APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Nicholas J. Johnson, presents for review a certified question of law. Johnson pled guilty to two counts of possession of Schedule I drugs for resale, one count of possession of Schedule IV drugs for resale, and simple possession. Johnson received an effective ten (10)-year Community Corrections sentence, and was ordered to serve one hundred and fifty (150) days, day for day, in the Williamson County Workhouse. As part of his plea, Johnson explicitly reserved, with the consent of the trial court and the State, a certified question of law challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. After review, we find that the question was not properly certified because it fails to clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Richard W. Herrell, a.k.a. Ricky Herrell, was indicted by a Dickson County Grand Jury for vandalism resulting in personal property damage of $500 to $1,000. Following a bench trial, Herrell was found guilty of the indicted charge and received a two-year suspended sentence. On appeal, Herrell raises one issue for our review: Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Lucious Allen,¹ pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to four felony offenses and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of eight years with the sentence running concurrently to a previously imposed federal sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging involuntary guilty pleas and that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose concurrent sentencing. On appeal, the petitioner disputes the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief without the appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case to the post-conviction court for appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The appellant, Charles E. Jones, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient for a jury to find him guilty of first degree murder. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant alleges (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction, and (2) the trial court erroneously failed to charge simple robbery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, and the defendant affirmatively acquiesced in the trial court's failure to charge simple robbery. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Stephen E. Cline, pled guilty in the Overton County Criminal Court to four counts of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court granted the appellant judicial diversion and placed him on probation for four years. Subsequently, the appellant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and failing to comply with the implied consent law. A warrant for revocation of probation and judicial diversion was issued alleging the foregoing offenses and contending that the appellant had fraudulently obtained a controlled substance. Pursuant to a hearing, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and entered judgments of conviction for all four counts of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the appellant violated his probation and judicial diversion; (2) whether the trial court violated the appellant's right to confrontation in admitting hearsay statements during the hearing; (3) whether the trial court violated the appellant's due process rights by failing to bifurcate the probation revocation proceedings; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to consider all of the proof before forming an opinion on the case. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Patrick D. Paris, appeals from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony into evidence as an excited utterance. We affirm the judgments of conviction.

The defendant, David Glenn Ayers, was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days with release eligibility after service of 75%. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, argues that the trial court should have set aside the verdict as thirteenth juror, and contends that the sentence is excessive. The judgment is affirmed.

The Petitioner was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to twenty-five years incarceration. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his attorney at trial was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant pursuant to his plea agreement to two concurrent ten-year sentences. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request that he serve his sentence on community corrections. Because we conclude that the sentence imposed is adequately supported by the record, and that the trial court did not err by refusing to allow the Defendant to serve his sentence on community corrections, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Stanley Boxley, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and to a consecutive ten year term for the attempted aggravated robbery. In this appeal as of right the Defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by ruling that the State could introduce evidence of threats against the accomplice witnesses if the Defendant inquired into the prosecution's recommendation that they receive probation. Finding the evidence insufficient to corroborate the accomplices' testimony, we reverse the Defendant's convictions and dismiss.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in a local workhouse. The court required the defendant to serve forty-eight hours and allowed the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence on probation. The defendant subsequently moved for a new trial and then amended his motion. The trial court denied his amended motion, and the defendant appeals this denial, alleging that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that they could consider this refusal as evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. After reviewing the record and applicable case law, we find that these issues lack merit and therefore affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for new trial.

The Defendant, Quentin D. Armstrong, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. The trial court merged the second count into the first and sentenced the Defendant to six years. In his appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated assault and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury concerning self-defense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his consecutive sentences totaling 29 years for two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. He contends the trial court erred in setting the length of each sentence and in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James David Alder, appeals from his convictions and sentences which he received in the Franklin County Circuit Court. After a change of venue from Sequatchie County and a jury trial in Franklin County, the trial court imposed the following convictions and sentences: aggravated assault, ten years (Range II); kidnapping, ten years (Range II); and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon, eleven months and 29 days (Class A misdemeanor). The trial court ordered the felony sentences to run consecutively to each other but concurrently with the misdemeanor, for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant complains that the trial court erred (1) in refusing to grant a mistrial after the victim testified that she had obtained an order of protection against the defendant and (2) in imposing the sentences. After our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the lower court's felony judgments but vacate and modify the misdemeanor judgment.

A Maury County grand jury indicted the defendant, Jerry Lane Rubert, for two counts of aggravated kidnapping and three counts of especially aggravated rape. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, as well as the evidence and statements derived from that seizure, on the grounds that the evidence was illegally seized. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, and at trial the prosecution introduced the evidence at issue. After the conclusion of this trial, a Maury County jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The defendant now brings this appeal, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we find that the defendant's allegations do not merit relief, and therefore affirm his convictions.

The defendant, Terry Lee Robinson, appeals from his conviction by a jury for first degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient, (2) the trial court erroneously prohibited a defense expert from testifying as to the victim’s cause of death, (3) the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior conduct in violation of Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b), (4) he was denied a fair trial because the jury was composed of ten women and two men, and (5) he was denied a fair trial because a television movie about a man fatally poisoning his wife with cyanide aired during the trial. Although we hold that the trial court erred regarding the defendant’s expert and the prior conduct evidence, we conclude the errors were harmless. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, William Orlando Crutcher, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of attempted rape of a child. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a ten year sentence for each of the Defendant's five convictions and ordered that the three aggravated sexual battery convictions be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ricky Lynn Earls, appeals from his conviction for theft of property valued over $1,000, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, Eric Bernard Howard, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery in the Criminal Court of Davidson County and sentenced to consecutive terms of seventeen years for each conviction. The Defendant now seeks post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief. We affirm.

The Appellant, Donald Ray Pannell, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pannell was convicted by a Marshall County jury of burglary, burglary of an automobile, and theft. He was sentenced as a Career Offender to eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Pannell argues: (1) that the trial judge erred in not recusing himself from presiding over the case, and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Frank C. Pease, appeals his conviction for criminal contempt. The sole issue for our determination is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Since the contempt finding was based upon defendant's anticipated, rather than actual, refusal to follow the court's order, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This is a state appeal from the dismissal of an indictment based upon a violation of mandatory joinder Rule 8(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendants, Baird and Fisher, and other individuals were first indicted on July 23, 1999, for aggravated gambling promotion. The indictment alleged the illegal activity occurred from August 1998 through December 1998. On October 18, 1999, the defendants pled guilty to aggravated gambling promotion. The defendants and other individuals were again indicted for aggravated gambling promotion on March 21, 2000. This indictment alleged the illegal activity occurred from January 1999 through June 1999, which was prior to the return of the first indictment. The trial court dismissed the second indictment, finding that it violated Rule 8(a) requiring joinder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

One day before his scheduled jury trial for first degree murder, the appellant sought and was granted the right to represent himself. He now appeals from his conviction by a Shelby County jury for the offense of first degree murder, asserting that the convicting evidence was insufficient and that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.