APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioners, Hugh Peter Bondurant and Kenneth Patterson Bondurant, appeal the summary dismissals of their petitions for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal of right, each alleges that his sentence was illegally imposed. Because the judgments are facially valid, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

On March 12, 1996, the petitioner, James P. Stout, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced to forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner elected not to pursue a direct appeal of his conviction and instead filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Javon Webster, was convicted of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in the Department of Correction for the felony murder conviction. The trial court merged the Defendant's attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction with the felony murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the deceased, (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's request for a special jury instruction on duress, and (4) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police. The State also raises an issue on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by merging the Defendant's conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery into his felony murder conviction. We affirm the felony murder conviction and reinstate and remand for sentencing the especially aggravated robbery conviction.

The Defendant, George Langford, was convicted of first degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to life without the possibility for parole for the murder and to concurrent sentences of four, five, and two years for the other crimes respectively. The Defendant appealed his convictions and this Court affirmed the convictions and the sentences. Our supreme court granted the Defendant's application for appeal and also affirmed his convictions and sentences. The Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Defendant now appeals to this Court alleging that the trial court erred in denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, who was charged with vehicular homicide and failure to yield right of way, filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review district attorney's denial of pretrial diversion. The trial court found that district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to facilitation of the sale of cocaine greater than 0.5 grams for an agreed sentence of four years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Bikrev, was convicted of theft of property over $1,000.00 by a Williamson County jury. After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction. The trial court suspended the sentence conditioned upon the Defendant serving one year in the Williamson County jail and completing four years of probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the State did not prove venue, (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a tacit admission made by the Defendant, and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Edward Arnold Rivera, was indicted by a Hardin County grand jury on two counts of official misconduct, each a felony, and one count of misdemeanor theft. The Defendant submitted an application for pre-trial diversion which was denied by the District Attorney General. The Defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Hardin County Circuit Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 38 for review of the denial of pre-trial diversion. The Circuit Court found no abuse of discretion, denied the petition, and granted the Defendant leave to seek an interlocutory appeal to this Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(a). The Defendant contends on appeal that (1) the District Attorney General abused his discretion in denying pre-trial diversion and (2) the record does not support the denial. This Court granted the Defendant's application, and we now affirm the Circuit Court's denial of the petition.

The Defendant, William Ray Collier, was convicted by a jury of two counts of possessing heroin with intent to sell or deliver within one thousand feet of a school, one count of possessing heroin with intent to sell or deliver, and three counts of driving on a suspended license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of seventy-one years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises three issues: whether the trial court erred in admitting certain expert testimony; whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; and whether his sentence is excessive. Finding no merit in any of the Defendant's contentions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In May 1999, a McMinn County jury found the Defendant guilty of the felony murder of one victim and of the criminally negligent homicide of a second victim. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to concurrent sentences of life in prison for the felony murder conviction and two years incarceration for the criminally negligent homicide conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction for felony murder; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to order the State to reveal the identity of a confidential informant; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the Defendant's co-defendant to testify against him at trial; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view a video tape of the Defendant's arrest; (5) whether the trial court allowed the jury to hear inadmissible hearsay testimony; (6) whether the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the entire written statement of the co-defendant; (7) whether the Defendant was denied a fair trial as a result of the State's failure to disclose exculpatory information; and (8) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion requesting individual voir dire of the potential jurors concerning pretrial publicity. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm the Defendant's convictions.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant of one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of rape of a child. For the former the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years, and for the latter he received a sentence of twenty-three years. The trial court then ordered these sentences to run concurrently. Subsequently, the defendant brought an unsuccessful motion for new trial and now pursues the present appeal in this Court raising two issues. More specifically, the defendant avers that the trial court erred 1) by limiting defense counsel's questioning of the victim concerning her prior sexual experiences and 2) by improperly utilizing two enhancement factors in sentencing the defendant. Upon review of these issues, we find that neither merit reversal and, thus, affirm the convictions and sentences. However, we have noted error in the rape of a child judgment requiring a remand for correction thereof.

