APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

For purposes of affording guidance to litigants and trial judges who, in the future, may find themselves situated similarly to the parties and the trial court in the present case, I believe this court should have analyzed the prior-crime issue by dichotomizing it into separate parts, namely, (1) the litany of prior crimes set forth within the escape count of the indictment and (2) the state-sponsored testimony about these prior crimes. I believe that both of these different sources of information merit different judicial responses. In an appropriate case, the form of the response to the indictment language may well dictate the response to the testimony.

The Appellant, Ronald Paul, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief by the Robertson County Circuit Court. Paul, a correctional inmate, timely delivered his petition to the proper prison authorities; however, he inadvertently addressed the envelope containing his petition to the wrong city. The petition was returned to Paul, who, on the same day, corrected his mistake and re-delivered to prison authorities for mailing. These events occurred one day after the one year period for filing had expired. On appeal, Paul argues that the trial court erred in finding his post-conviction petition timed-barred. After review, we hold that Paul's petition was deemed "filed" for purposes of Supreme Court Rule 28 when it was first delivered to prison authorities and, as such, was timely.

The Appellant, William Greer, was indicted on one count of theft of property under $500, one count of fraudulent use of a debit card, and one count of misdemeanor assault. Prior to trial, the assault charge was severed. A Coffee County jury found the Appellant guilty of one count of fraudulent use of a debit card, a class A misdemeanor. The Appellant was sentenced to ninety (90) days in the Coffee County jail. Greer appeals his conviction contending that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the unsolicited comments of the victim relating to the Appellant's severed charge of assault resulted in reversible error. After review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, an inmate at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in Nashville, was convicted by a jury of attempted felony escape, aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping stemming from a failed prison escape. The Appellant was incarcerated at the Riverbend facility as a result of his prior convictions for especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping and second degree murder. The Appellant challenges on appeal his convictions for aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, arguing (1) sufficiency of the convicting evidence, (2) systematic removal of African-Americans from the petit jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, and (3) the prejudicial admission into evidence of the Appellant's prior convictions for especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and second degree murder. The State argues that proof of the Appellant's prior convictions was an essential element of the felony escape charge and, therefore, admissible. After review, we find reversible error in the admission in the instant case of the Appellant's prior convictions for especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping and second degree murder. As such, the judgments of convictions are reversed and remanded for a new trial.

The defendant appeals two convictions for stalking, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and the admissibility of photographs. We affirm one of the defendant's convictions for stalking, but we vacate the judgment of conviction for the other because the evidence reflects the existence of only one stalking offense.

Thomas J. Tackett appeals from his Warren County especially aggravated robbery conviction, for which he received a 25-year incarcerative sentence. He urges us to find error based upon insufficiency of the convicting evidence, admission of certain evidence at trial, jury instructions not given, and sentencing. Although there is no merit in the issues advanced by the defendant, we notice as plain error that the defendant's conviction is for a greater crime than that which is charged in the indictment. We therefore modify his especially aggravated robbery conviction to aggravated robbery and remand for sentencing for that crime.

