APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Madison County deputy jailer saw a plastic bag of 2.5 grams of cocaine fall from the defendant's crotch area as he removed his clothing for a strip search after his arrest for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The defendant was subsequently convicted of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the introduction of contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony. He argues on appeal that he cannot be convicted of introduction of contraband into a penal institution when his entrance into the jail was involuntary, and that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. Based on our review of the record and of applicable law, we conclude that a voluntary entrance into a penal institution is not a requirement of the offense, and that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the defendant's convictions in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Travis Jones, Jr., appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On March 22, 2000, Jones, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, entered "best interest" pleas to two counts of second degree murder. As provided by the plea agreement, Jones was sentenced by the Davidson County Criminal Court to consecutive fifteen-year terms for each conviction. On appeal, Jones challenges the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition, arguing that he was "forced" into pleading guilty due to trial counsel's inadequate pre-trial preparation. Finding no error, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant for first degree murder, and the State elected to seek the death penalty in this case. Following the guilt phase of the defendant's bifurcated trial, the trial jury convicted him as charged. At the close of the sentencing phase, the trial jury further found that the evidence supported the existence of the alleged aggravating factor but concluded that this factor did not outweigh the mitigating factors. The jury, therefore, sentenced the defendant to serve a life term without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, the defendant filed a new trial motion which the trial court denied. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in barring him from the courtroom because of his outbursts in the jury's presence; (3) that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after deciding that the defendant could not be present at his trial because of these outbursts; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting three letters written by the defendant; and (5) that the prosecution, in its closing argument, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense by commenting on a witness mentioned by the defense in its opening statement but not called to testify at trial. Upon reviewing these issues, we find that none merit relief and, therefore, affirm the defendant's conviction.

The defendant pled guilty to the offense of carjacking and was sentenced to 7.2 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal he claims that he was improperly denied probation because the trial judge mistakenly held that individuals convicted of carjacking were statutorily ineligible for probation. We hold that the legislature has allowed individuals convicted of carjacking and sentenced to eight (8) years or less to remain eligible for probation. Moreover, the trial judge also erred in determining that the use of a weapon in a carjacking was, standing alone, sufficient reason to deny the defendant probation. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.

The petitioner, John Paul Seals, appeals as of right the Hamblen County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which the court deemed to be filed outside of the statute of limitations. He contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for the appointment of an additional psychological expert in order that he might prove that his mental incompetence tolled the statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The appellant, Joseph Antonio Hough, was convicted of two counts of delivering cocaine and was sentenced as a Range II offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court committed legal error by allowing the appellant to represent himself, and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Lester Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the petitioner contends (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and (2) that the trial judge who presided over the revocation hearing was not impartial. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Gerald E. Saylor, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years imprisonment. The defendant appeals, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession; (3) the trial court erred in excluding testimony that several hours before the killing the victim had stated to a third party that he was going to kill the defendant; (4) the trial court erred in excluding testimony to rebut the state's inference that the defendant planted weapons on the victim and that the victim had made prior threats to the defendant; (5) the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial when the jury heard references to his being "on parole" and "on the run"; and (6) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors to his sentence. Although we conclude that enhancement factor (5) regarding exceptional cruelty should not have been applied, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Shane Powell, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder by aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child abuse. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder, and to a concurrent term of twenty years for the aggravated child abuse. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; the admission of proof of a prior alleged instance of child abuse; and the constitutionality of his dual convictions for felony murder by aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child abuse. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robyn Renee Rainer, pled guilty to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and deliver. Her plea agreement included an agreed sentence of eight years as a Range I standard offender, with the manner of service to be imposed by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court placed the Defendant on community corrections. Following the Defendant's second violation of the terms of her community corrections sentence, the trial court revoked the Defendant's community corrections status and ordered that her sentence be served in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals the trial court's ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, James McFall, was found guilty by a jury of violating a motor vehicle habitual offender order. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant as a multiple, Range II offender to three years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the indictment; the sufficiency of the evidence; the trial court's instructions to the jury; and the efficacy of the State's Notice of Intent to Seek Enhanced Punishment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and received a three-year suspended sentence. Approximately nine months later, a probation violation warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging that the Defendant had violated his probated sentence by failing to report and by failing to attend a sexual perpetrators program. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve his sentence. This appeal followed. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Christopher Ray Smith, entered “best-interest” pleas of guilty to one count of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, Smith was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty-five years for aggravated rape and twelve years for aggravated robbery. Additionally, the trial court ordered this effective thirty-seven year sentence to be served consecutively to outstanding aggravated robbery and theft convictions from Humphreys
and Dickson Counties. On appeal, Smith contends the trial court erred in (1) imposing consecutive sentences for his aggravated rape and aggravated robbery convictions and (2) ordering that his Williamson County sentences be served consecutively to his Humphreys County and Dickson County sentences. Finding no error, the judgment of the Williamson County Circuit Court is affirmed.

The petitioner, William Brian Belser, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count each of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to nineteen years incarceration on each count, to be served concurrently. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. Concluding that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel and that the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Edward Korik, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court's ordering him to serve forty-five days in jail for his guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. He contends that this court should remand his case to the general sessions court, where it originated, with orders that the general sessions court consider his request for work release instead of incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner pled guilty in state court to second degree murder and aggravated assault. Petitioner contends he was told by trial counsel that a pending first degree murder charge in state court would result in incarceration for life without parole in federal court on related charges. He asserts that trial counsel's performance was deficient resulting in unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas. We disagree and affirm.

The appellant, Timothy Tyrone Sanders, was convicted in the Bedford County Circuit Court of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell. On direct appeal, this court reversed the appellant's conviction because the trial court failed to properly charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession, and we remanded the case for retrial. State v. Timothy Tyrone Sanders, No. M2000-00603-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38, at **13-14 (Nashville, January 18, 2001). Subsequently, the appellant was once again convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II offender to seventeen years and six months incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In the instant appeal, the appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) whether the trial court erred in determining the length of his sentence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to one count of child abuse, a Class D felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years to be served on intensive probation. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him judicial diversion and by imposing as a condition of his probation that he not reside in the same household with children of "tender years." Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On March 6, 1997, the defendant pled guilty to a two-count indictment for passing worthless checks in an amount over $10,000, a Class C felony, and in an amount over $1,000, a Class D felony. He was granted judicial diversion and placed on probation. The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant's diversion and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of four years and six months for the Class C felony and two years for the Class D felony, all suspended except seven months service in the county jail. In this appeal, the defendant contends he should have received full probation or community corrections upon being revoked from judicial diversion. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of theft over $500.00, two counts of theft over $1000.00, and driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. He was given an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. The trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after considering and weighing the proper factors and principles set out under sentencing law, and the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.The defendant was convicted of theft over $500.00, two counts of theft over $1000.00, and driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. He was given an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. The trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after considering and weighing the proper factors and principles set out under sentencing law, and the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, appeals as of right from his convictions and sentences for aggravated rape, rape, aggravated robbery, robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an aggregate sentence of sixty-six years. The convictions relate to four victims and result from two trials that were consolidated for this appeal. The defendant raises numerous issues. Although we conclude that several errors occurred, only one requires reversal of any convictions. Because of improper consolidation, we reverse the judgments for the three aggravated rape convictions and one especially aggravated kidnapping conviction relating to the victim, D.C., but we affirm the remaining judgments of conviction.