APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Ricky A. Burks was convicted by a Davidson County jury of the first-degree murder of his wife. The trial court granted Burks' motion for judgment of acquittal and entered a judgment for second-degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Burks, as a range II offender, to forty years confinement in the Department of Correction. Burks now appeals both the judgment of conviction and the sentence entered by the Davidson County Criminal Court, challenging the trial court's (1) denial of his motions to suppress; (2) admission of prior bad acts of the defendant; (3) jury instructions regarding prior bad acts; (4) admission of autopsy photographs of the victim; (5) refusal to instruct on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide; (6) finding that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of second-degree murder; and (7) imposition of the maximum sentence of forty years. The State cross-appeals challenging the trial court's ruling in reducing the jury's verdict of first-degree murder to that of second-degree murder. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant appeals his conviction for murder in the first degree and the sentence of death imposed by the jury.1 This opinion is delivered in two parts, with a separate opinion addressing Part II.
In Part I of this opinion we address the following issues:

(1) Admission of evidence regarding his escape attempts;
(2) Shackling of his feet and hands;
(3) Prohibition of mitigation evidence at sentencing;
(4) Admission of his statement to police;
(5) Propriety of the prosecutor’s closing argument;
(6) Unconstitutionality of the death penalty; and
(7) Proportionality of sentence of death.

After careful review, we affirm the conviction for murder in the first degree.  In Part II of this opinion, Judge Williams sets forth his minority position on the following issues:

(1) Application of the (i)(2) aggravating factor in the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) Cumulative effect of errors.

The position of the majority on the issues addressed in Part II is set forth in the separate opinion filed by Judge Witt, in which Judge Hayes has joined. The majority concludes that the verdict is enigmatic and uncertain, requiring reversal of the sentence of death and re-sentencing.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Darryl A. Larkins, of two counts of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to serve an effective sentence of fifty-years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant of aggravated rape and attempted aggravated rape; 2) whether the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions were obtained contrary to Tennessee law in State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991); and 3) whether the Defendant was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial and a fair and impartial jury, regardingthe aggravated burglary conviction. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing on the offense of attempted aggravated rape.

On April 30, 1996, the petitioner, Alan Hall, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and possession of burglary tools. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of life plus twelve years. Subsequently, on September 15, 1999, the trial court entered an order correcting the petitioner's judgment of conviction for especially aggravated robbery to reflect that the petitioner would serve one hundred percent (100%) of his sentence in confinement instead of thirty percent (30%) as was erroneously reflected on the original judgment. Within a year after the entry of the corrected judgment, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as being barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contests the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Judy K. Caruso, entered pleas of guilt to two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property over $1,000. As a part of the plea agreement, the state agreed to dismiss two charges of possession of stolen property and one charge of misdemeanor vandalism. The defendant negotiated concurrent sentences of four years on the burglary convictions and two years on the theft convictions. The trial court denied a request for probation, ordered a 200-day jail sentence to be served day for day, and required the balance of the four-year sentence to be served in a Community Corrections program. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that she should have been granted an alternative sentence involving immediate release. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Henry Ford Williams, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court's revocation of his community corrections sentence. The trial court accepted the defendant's guilty pleas to Class B felony possession of cocaine for resale and to Class C felony possession of cocaine. On September 16, 1993, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years, with eleven months and 29 days to be served in local confinement and the balance to be served in community corrections. On February 18, 2000, the state filed a community corrections revocation warrant. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and revoked the defendant's community corrections placement. From that order, the defendant has appealed to this court. Upon our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the action of the trial court..

A Davidson County jury convicted the petitioner of two counts of child rape. For each of these offenses, he received a sentence of eighteen years, and the trial court ordered the sentences to be run consecutively. On direct appeal this Court modified the petitioner's sentences to sixteen and one half years each, resulting in an effective sentence of thirty-three years, but otherwise found the petitioner's claims merited no relief. Subsequently the petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Determining that the petitioner had raised a colorable claim, the trial court appointed counsel to represent him and later conducted an evidentiary hearing on the petition. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court filed an opinion denying the petition. From this denial the petitioner brings the instant appeal alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by inadequately advising the petitioner of the potential sentence he could receive should he elect to go to trial. However, following our review of the record, we find that the trial court correctly denied the petition, and we, therefore, affirm the lower court's decision.

