APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, John Arron Heard, appeals from the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court revoking his community corrections sentence. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in the penitentiary. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Angela Bright brings this appeal of the Blount County Criminal Court's revocation of her probationary sentence and order placing her Department of Correction sentence into effect. Because the lower court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

The defendant, Charles Orlando Fields, was indicted for one count of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school, a Class A felony, and one count of distributing one-half gram or more of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school, a Class A felony. An Obion County Circuit Court jury convicted him of both counts. The trial court merged the distributing cocaine conviction into the selling cocaine conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony D. Bynum, was convicted of possession of anhydrous ammonia, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years, one year to be served in the Weakley County Jail and the balance to be served on probation. The defendant was fined $1,000.00. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an interlocutory appeal by the state from an order by the trial court excluding a .20 breathalyzer result from consideration in the imposition of an enhanced sentence for a DUI offense. The order is vacated and the cause is remanded for trial.

I concur with the result reached by the majority and consider this case distinguishable from Scisney. In Scisney, Judge Tipton and I, in separate opinions, concluded an intoximeter reading of .04%, by itself, was insufficient to establish “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the blood alcohol concentration was, in fact, .04%. See State v. Mark T. Scisney, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9605-CC-00209, 1997 WL 634515, at *9-11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 1997, at Nashville). This was because there was a 25% chance that the actual level was below .04% due to the margin of error. Id.

The defendant, Courtney L. Johnson, appeals the revocation of her probation by the Montgomery County Circuit Court. On appeal, she challenges the trial court's decision, after revocation, to order her to serve the balance of her effective sentence of approximately ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Chianti Fuller was indicted for four offenses: (1) possession with intent to sell 0.6 grams of cocaine, a schedule II controlled substance, (2) possession with intent to deliver 0.6 grams of cocaine, a schedule II controlled substance, (3) simple possession of marijuana, a schedule VI controlled substance, and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant was convicted by a jury of counts (1) and (2), and pled guilty to counts (3) and (4). The trial court merged count two into count one and sentenced the Defendant to nine years and six months for possession of cocaine with intent to sell. The Defendant was also sentenced to nine months to be served concurrently with his other sentence for each of the two misdemeanor convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the sentence was excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ronald Prentice, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a sentence of four years on each count, with a concurrent one year sentence of incarceration and consecutive sentences of three years probation. In this appeal of right, he argues that the trial court erred (1) by improperly joining the offenses, (2) by excluding testimony regarding his divorce from the victim, and (3) by prohibiting a hypothetical question to an expert witness for the state. The judgment of the trial court in case number 98-D-2523 is affirmed. The judgment of the trial court in case number 99-A-13 is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

The Defendant, Tony D. Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony possession of cocaine with intent to sell. After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced to ten years as a Range I standard offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court erred in imposing a ten year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The post-conviction petitioner, Larry N. Wilson, seeks to set aside his four Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of aggravated robbery and his effective 24-year sentence. The convictions were based on guilty pleas. In his post-conviction proceeding, he posited that the pleas were involuntarily or unknowingly made and that they were the result of the ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Concluding that the record supports that determination, we affirm.

Indicted for the offense of premeditated first degree murder, defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-three years. In this appeal as of right, defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when the state referred to defendant's being in jail pending trial; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting defendant's prior misdemeanor convictions for impeachment purposes; (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when the prosecutor misstated the evidence in final argument; (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when extraneous prejudicial information was present during jury deliberations; and (6) whether the sentence was excessive. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a jury trial, the defendant, a juvenile at the time of the offenses, was convicted of six counts arising out of the shooting deaths of two victims. The jury sentenced him to life in prison for Count One, first degree premeditated murder of the first victim, and for Count Two, first degree felony murder of the first victim based upon robbery of the first victim. The jury sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for Count Three, first degree felony murder of the second victim based upon premeditated murder of the first victim, and for Count Four, first degree felony murder of the second victim based upon robbery of the first victim. The trial court merged the conviction for Count Two into Count One, and the conviction for Count Four into Count Three. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty (20) years for Count Five, especially aggravated robbery, one (1) year for Count Six, possession of marijuana with intent to resell, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and his request for a state-funded mitigation expert, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for first-degree murder. After careful review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to suppress the defendant's statements. Further, we hold that although the defendant's status as a non-capital defendant did not preclude him from receiving state-funded expert services, our de novo review of the record reveals that the defendant failed to make the required showing of a particularized need for a mitigation expert. Therefore, the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for such services was correct. Finally, we hold the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for premeditated and felony murder in the first degree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that insufficient evidence of his identity as the perpetrator was presented at trial and (2) that there was a material variance between the indictment and the proof at trial. Having reviewed the record, we conclude (1) that sufficient evidence was presented to support the Defendant's conviction and (2) that a variance between the indictment and the proof at trial existed, but that the variance did not affect the substantial rights of the Defendant and thus was not fatal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Douglas Hughes, entered a plea of no contest to one count of aggravated rape, and a plea of guilty to ten counts of aggravated rape, on November 30, 1992. On March 4, 1993, a sentencing hearing was held and the Defendant was sentenced for these crimes to an aggregate term of eighty years. The Defendant's trial counsel failed to timely perfect the Defendant's appeal, and on June 30, 1995, the Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, seeking a delayed appeal. The delayed appeal was granted and this Court affirmed the Defendant's sentence. See State v. Michael Douglas Hughes, No. 01C01-9701-CR-00021, 1998 WL 301730, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 10, 1998). The Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Defendant's application for permission to appeal on February 22, 1999. The Defendant filed the present petition for post-conviction relief on August 25, 1999, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at his plea, sentencing, and on appeal; that his guilty plea is invalid because it was not made voluntarily, understandingly, and knowingly; and that the length of his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court dismissed the present petition on the grounds that it was not timely filed, that the grounds for relief have been waived, and that it does not contain grounds sufficient to constitute a motion to reopen the previous petition. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We reverse the trial court's ruling and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing.

