APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Russell Lane Overby, appeals from the Hardin County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On December 8, 1997, Overby was found guilty of rape by a Hardin County jury, and was sentenced to a term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this collateral attack of his rape conviction, Overby alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, both at trial and on direct appeal. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted of reckless aggravated assault and sentenced as a Standard Range I offender to two (2) years, with all but ten (10) days suspended. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendant acted recklessly in causing serious bodily injury to the victim. However, applying the appropriate factors for consideration, we conclude that the defendant is eligible for judicial diversion, and there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for judicial diversion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

The Petitioner was convicted by a Cocke County jury of seven counts of selling cocaine and one count of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied postconviction relief, and this appeal ensued. Concluding that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was found guilty of violating the state speeding law by the Fairview City Court and, on appeal, was again found guilty by the Circuit Court of Williamson County. In this appeal, defendant contends he was denied his constitutional right to trial by jury, and the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Although we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, we conclude defendant was deprived of his right to trial by jury. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The defendant was convicted by a Davidson County jury of DUI. In this appeal, he alleges the Vehicular Crimes Grand Jury, which was convened in Davidson County to consider only vehicle-related crimes, was illegally empaneled. He further contends the investigatory stop of his automobile was improper. We affirm.

The appellant, Walter McGill, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery by an authority figure and was sentenced to five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant him full probation, or, in the alternative, split confinement. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jack Clayton Moberly, Jr., was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of ten years for the aggravated robbery conviction, two years for the conspiracy to commit robbery conviction, and four years for the aggravated assault conviction. The defendant appeals his aggravated robbery conviction, claiming that the indictment fails to allege that offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted an extraordinary appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 10(a), to consider the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of the defendant’s ex parte motion seeking funds for expert services, as outlined in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13 and the holding in State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. 1995). We stayed the trial court’s proceedings pending our consideration of this issue. Upon a thorough review of the record in this case, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we reverse the ruling of the trial court, remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion, and lift the previously ordered stay so that trial court proceedings may resume.

The defendant, Hamadi G. Haley, was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder, 17 years for the especially aggravated robbery, and eight years for the aggravated robbery, with all terms to be served concurrently. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that he was denied access to material witnesses by the state and that he should have been granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Appellant, Christopher Campbell, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court following his jury conviction for aggravated robbery. At sentencing, the trial court ordered that Campbell's eight-year sentence in this case be served consecutively to three prior convictions for aggravated robbery. On appeal, Campbell argues that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. Because the trial court failed to recite any reasons for imposing consecutive sentences as required by Rule 32, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, we are unable to perform appellate review of the sentencing issue. Accordingly, the case is remanded for determination of consecutive sentencing as provided by Rule 32.

The defendant appeals his convictions for aggravated burglary and possession of burglary tools. After a review of the record, we conclude that the defendant was not prejudiced by the State’s failure to redact an obscure reference to the defendant’s probation status from an audio taped statement that was played at trial. However, we are unable to find sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant had a hammer and screwdriver in his automobile with the intent to commit burglary. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools, a Class A misdemeanor, is reversed and dismissed. The aggravated burglary conviction is affirmed.

The Appellant, Nakia Rumph, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2000, Rumph pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, Rumph challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court dismissing the petition.

The Appellant, Elwood Jeffrey Barrigher, appeals the judgment of the Obion County Circuit Court revoking his placement in the Community Corrections program and reinstating his original nine-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Prior to his revocation, Barrigher was serving a nine-year Community Corrections sentence, which stemmed from his 1999 class B felony conviction for delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the revocation.

The defendant, Johnny Moffitt, entered a plea of guilt to second degree murder. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 10 years. By agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37. The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court should have dismissed the charge due to the loss or destruction of evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant appeals his convictions of rape of a child and incest. We conclude that the State did not improperly bolster the victim's testimony on direct examination. In addition, the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him or to an impartial jury when the trial court denied his request to question a non-witness about an alleged statement made out-of-court. Furthermore, the State was not obligated to disclose the contents of a Department of Human Services file requested by the defendant under Brady v. Maryland or Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. We must, however, reverse the defendant's conviction of incest and remand for a new trial on Count Two based upon the State's failure to make a proper election for the offense. We, therefore, affirm the rape of a child conviction, reverse the conviction of incest, and remand for a new trial.

The appellant, Jacky E. Jones, was found guilty by a jury in the Blount County Circuit Court of one count of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud and was sentenced to three years incarceration in the Blount County Jail. The trial court later granted the appellant probation. Months into the service of his probationary sentence, the appellant stopped reporting to his probation officer. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and sentenced him to serve his original sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to sentence him to community corrections after revoking his probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, El Paso Pitts, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and argues that the trial court erred by allowing his trial counsel to be present during the evidentiary hearing. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Sylvester Ford, was tried by jury and found guilty of one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve twenty years as a Range I offender. The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The defendant now brings this appeal, alleging that he should receive a new trial because the trial court committed plain error by failing to require the state to elect which acts the jury should consider to support the defendant's indicted offenses. The defendant subsequently filed a writ of error coram nobis, and the trial court denied the defendant's petition, finding that the petition was untimely filed and did not allege information that would warrant a new trial. After reviewing the record, we find that the defendant's direct appeal claim has merit and warrants a new trial, and, therefore, we need not address the merits of the defendant's coram nobis petition.

I am unable to join with the majority in affirming dismissal of the petition upon grounds that it was time-barred.