On December 16, 1993, William Singleton, the Defendant and Appellant, was convicted by a Claiborne County jury of first-degree murder. This Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction following direct appeal. Subsequently, the Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. The Defendant appeals here, arguing that the trial court erroneously dismissed the petition. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, William Makransky, appeals his convictions for aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial court applied the incorrect standard for the prejudice prong in denying him relief on this issue in his motion for a new trial. Although we determine that the trial court did apply the incorrect standard for prejudice, our de novo review reveals that the defendant's trial attorney was not ineffective. Because of an error in the judgments, the sentences for contributing to the delinquency of a minor are modified.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft of property less than $500. He was subsequently sentenced to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days in the Lauderdale County jail. In this pro se appeal, Defendant argues that the State failed to provide him with discoverable material or information under Rule 16 of Tenn. R. Crim. P. After a review of the record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we conclude that the State complied with the mandates of Rule 16. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to ten years incarceration. Following direct appeal to this Court, which affirmed the Petitioner's conviction and sentence, and to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which denied permission to appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court conducted a hearing and denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court's decision. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Petitioner's representation at trial was adequate and therefore affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1999 guilty plea to and resulting conviction for the attempt to commit first degree murder. He contends that his plea resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel in that he was not advised that a jury could consider lesser included offenses to the offense charged in the indictment. He also contends that the trial court based the dismissal of his case upon an improper standard. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The defendants, Joshua Lee Williams and Maurice Miguel Teague, encountered each other on the street where Teague produced a pistol and attempted to shoot Williams. When the gun did not fire, Williams knocked it from Teague's hands, picked it up, and fired in turn at Teague, in the process fatally wounding a neighborhood resident. Williams was indicted for first degree murder for the shooting death of the deceased, and criminal attempt to commit first degree murder of Teague, who was indicted for criminal attempt to commit first degree murder of Williams. At the conclusion of their joint trial, Williams was found guilty of second degree murder and criminal attempt to commit second degree murder, and Teague guilty of criminal attempt to commit second degree murder. Williams received an effective sentence of twenty years at 100% as a violent offender. Teague was sentenced as a standard, Range I offender to ten years. Teague raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) not instructing the jury on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense; and (3) the propriety of his sentence. Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction for second degree murder. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Cash Pate, was convicted by a jury of second offense driving under the influence (DUI). In this appeal as of right, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence obtained against him because that evidence was the fruit of his unlawful seizure at a roadblock. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and the trial court's order denying the Defendant's motion to suppress.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of theft of a vehicle worth more than $10,000, a Class C felony, for which he received a fifteen-year sentence as a career offender. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of theft and that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his attempt to steal gasoline that led to his arrest. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Orlando Crayton, was convicted of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon, and two counts of vandalism under $500.00. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 months, 29 days for each vandalism count, six years for aggravated assault, two years for reckless endangerment and 11 months, 29 days for unlawful possession of a weapon. Because the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, the effective sentence is six years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges (1) the admissibility of evidence indicating the defendant's gang affiliation; (2) the admission of an estimate regarding the damage to a vehicle; and (3) the admission of a hearsay statement. The judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal by permission pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant, Jennifer McClure, was indicted by the Haywood County Grand Jury for various charges arising out of the seizure and subsequent search of the commercial motor carrier in which she and her husband were traveling. The trial court suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of that seizure and search, ruling that the seizure of the motor carrier was unconstitutional. The State then filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the trial court. This Court likewise granted the State's application for permission to appeal. On appeal, the State asserts: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing the State's request to either reopen the proof or be allowed to file with the court the rules and regulations governing Department of Safety inspections; and (2) that if these rules and regulations are considered, the trial court erred by granting the Defendant's motion to suppress. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the State's request to reopen the proof or to file the applicable rules and regulations because the trial court did permit the State to file with the court the rules and regulations regarding Department of Safety inspections. In addition, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting the motion to suppress because the seizure of the Defendant's commercial motor carrier was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The defendant, Rhonda Grills, was convicted of facilitation of the felony rape of a child less than 13 years of age. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 10 years. The defendant was fined $25,000.00. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence is adequate to support the facilitation of the rape of a child, the judgment is affirmed.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to eleven years incarceration. The defendant now appeals and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial when a detective improperly testified that the Defendant was “well known for home invasions,” (2) whether the state failed to disclose fingerprint evidence in a timely fashion, and (3) whether sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the motion to declare a mistrial, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

On November 24, 1998, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. Following a subsequent jury trial, the Defendant was convicted on both counts. On September 30, 1998, after a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to serve thirty years incarceration for the aggravated robbery consecutively to fifteen years for the aggravated assault. The court also ordered both sentences served consecutively to a sentence for which the Defendant was on parole. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider robbery and theft as lesser-included offenses of aggravated robbery and that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider reckless endangerment, reckless aggravated assault and simple assault as lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.as lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court., we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1999, a Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eight years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the gun alleged to have been used in the robbery; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony by the victim concerning the death of the victim's mother; (4) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and (5) whether the cumulative effect of errors at trial warrants a new trial. Having reviewed the record, we find no error and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority opinion that the granting or denial of a mistrial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and that a trial court should grant a mistrial only when it is of “manifest necessity.” I would add that the burden of establishing a “manifest necessity” is upon the appellant. State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Petitioner appeals the denial by the trial court of his writ of habeas corpus and writ of certiorari. Petitioner contended in his petition that he previously pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Madison County to the offenses of facilitation of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, and arson, and received an effective sentence of 60 years. He further contended that court did not have jurisdiction to try him as an adult; his rights to double jeopardy were violated as a result of his transfer to the Criminal Court; and he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, he claims the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without appointing counsel, without conducting a hearing, and by failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William Butler Bolling appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's determination that he serve his plea bargained, effective two-year sentence for gambling crimes in the Department of Correction. He claims he should have received some form of alternative sentencing, preferably probation, for his felony conviction. Because Bolling has failed to demonstrate the error of the trial court's determination, we affirm.