APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, who had three convictions for DUI, was incarcerated after the suspended portion of his most recent DUI sentence had been revoked because of a fourth arrest for DUI and his failure to report the new arrest to his probation officer. The following month, the defendant was released on a four-day furlough to attend his grandmother's funeral in Louisiana, and, apparently because of the late hour when the release occurred, the conditions of his release were not explained. Two hours later, the defendant was seen by a jail deputy at a nearby Hooter's Restaurant, as he drank a beer with his brothers, whom he had met there for the journey to Louisiana. Following a hearing, he was held in contempt of court for consuming an alcoholic beverage while on furlough and sentenced to ten days confinement to be served consecutively to the sentence for which he then was incarcerated. He timely appealed that ruling, arguing that since the conditions of the furlough had not been explained to him, the evidence was insufficient for the finding that he was in contempt of court. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Ben Mills, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder, one count of felony murder, one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. For the remaining convictions, the trial court imposed sentences as follows: eight years as a standard, Range I offender for aggravated robbery to be served concurrently with the life sentence, and 15 years as a standard, Range I offender for each attempted first degree murder conviction to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentences for first degree murder and aggravated robbery. The effective sentence, therefore, is life plus 15 years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding all of the lesser included offenses of felony murder; and (3) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on intoxication. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. The judgment for first degree murder is modified to reflect that the conviction for felony murder is merged into the conviction for premeditated first degree murder.

A Lauderdale County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for robbery, and following a trial, a Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant of the offense charged. In this direct appeal, the defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction; (2) whether evidence introduced at trial was illegally obtained in contravention of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights; (3) whether the defendant was deprived of an "independent analysis of the evidence"; and (4) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury. Finding no error in the record, we affirm the defendant's conviction.

Convicted by a jury of third-offense driving while under the influence (DUI), the defendant, Jacquie Upchurch Giardina, challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and her sentence of eleven months and 29 days to be served in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the conviction and the sentence.

The petitioner, Yasmond Fenderson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief to challenge his Knox County convictions of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing but denied post-conviction relief. The petitioner appeals and claims the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding that the record supports the post-conviction court's denial of relief, we affirm.

Defendant, Gregory Scott Payne, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of sexual battery, one count of attempted rape, and two counts of rape. Following a trial, the jury found defendant guilty of one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony, as a lesser-included offense of one of the rape charges, and not guilty of the remaining offenses. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant as a standard Range I offender to two years in confinement. In this appeal, defendant asserts that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike the victim's testimony or declare a mistrial (based on the failure of the police to produce the taped recording of the victim's statement). Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence length and by denying him probation or any other form of alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner originally pled guilty to aggravated rape and, by agreement, was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Petitioner timely sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted of DUI and driving in violation of a Habitual Traffic Offender Order. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence corroborating the defendant's statement that he was driving. Furthermore, the trial court is presumed to have fulfilled its role as thirteenth juror when, as in the instant case, the trial court overrules a defendant's motion for new trial without comment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for driving on a revoked license. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment

The petitioner appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition. The issue presented for appeal is whether the petitioner's post-conviction petition is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Kardius Wilks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Wilks contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his first degree murder conviction because the State failed to prove that the murder was premeditated and intentionally committed. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After the defendant's arrest for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, a Shelby County General Sessions Court conducted a preliminary hearing to determine if there was probable cause to support his arrest. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the court dismissed the defendant's case. However, a Shelby County grand jury later indicted the defendant for first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. Pursuant to a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve twenty years in confinement. The defendant now brings this appeal, challenging his conviction on the basis that (1) he was denied an opportunity to review the preliminary hearing tape, which was destroyed, and that (2) the trial court refused to admit certain testimony to cure this deficiency. After reviewing these claims, we find that neither of them merit relief. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions.

The defendant, Larry Brooks, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, vandalism, and theft up to $500. The defendant was subsequently sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty years for the robbery, ten years for the assault, ten years for the burglary, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each of the misdemeanors, all sentences to run concurrently. In this direct appeal the defendant raises four issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant more than forty-five days after the jury verdict; and (4) whether the trial court erred in classifying the defendant as a persistent offender in imposing sentence. Finding that principles of double jeopardy prohibit the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and theft, we reverse and dismiss those convictions. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Russell Lane Overby, appeals from the Hardin County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On December 8, 1997, Overby was found guilty of rape by a Hardin County jury, and was sentenced to a term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this collateral attack of his rape conviction, Overby alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, both at trial and on direct appeal. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted of reckless aggravated assault and sentenced as a Standard Range I offender to two (2) years, with all but ten (10) days suspended. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendant acted recklessly in causing serious bodily injury to the victim. However, applying the appropriate factors for consideration, we conclude that the defendant is eligible for judicial diversion, and there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for judicial diversion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

The defendant was convicted of intentionally evading arrest in an automobile, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to six years incarceration. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by classifying him as a career offender. Concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's determination that the defendant is a career offender, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for re-sentencing.

The Petitioner was convicted by a Cocke County jury of seven counts of selling cocaine and one count of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied postconviction relief, and this appeal ensued. Concluding that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was found guilty of violating the state speeding law by the Fairview City Court and, on appeal, was again found guilty by the Circuit Court of Williamson County. In this appeal, defendant contends he was denied his constitutional right to trial by jury, and the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Although we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, we conclude defendant was deprived of his right to trial by jury. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The defendant was convicted by a Davidson County jury of DUI. In this appeal, he alleges the Vehicular Crimes Grand Jury, which was convened in Davidson County to consider only vehicle-related crimes, was illegally empaneled. He further contends the investigatory stop of his automobile was improper. We affirm.

The appellant, Walter McGill, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery by an authority figure and was sentenced to five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant him full probation, or, in the alternative, split confinement. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jack Clayton Moberly, Jr., was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of ten years for the aggravated robbery conviction, two years for the conspiracy to commit robbery conviction, and four years for the aggravated assault conviction. The defendant appeals his aggravated robbery conviction, claiming that the indictment fails to allege that offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted an extraordinary appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 10(a), to consider the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of the defendant’s ex parte motion seeking funds for expert services, as outlined in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13 and the holding in State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. 1995). We stayed the trial court’s proceedings pending our consideration of this issue. Upon a thorough review of the record in this case, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we reverse the ruling of the trial court, remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion, and lift the previously ordered stay so that trial court proceedings may resume.