The defendant appeals the denial of probation for the five-year sentence he received for sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony. He asserts that the record fails to support a conclusion that the statutory presumption of his eligibility for alternative sentencing has been rebutted. We modify the term of confinement and order supervised probation forthwith and remand the case to the trial court for imposition of appropriate conditions.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to ten counts of rape of a child. On appeal, the petitioner raises the issues of whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel and whether his guilty plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant appeals his premeditated first degree murder and abuse of a corpse convictions for which he received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and two years, respectively, arguing:
(1) the trial court erred in not enforcing a plea agreement; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (3) hearsay  evidence of the victim’s statements was erroneously admitted; (4) evidence obtained via wiretaps was erroneously admitted; (5) evidence regarding defendant’s alleged romantic relationship with a woman other than his wife was erroneously admitted; and (6) the trial court should have charged the jury regarding alibi. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in all respects save one. I seriously question the conclusion that all of the victim’s statements to her mother were admissible as excited utterances. A declarant’s opinion about who caused an event would ordinarily not be admissible even if the declarant appeared and testified at a trial. Here, I do not believe that the victim’s opinion about who started the fire was admissible.  However, given the location and timing of the fire, the inferences drawn by the victim as to the potential cause of it would be obvious to the jury in any event. Thus, I do not believe that the error affected the verdict.

The petitioner appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his petition, he alleged that his conviction should be set aside because the victim had recanted his testimony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief and the petitioner appealed. After a thorough review, we affirm the court's order of denial.

The Defendant, Ned Jackson,¹ was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that insufficient evidence of the Defendant’s identity as the culprit was presented to convict the Defendant of aggravated robbery and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of theft and aggravated assault. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of the premeditated first degree murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this appeal the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt of aggravated robbery, I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses.
Currently, members of this court are divided concerning the correct interpretation of the two-step process set forth by our supreme court in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 469 (Tenn. 1999), for determining if the evidence adduced at trial justifies jury instructions on lesser-included offenses. See, e.g., State v. Linnell Richmond, No. E2000-01545-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1222247 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, October 15, 2001). I am largely in agreement with the position expressed by Judge Smith in his opinion in Richmond, No. E2000-01545-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1222247, at *21 (concurring in part and dissenting in part)(footnote omitted), that [a] reading of the recent cases of [State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 80 (Tenn. 2001), and State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 724-725 (Tenn. 2001),] leads one to the inescapable conclusion that our high court has mandated that lesser-included offense instructions be given anytime the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for these offenses. This means that anytime the proof is sufficient for a conviction of the indicted offense, the proof will a fortiori be sufficient for a conviction of the lesser-included offenses. . . . As a practical matter, this in turn means that it will almost always be error to fail to instruct the jury as to all lesser-included offenses of the indicted offense. Thus, the only real inquiry, in my opinion, in virtually all of the cases raising the lesser-included offense issue is whether the error in failing to instruct on the lesser offenses can be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant drove up behind a vehicle which had halted because of a driver's license roadblock near Knoxville. He then proceeded onto the right shoulder to get around that vehicle and was stopped by the Tennessee Highway Patrol officer conducting the roadblock. What next occurred was highly disputed, but the events culminated with the defendant's being sprayed with Freeze, some of which was deflected back onto the officer, partially incapacitating him also. The defendant was charged with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and failure to carry and display a driver's license on demand. The reckless driving charge was nolle prosequi and, following a jury trial, the defendant was found not guilty of resisting arrest but was convicted of the driver's license charge, sentenced to ten days confinement, which was suspended, and ordered to pay a $50 fine and court costs. He timely appealed the conviction, arguing that the roadblock was unconstitutional. Based upon our review, we conclude that the roadblock was unconstitutional and that the officers lacked probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.