The defendant appeals and asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of vandalism. Specifically, he contends that the State's evidence failed to prove the amount of damage beyond a reasonable doubt to establish a felony. After review, we hold that the trial court properly calculated the value of the amount of damages done by the defendant and that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for felony vandalism.

The petitioner's conviction for rape was affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed that he received inadequate assistance of counsel at his trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a state appeal from the suppression of evidence. The defendant was indicted for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, and leaving the scene of an accident. The defendant filed a motion to suppress which the trial court granted. In this appeal, the state alleges that the trial court erroneously concluded the defendant was unlawfully arrested, or, in the alternative, the order of suppression was overbroad. Upon review of the record, we modify the order of suppression to allow evidence gathered prior to the unlawful arrest. We remand for further proceedings.

I must dissent from the holding of the majority opinion in this case for the following reasons:

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was violated by his multiple sentences. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding that the judgments of conviction were facially valid. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The defendant appeals his conviction of the sale of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years, three months in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and imposed a $2000 fine. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Noah J. Love, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct his sentence. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court properly denied relief. Because the trial court had no jurisdiction to amend the sentence four years after the defendant had been transferred to the Department of Correction, the judgment is reversed.

The defendant contends that the State should be barred from revoking his Community Corrections sentence because no detainer was placed on him while he served a six-year prison sentence in North Carolina while his revocation warrant was pending in Tennessee and the State knew of his location. We conclude that the State was under no obligation to file a detainer against the defendant, and that the State was not time barred from proceeding with the Community Corrections revocation after the defendant's return to this state. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and two counts of theft over one thousand dollars, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of three years incarceration in the local workhouse. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant entered a best interest plea of guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and was sentenced to four years on community corrections. The plea attempted to reserve a certified question of law relating to the suppression of evidence. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to address the certified question of law. The appeal is dismissed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioners in the instant case each pled guilty to one count of murder in the perpetration of a robbery under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202, one count of especially aggravated robbery under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-403, and one count of aggravated assault under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102. The Petitioners were sentenced to concurrent sentences of life, twenty-five years, and six years, respectively. On April 20, 1995, the Petitioners filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Special Judge Bobby Capers was appointed to hear the post-conviction petition. The trial court heard the Petitioners' petition between August 9, 1999 and August 19, 1999, and granted post-conviction relief to Petitioners Smith and Versie. On December 3, 1999, the State filed a notice of appeal, challenging the post-conviction court's findings that neither of the Petitioners received effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court was correct in granting post-conviction relief to the Petitioners. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Cyrus D. Wilson, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.¹ The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his trial was tainted by due process violations. After an evidentiary hearing the post-conviction court denied relief. The Defendant now appeals as of right. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Upon his guilty plea, the Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent ten year sentences to be served on community corrections. Several months into service of his sentences, the Defendant was arrested and his community corrections sentences were revoked. The trial court subsequently resentenced the Defendant to two consecutive ten year sentences. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court was without authority to impose consecutive sentences and that consecutive sentences are improper. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant of first degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jerry Lynn Sanders, appeals from his convictions of aggravated burglary, theft of property less than $500.00, and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. He asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying his request to admit into evidence a notarized statement wherein the alleged victim stated that he wanted to dismiss the charges in this matter. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Jared Richardson, pled guilty to two counts of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of six years for each count, to be served in the Davidson County Workhouse. The trial court also assessed a fine of $3,500 and ordered the defendant to forfeit his weapon. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court should have imposed probation or some other alternative sentence. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, indicted for the false reporting of a bomb threat at an elementary school, was convicted of the offense of harassment, and fined $1000. No motion for a new trial was filed. In a pro se appeal to this court, the defendant raises essentially four issues: (1) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (2) whether he was denied the right to testify at trial; (3) whether the State withheld exculpatory evidence; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of harassment. After a careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.