuse himself; and that the post-conviction court erred in refusing to admit certain evidence. We affirm the denial of the Defendant's request for post-conviction relief.

In 1982, the Petitioner pled guilty in Shelby County to two counts of rape, three counts of robbery, one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, four counts of burglary, one count of attempted burglary, one count of first degree criminal sexual conduct, one count of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, and one count of a crime against nature. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of ten years. In 1991, the Petitioner was convicted in Davidson County of twenty-one counts of rape, one count of aggravated rape, two counts of first-degree burglary, one count of second-degree burglary, two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of robbery, and one count of assault with intent to commit rape. In 1997, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition challenging his 1982 convictions and sentence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the statute of limitations. The Petitioner now appeals the trial court's ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement he agreed to a three-year sentence as a Range I Standard Offender, with the manner of service to be determined after a hearing by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 270 days in the workhouse on weekends ("day for day") from 7:00 p.m. on Fridays to 7:00 p.m. on Sundays and five years probation with a 10:00 p.m. curfew on weekdays. The defendant contends he should have received full probation or some other less restrictive form of alternative sentencing. We affirm the trial court's denial of full probation but modify the time of service in the workhouse on weekends to 104 days.

Petitioner, George Thurman Haynie, Jr., filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking a felony conviction for passing a worthless check and a misdemeanor conviction for passing a worthless check. The Circuit Court of Williamson County dismissed the petition and Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record, the pro se brief filed by the Appellant, the brief filed by the State, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Perry Hyde, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The Petitioner, George Todd, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 1985, the Petitioner entered into a negotiated plea agreement and pled guilty to second degree murder. As part of the plea agreement the Petitioner received a forty-five year sentence as a Range II offender. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition was denied and the Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition to this Court. On December 21, 1989, this Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. On August 24, 2000, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lake County Circuit Court, alleging that the passage of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 served to void his sentence and all other sentences in the State of Tennessee, and was the equivalent of a pardon. The Lake County Circuit Court denied the Petitioner's petition.

The petitioner, George Milton Brooks, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his pre-trial proceedings when counsel: (1) failed to investigate all apparent substantial defenses on Petitioner's behalf; (2) failed to assert certain Fourth Amendment violations during the hearing on Petitioner's motion to suppress; and (3) incorrectly advised Petitioner whether he could properly reserve two questions of law for appellate review. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant pled guilty to felonious possession of a handgun for an agreed sentence of one year.  The parties reserved a certified question of law; namely, whether an individual, who was previously convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon but subsequently had his full citizenship rights restored pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-101--105, can lawfully possess a handgun. We conclude that a convicted felon, otherwise prohibited from possessing a handgun under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A), may lawfully possess a handgun in his residence after his “full citizenship rights” have been restored.

I join the court's opinion and agree with its holding in affirming dismissal of the petition; however, because I do so for different reasons, I write separately.

The defendant was charged in the Williamson County Circuit Court with DUI, first offense, after a police officer observed him operating his vehicle in an erratic fashion. A videotape was made and admitted into evidence of the defendant's taking field sobriety tests, upon which the officer testified that he did poorly. Following his conviction for this offense, the defendant timely appealed. In his appeal, he raised several issues, including the refusal of the trial court to instruct as to a lesser-included offense, complaints about the admission of evidence, the conduct of the trial, and rulings of the trial court. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I am unable to join with my colleagues in concluding that “restoration of citizenship rights” to a felon convicted of a crime of violence restores to the felon his right to possess a handgun. My reasons are twofold.

The defendant, William P. Brooks, was convicted of driving on a revoked license, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, requiring 90 days to be served in jail and the balance to be served on supervised probation. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence and by imposing an excessive sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I concur in the results reached by the majority on all of the issues and in the rationales employed to reach the results in all but one issue, that being the ineffectiveness of counsel regarding the failure to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of facilitation. I respectfully would have taken a different approach in resolving this issue.

The defendant was convicted by a Lewis County jury of criminal responsibility for facilitation of a felony and possession of drug paraphernalia. The underlying felony conviction was for possession of cocaine in an amount of .5 gram or more with intent to sell or deliver. The defendant's brother pled guilty to this felony, a Class B felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years in continuous confinement on the facilitation conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days in the workhouse on the drug paraphernalia conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of nine years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that his sentence on the facilitation conviction was inappropriate both as to length and manner of service. Having reviewed the limited record, we conclude that the sentence is appropriate and therefore affirm the decision of the trial court.

ThePetitioners filed pro-se petitions for post-conviction relief on September 25, 1997, in accordance with the Post Conviction Relief Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-101. Amended petitions were subsequently filed by court appointed counsel on November 14, 1997. The Petitioners’ petitions were later dismissed and this appeal followed. In this appeal, the Petitioners set forth several grounds upon which they claim that post-conviction relief should have been granted. Specifically, the Petitioners allege ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that counsel: failed to file a motion for judgment of acquittal; failed to appeal the judgment of conviction for second degree murder; failed to dismiss two jurors who were alleged to be biased against the Petitioners, which resulted in a denial of their right to a fair and impartial jury; failed to interview and cross-examine a witness of the State’s; and failed to file a motion to suppress photographs that were entered into evidence.  Petitioner Donnie Wheeler also contends that post-conviction relief should have been granted because counsel failed to request an instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal responsibility for the facilitation of a felony, and because the trial court failed to charge the jury with the same lesser-included offense. After careful examination of the issues set forth herein, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief to the Petitioners.

The petitioner challenges the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment for second degree murder because that offense is not a lesser included offense of felony murder with which he was indicted. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the habeas corpus petition.