APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Charles H. Martin, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike handwritten portions of the indictment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Scotty Dewayne Robinson, pled guilty to Class D felony theft pursuant to a plea agreement recommending the imposition of a three-year sentence to be served consecutively to a federal sentence. The trial court accepted the defendant's plea of guilty and imposed the recommended sentence. In this appeal, the defendant argues the trial court improperly sentenced him. We conclude the defendant has no appeal as of right of his sentence since it was a part of a plea agreement in which the defendant waived the right to appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant was indicted for operation of a motor vehicle after being declared an habitual offender. Following a bench trial, he was convicted of the indicted offense. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

The Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to attempted aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant received a four-year sentence, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve the four-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that he should have received some form of alternative sentencing. Concluding that the record supports the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James D. Newland, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revoking his probation that was ordered for his guilty plea to rape. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal by the petitioner, Roy Lane, involves both a delayed appeal from his first degree murder conviction and an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. In the delayed appeal, the petitioner contends that the Cocke County Circuit Court (1) improperly admitted evidence about the petitioner's prior bad acts and (2) gave erroneous jury instructions. In the post-conviction appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As to the petitioner's delayed appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err and affirm his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. As to his post-conviction petition, we affirm the trial court's finding that the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel.

The appellants, Ronald Eugene Rickman and William Edward Groseclose, appeal their convictions by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of, respectively, first degree murder and being an accessory before the fact to first degree murder. In this appeal, appellant Groseclose presents the following issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to sever his trial from that of co-defendant Rickman; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting at trial the former testimony of Barton Wayne Mount; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony by Gary King; and (4) whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt. Appellant Rickman solely challenges the introduction at trial of Mount's former testimony. Following a careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of the judgments to reflect the appellants' receipt of credit for time served in the Tennessee Department of Correction prior to trial. We affirm the judgments in all other respects

The Appellant, Robbie Gene Powers, challenges his convictions for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense; driving on a revoked license, third offense; and violation of the implied consent law. The Appellant received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months and five days of incarceration in the county jail. On appeal, the Appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside or declare void two prior DUI convictions, which were used for enhancement purposes; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) his sentences were excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Obion County Circuit Court.

The defendant, Ted Ray Brannan, was found guilty by a Franklin County jury of aggravated burglary and theft of property. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years, ten years as a Range III persistent offender for his aggravated burglary conviction to be served concurrently with his twelve year sentence as a career offender for his theft of property conviction. The defendant appealed his conviction to this Court, and we dismissed the appeal, finding that the appeal was not properly before this Court because the defendant had failed to file a timely motion for new trial or a timely notice of appeal. See State v. Ted Ray Brannan, No. 01C01-9704-CC-00148, 1998 WL 242453, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, May 15, 1998). The defendant then sought post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court found that the defendant was deprived of a direct appeal because his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for new trial or a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the post-conviction court granted the defendant a delayed appeal. However, the court found that the defendant's other allegations of error were meritless. The defendant is now before this Court on a delayed appeal challenging the post-conviction court's finding that his other post-conviction issues lacked merit. Although we find that the lower court should have dismissed the post-conviction petition when granting him a delayed appeal, in the interest of judicial economy, we will address the issues pertaining to the post-conviction petition as well as those in his direct appeal. Having found that all the issues in this appeal lack merit, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

The state brings this interlocutory appeal in which it challenges the order of the Rutherford County Circuit Court authorizing the admission into evidence of certain testimony relating to the prior sexual behavior of the alleged rape victim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The appellants, Tyce Jackson and Larry Simmons, were initially charged with delinquency in a juvenile petition filed in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County. This petition arose out of two separate car jackings occurring in October of 1997. A hearing was held in the juvenile court upon the State's petition to transfer the appellants to criminal court for trial as adults. Finding that the appellants should be tried as adults, the juvenile court transferred the case to the Montgomery County Criminal Court.

The appellants appealed their transfer by way of a petition for the writ of certiorari filed in the criminal court. The criminal court denied the writ. The appellants were indicted on two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of carjacking, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of illegal weapon possession and one count of aggravated assault. Both appellants ultimately entered guilty pleas in criminal court to one count of aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated assault. They each received concurrent sentences of ten and six years respectively. As part of the plea agreement the appellants reserved a certified question of law concerning the standard used by the juvenile court in transferring the appellants for trial as adults. The appellants claim that because proof at the transfer hearing showed them to be "voluntarily committable" to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally ill they were not subject to transfer for trial as adults. In addition, Appellant Simmons alleges that the evidence at the transfer hearing failed to adequately identify him as a perpetrator of the offenses.

We find that while Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(4)(B) prohibits the transfer to criminal court of juveniles who are "involuntarily committable" to a mental health facility, no such prohibition exists with respect to juveniles whose mental disorders might make them subject to voluntary admission to a mental health facility. In addition, we find that Appellant Simmons has failed to present this Court with a record sufficient to permit review of the issue concerning his identity as a perpetrator of the offenses at issue in this appeal. The judgments, conviction and sentences are therefore affirmed.

The Defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of vehicular homicide by intoxication and reckless driving. He received an effective sentence of nine and a half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to convict him of the charged offenses and (2) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Larry Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of theft of property with a value over $500.00 and evading arrest. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to six years for the theft charge and eleven months and twenty-nine days for evading arrest. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the Defendant's conviction for evading arrest and reverse and dismiss his conviction for theft of property.

Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea and motion for a new trial. On appeal, defendant has two assertions: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the State committed a Brady violation. Concluding that defendant received effective assistance of counsel and did not demonstrate a Brady violation, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Williamson County Grand Jury returned separate, one-count presentments against the defendant, Tracy T. Bostic, charging him with felony sale or delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417, and with felony sale or delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance, in violation of Code section 39-17-423. The defendant was tried and convicted on the controlled substance charge, and the trial court imposed an incarcerative sentence of nine years as a Range II, multiple offender and assessed a $25,000 fine. The defendant elected to forego a trial on the counterfeit controlled substance charge, and he entered a “blind” guilty plea to that offense, for which he received a three-year incarcerative sentence as a Range II, multiple offender, which was ordered to be served consecutively to the nine-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence upon which his controlled substance conviction rests, and he complains about the length and manner of service of his combined sentences and about the $25,000 fine. Based upon our review of the video record in this case and our consideration of the briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and the incarcerative portion of his sentences, but we modify the $25,000 fine imposed to $15,000.

The petitioner originally pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to one count of aggravated assault for an agreed eight-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender. He timely sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective, and his guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm.

Petitioner, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. Petitioner claims counsel failed to adequately investigate evidence and properly file a motion for new trial and an amended motion for new trial. We conclude counsel was not ineffective and affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

A Madison County jury convicted the petitioner and his co-defendants of felony murder, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated burglary, and theft over five hundred dollars. See State v. Montez Antuan Adams, No. 02C01-9709-CC-00352, 1998 WL 556174, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Sept. 1, 1998). For these offenses the petitioner effectively received a life sentence. Id. On appeal this Court reduced the especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary and announced the corresponding sentence for this offense with respect to the petitioner and each of his co-defendants; however, the remainder of the convictions were affirmed, and the effective sentence remained the same. Id. at *1, *9. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and received appointed counsel thereon. At the evidentiary hearing on this petition, the petitioner unsuccessfully pursued an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Through this appeal he continues to aver that he received ineffective assistance because counsel did not fully discuss potential trial tactics and strategies with him, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to aid in his defense. After considering this matter, we determine that the petitioner has failed to prove that this claim merits relief. As such, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petitioner's post-conviction petition.

The defendant brings this interlocutory appeal in which he challenges the prosecutor's denial of pretrial diversion for simple assault and the trial court's denial of his certiorari petition. We conclude the prosecutor properly considered the need for deterrence for domestic violence, the defendant's lack of remorse and failure to take responsibility for his actions, and the seriousness of the offense and its impact upon the victim. However, we conclude the prosecutor wrongfully considered certain factors relating to domestic violence cases that have no application to the circumstances of this case, and wrongfully considered the defendant's depression for which he takes prescription medication. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand this matter to the district attorney general for further consideration in accordance with this opinion.

The Defendant, Kenneth Javon Bills, was convicted by a jury of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to ten years for the attempted murder and four years for the aggravated assault, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether double jeopardy principles require dismissal of his aggravated assault conviction; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting certain rap lyrics authored by the Defendant; and (4) whether his sentence is excessive. Finding that double jeopardy principles prohibit the Defendant's dual convictions, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Cory James Martin, was indicted for two counts of rape of a child and three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. After granting a motion to suppress two incriminating statements made by the defendant prior to his arrest, the trial court permitted the state an application for permission to appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this interlocutory appeal, the state asserts that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress. Because the defendant was not in custody at the time of the statements and Miranda warnings were not required, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial.

The Defendant, John Wayne Slate, Sr., appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief. The Defendant contends the trial court improperly dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Shanta Lavett McKinney, pled guilty to one count of automobile burglary; one count of theft over $1000; one count of misdemeanor assault; and one count of theft under $500. He was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to one year, six months for the auto burglary; three years for the theft over $1000; eleven months, twenty-nine days for the assault; and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft under $500, all sentences running concurrently. Under separate indictment, the Defendant pled guilty to four counts of aggravated burglary; one count of theft between $500 and $1000; and three counts of theft under $500. He was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years for each of the burglaries; one year six months for the theft over $500; and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each of the thefts under $500. These sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the previously mentioned sentences, for an effective sentence of eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal the Defendant challenges both the length of his felony sentences and the trial court's denial of an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted for second degree murder, convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, and subsequently sentenced to a term of six years. In this appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the state improperly cross-examined him concerning his use of illegal drugs; (3) the district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument; (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury concerning the weight to be given the defendant's testimony; and (5) the defendant's sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.