APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denying her post-conviction relief from her especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnaping convictions and resulting concurrent fifteen-year sentences that she received in 2000 based upon her pleas of guilty. She contends that her guilty pleas resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel misadvised her about the percentage of her sentence that she would have to serve in confinement. We affirm the trial court's denial of relief.

The defendant, Otis Campbell, was convicted of two misdemeanor counts of a three-count indictment and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively to each other as well as to two other sentences for which he had earlier been placed into the community corrections program. He timely appealed, presenting as his sole argument the claim that the trial court erred in ordering that all of the sentences be served consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After pleading guilty to aggravated assault and receiving a sentence of split confinement of three years with nine months to be served day-for-day, defendant appeals her sentence. She requests full probation or allowance of good conduct credits while serving the incarceration portion of her sentence. We affirm the denial of full probation and reverse that portion of the sentence that provides day-for-day service. We hold that a defendant sentenced to the county jail for less than one year is entitled to earn good conduct credits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-111(b).

The defendant, Paul Payne, Jr., was convicted in a bench trial of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days and suspended all but 48 hours. The defendant was fined $350.00. In this appeal of right, the defendant complains that the stop of his vehicle was unlawful, that the evidence at trial was insufficient, and that there was no reasonable basis for the administration of the blood alcohol test. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Eric Wallace, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issues presented for review are (1) whether the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel; (2) whether the petitioner was denied the right to a speedy trial; and (3) whether the state used improper impeachment evidence. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, the order denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The defendant, Thaddeus Morris, was convicted of three counts of assault, three counts of reckless aggravated assault, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of carjacking following a jury trial. The trial court merged the three assault convictions with the three reckless aggravated assault convictions and the aggravated robbery conviction with the carjacking conviction. The defendant was sentenced to seven years, six months for each of the reckless aggravated assault convictions, with two of the sentences to be served concurrently and the third to be served consecutively. For the carjacking conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twelve years to be served consecutively to the third reckless aggravated assault sentence, for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for carjacking and aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erred by not including "moral certainty" in its jury instruction on reasonable doubt; (3) cumulative error occurred during the trial; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Annetta Bell, was convicted after a bench trial of theft of property having a value less than $500.00. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days. All but six months was suspended. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction.

Pursuant to a bench trial, the appellant, Greg Stewart, was convicted of two counts of simple possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the appellant to two concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Coffee County Jail. On appeal, the appellant contests the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the drug evidence due to the lack of proper consent to the search. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Willie G. Lofton, appeals his conviction for driving under the influence. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury as to the offense of driving while impaired as a lesser included of driving under the influence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Darrell S. Miller, was convicted by a jury in the Benton County Circuit Court of two counts of possessing controlled substances with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspending all but one year and placing the appellant in a community corrections program for the remainder. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted drug exhibits; (2) whether the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of Stacy Mumper regarding a prior transaction between the appellant and Mumper's companion; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (4) whether the trial court approved the verdict as thirteenth juror; and (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial when the appellant produced sworn affidavits that Brenda Wynn perjured herself on the witness stand. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served at seventy-five percent. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court incorrectly applied two enhancement factors, thereby causing his sentences to be excessive, and (2) whether the trial court erred by ordering that certain of his sentences run consecutively. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Antonio Dewayne Carpenter, was indicted for premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. The state filed notice seeking the death penalty. The defendant was convicted on each count of the indictment and the trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court ordered concurrent twenty-year sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery. All of these sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to three life sentences for federal convictions stemming from the same incident. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the dual sovereignty doctrine, which permits successive federal and state prosecutions for the same acts, should be abandoned. The judgments are affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, with the murder convictions merged into a single conviction for first degree murder following the jury's verdict. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment on the murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years on the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to be served concurrently to the life sentence. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed a timely appeal to this court, raising four issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony about a statement of denial he made to police; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing a photograph of the victim's body to be introduced into evidence; and (4) whether the jury should have been instructed that the State had taken the position, in a dismissed conspiracy indictment, that the defendant's accomplice was the shooter. After a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

The Defendant, Harold D. Arnold, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant and failure to maintain an accurate log book after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the results of a breath analysis test. The Defendant properly reserved a certified question of law for this Court to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Yevette Somerville, was convicted of theft of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail. As her sole issue on appeal, the defendant argues that the State’s failure to inquire about and preserve potentially exculpatory evidence violated her due process rights under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the loss of the evidence did not unfairly prejudice the defendant’s case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On October 5, 1998, the defendant, Barry Dunham, pled guilty in the Macon County Criminal Court to one count of second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant filed for post-conviction relief which was granted by the post-conviction court. The State now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for new trial.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing with intent to sell less than 0.5 grams of a substance containing cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to five years incarceration in the workhouse. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for five years. Approximately four months later, a warrant was issued against the Defendant alleging that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The warrant alleged that the Defendant had been arrested for evading arrest and aggravated assault, that the Defendant had failed to report these arrests to his probation officer, and that the Defendant had failed to report to his probation officer after being released from jail. Following a hearing on the warrant, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant now brings this appeal, in which he challenges the trial court's order requiring him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted in Wayne County Circuit Court of five counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The Defendant received an effective sentence of seventy-five years incarceration. This Court subsequently reversed the five rape of a child convictions and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the remaining two twelve-year sentences for aggravated sexual battery should be served consecutively or concurrently. The trial court determined that the sentences should be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-four years incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering that the Defendant's sentences for aggravated sexual battery run consecutively. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case returns to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The defendant appeals his jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and especially
aggravated robbery. He raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant’s request for a mistrial based on a juror’s response during voir dire; (2) whether the trial court erred in directing a witness to answer questions on cross-examination; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to certain lesser-included offenses. This court initially reversed the appellant’s
conviction for aggravated assault, based on double jeopardy considerations, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court on all other issues. See State v. Reginald Merriweather, No. W1999-
2050-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 242570 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, March 6, 2001) (perm. to appeal granted). On June 5, 2001, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of State v. Curtis
Jason Ely and State v. Laconia Lamar Bowers, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001). In Ely and Bowers, the Court announced new standards regarding the duty to instruct on lesser-included offenses. In
light of the decision in Ely and Bowers, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this court to determine whether error in not instructing facilitation was harmless. See State v. Reginald Merriweather, No. W2001-02206-CCA-RM-CD, Madison County (Tenn., September 10, 2001).  After revisiting this issue under the standards announced in Ely and Bowers, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand this matter for a new trial. 

Because Ely and Bowers involve the issue of lesser-included offenses only, the remand does not alter the analyses in our original opinion as to other issues. However, the necessity of a new trial does render premature our earlier determination to dismiss the conviction for aggravated assault. So as to avoid confusion, sections I and II from our original opinion will be restated in their entirety.  Sections III and IV, dealing with the conviction for aggravated assault and the issue of lesser-included offenses, have been changed.