The defendant, Joel M. Puentes, appeals his conviction by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court for facilitating second degree murder, a Class B felony, for which he received a nine-year sentence. He contends that (1) the indictment is deficient in its allegations regarding homicide, (2) the proof is insufficient to convict him, and (3) the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding accessory after the fact as a lesser included offense to homicide. We conclude that no error exists and that the evidence is sufficient. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher D. Lanier, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to incarceration for nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court's decision to not require a police officer who testified for the state to reveal the identity of a confidential informant. Finding no error warranting reversal, we affirm.

Petitioner, Michael W. Smith, filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County. He alleged that his conviction for escape in the Circuit Court of Hardeman County was invalid because of an illegal and void sentence. Petitioner did not attach to his petition the Hardeman County judgment or any other portion of that record. He also alleged that the sentence had been served, that he was illegally sentenced as a Range II offender because he had no prior felony convictions, and that no enhancement factors could properly be applied to a Range I sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition and assessed trial court costs against Petitioner, who now appeals both the summary dismissal of his petition and the assessment of costs against him. We affirm the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, but reverse that portion of the order taxing costs to Petitioner.

The appellant, Earl Dewayne Cole, was convicted by a Madison County jury of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to a term of seven (7) years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal the appellant claims the trial judge failed to adequately respond to a jury question regarding the need for unanimity in their verdict, that the written jury instructions showed the victim's name and weapon only under the main charge, and that the trial judge should have considered a lesser offense at sentencing. We find that all of these alleged errors have been waived by the failure of the appellant to enter a contemporaneous objection to them, by the failure to raise these issues in the motion for a new trial, and by the failure of the appellant on appeal to cite to any relevant authority supporting his arguments. Moreover, we find that none of these alleged errors constitute plain error. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Clifford Coleman, Sr., was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues as follows: (1) The evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree murder; (2) the trial court erred by denying his requested jury instruction on deliberation; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; (4) the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after dismissing a juror; and (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after a witness was allowed to testify in violation of the rule of sequestration. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

After being indicted for aggravated perjury, the defendant, Melvin E. Beard, filed a motion for a bill of particulars. In response, the state filed two bills of particulars, one on January 22, 1999 and one on August 5, 1999. At the conclusion of a jury trial, which was held on March 8-9, 2000, the jury convicted the defendant of aggravated perjury. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender to serve five years in confinement. The defendant now brings this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence on several grounds. Following a thorough review, we find none of the issues raised warrant relief and we therefore affirm the conviction and sentence.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of aggravated vehicular homicide and driving on a revoked license. He was sentenced to 25 years for aggravated vehicular homicide and a concurrent six months for driving on a revoked license. The defendant contends in this appeal that (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (2) a facially invalid judgment for a prior DUI conviction was used to enhance his conviction to aggravated vehicular homicide; and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted at a bench trial of three counts of aggravated assault and received an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) he was denied the right to testify; and (3) the sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

Through his 2000 post-conviction petition, Melvin Peacock seeks to avoid his 1996 Davidson County jury convictions of possession of cocaine for resale and felony possession of a weapon, for which he received an effective sentence of 20 years. After appointing post-conviction counsel and holding an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's single issue of whether he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the lower court denied post-conviction relief. Because the record supports the court's decision, we affirm.

The petitioner, Michael M. Taylor, has filed a petition for post-conviction relief to challenge his 1997 second degree murder conviction imposed after a jury trial in the Davidson County Criminal Court. The petition alleges the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and two trial court errors. After the appointment of counsel and counsel's amendment of the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Subsequently, the post-conviction court made findings of fact and on November 13, 2000 entered an order denying post-conviction relief. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal on February 23, 2001. Because the notice of the appeal was untimely and because the record contains no for basis for excusing the untimely filing of notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant was tried by jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court on two counts of felony possession of marijuana arising from a single episode. The jury acquitted the defendant of possession of marijuana with intent to sell but convicted him of possession with intent to deliver. The trial court ordered a two-year workhouse sentence. On appeal, the defendant questions the sufficiency of the evidence, and he complains that erroneous evidentiary rulings, inadequate jury instructions, and prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments require a new trial. Based upon our review, we affirm the conviction.

A claim that a guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because of coercion is not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. We affirm the trial court's denial of the writ.

The petitioner, Jose D. Holmes, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Shelby County from his conviction of especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal, the petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.